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ABSTRACT 
Postmodernism privileges figures of negativity, figures defined under such terms as 
alterity, absence, aporia and the Other. The ostensible function of these tropes is the 
disruption of logocentrism through the introduction of the indeterminate. However, by 
arguing that the 'metaphysics of presence' is all that exists in social communication, 
alterity can be reinterpreted as a metanarrative trope whose language and function 
repeat attributes previously defined by theology. Much postmodem fiction, with its 
indeterminate style, acts like a negative theology by systematically negating other 
thematic presences in the text in order to present alterity itself as a dominant with final 
jurisdiction over all areas of language and being. Because of its dominance, this 
alterity comes to exercise conceptual powers akin to the metaphysical expressions of 
the divine: ineffability, infinity, omnipotence, atemporality, ethical force. The 
religious and mystical references that often crowd postmodem fiction, therefore, 
support alterity's shift from the aporetic to the transcendent. By examining 
metaphysical alterity in postmodem treatments of character, death, allegory and 
history, I argue that postmodem literature is a limited theological discourse that 
questions postmodem pluralism and populism. The reified negative has such a 
privilege in postmodernism that it creates an aporetic politics that is only capable of 
representing otherness rather than others. I suggest that this is a 'natural' philosophy 
for late-capitalism in that it refuses broad social praxis in favour of a value-free 
market and anti-foundational argument. I set aside Salman Rushdie as someone whose 
fiction manages to use metaphysics and fragmentation in a non-transcendental 
manner. Rushdie locates meaning in the dialogue between the metaphysical and the 
material, rather than an abstracted absence and presence, and thus he is able to portray 
metanarratives without transcendence or dogmatism. As such, Rushdie shows that 
postmodernism's insistence on alterity fafls to engage meaningfully with social 
conditions. 
Introduction 
'In the Country of the Last Things': Postmodernity, Religion and 
Alterity. 
Are we now living in the last days of postmodem ideas? Has the original postmodem 
desire for multiplicity crumbled in the face of nationalist politics, economic 
hegemonies and international conflicts? Just as Lyotard, Hassan and Meyer once 
heralded the death of the humanist logos, there are now resonant voices which write 
equally confident obituaries for the expressions and possibilities of postmodernism: 
I think postmodernism is now dead as a theoretical concept and, more important, as a way of 
developing cultural frameworks influencing how we shape theoretical concepts. With its basic &I 
enabling arguments now sloganized and its efforts to escape binaries binarized, it is unlikely to 
generate much significant new work. ' 
Here Charles Altieri envisages postmodernism's aesthetic, theoretical and social 
terminus, where the language of multiplicity and difference becomes anachronistic 
and banal. His assured vision of the postmodem dead-end seems to reflect a growing 
caginess in many people about postmodernism's ability to meet its original liberatory 
promise, especially in the need to transfer theory into meaningful cultural and political 
action. More particularly, postmodernism has unavoidably wandered into the 
standardisation and codification of its difference and contradiction. Indeed, it does 
seem to be the case that however much postmodemism has embraced the drive 
towards contradiction, it has also created identifiable metanarratives of its own in its 
modes of language and its codes of accessibility. 
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Formulating the metanarratives of postmodernity leads us to perhaps the most 
important dilemma in contemporary theory. Is it actually possible to express 
difference and absence without relying on a general return to totalisation and 
presence? This question is not simply answered by poststructuralism's tenet that we 
can never escape the 'metaphysics of presence'. What needs to be reconsidered is 
whether the metaphysics of presence is all there is within linguistic systems that have 
their telos in communication between social subjects. I will not go on to claim in this 
thesis that there is indeed an indelible bond between word and object. Yet by 
gravitating towards a Bakhtinian sociology, the basis of my argument will be that the 
'free play' of language is always grounded within the communicative demands of a 
particular social body, be that community local, national, or international. By applying 
this perspective, I shall in turn contend that absence and alterity, arguably the 
enigmatic cornerstones of postmodern theory, are figures formed in the social tradition 
seemingly at the top of the anti-foundationalists' hit-list - religion. Postmodem 
theory does not sever the roots of totalisation; it repeats totalisation while trying to 
spiritually set itself apart from critical engagement. 
Perhaps at its source postmodernism requires a new honesty, where instead of 
focusing on the aporetic and differential, it questions what presences it actually creates 
in language and culture through its own theoretical voice. Universals are pervasive 
and necessary, and postmodernism has a peculiar and limited range of metanarratives. 
David Harvey argues that even in the midst of the most demonstrably pluralising 
discourse, a kind of aesthetic and philosophical purity filters back in and reconnects 
multiplicity with universal concepts: 
The cracks in an intellectual edifice that open the way to the empowerment of aesthetics over 
ethics are important. Deconstructionism, like any system of thought and any definition of an 
overwhelming symbolic order, internalizes certain contradictions which at a certain point 
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become more and more self-evident. When Lyotard, for example, seeks to keep his radical 
hopes alive by appeal to some pristine and unsullied concept of justice, he proposes a truth 
statement that lies above the m8lde of interest groups and their cacophony of language games. 
When Hillis Miller is forced to appeal to liberal and positivist values to defend his mentor Paul 
de Man against what he considers the calumny of false accusations, then he, too, invokes 
universalS. 2 
Harvey not only accuses postmodern theorists of being deaf to the full philosophical 
register of their convictions, but also perceives a latent transcendentalism in the 
sublimities often inscribed in postmodern language itself. Such sublimities, I shall 
argue, are usually the inhabitants of the concept of alterity. 'Alterity' (along with the 
synonymous terms 'other', 'difference', 'absence' etc. ), is the central interest of this 
thesis because the term seems to have become the primary trope of a world ostensibly 
without totalisation or logos. Alterity is discursively offered as the nothing which is an 
absolute something, an absence perfectly within and beyond conception and 
description. Yet it is precisely this status of the 'within' and the 'beyond' which 
ultimately destabilises the entire concept of the absolute other or otherness. Alterity is 
not a background radiation of negativity lingering on from the postmodern big-bang 
that destroyed the logos. Instead, alterity seems to be a distinct presence within the 
postmodern sense of self-identity and also a theme which performs specific functions 
within postmodern negotiations of culture, society and art. More generally, I shall 
claim that in many ways alterity is a figure which acts as a kind of intellectual crisis- 
management by ineffectively trying to walk the line between social action and a 
discomfort with universals. Hans Bertens sees this ethical tightrope as a marked 
signature of the contemporary condition: 
After an overlong period in which Enlightenment universalist representationalism dominated 
the scene, and a brief, but turbulent period in which its opposite, radical anti- 
representationalism, captured the imagination, we now find ourselves in the difficult position 
of trying to honor the claims of both, of seeing the values of both representation and anti- c 
representation, of both consensus and dissensus. 3 
Alterity is one way in which postmodernism attempts to arbitrate this indecision, as 
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otherness is used to reclaim a particular mode of social identity while simultaneously 
appearing to defy rigid orders of conceptualisation. Claiming that alterity provides 
basic ontological ingredients is doubtless anathema to the postmodernists, for solid 
identity seems inherent within the metaphysical tradition from which postmodemism 
has tried to escape. Yet I will contend that alterity is squarely within ontological, 
metaphysical and even theological language in terms of both its description and, more 
importantly, its function. Alterity and its equivalent terms are ideas which anchor 
postmodem identity to major ontotheological traditions, traditions which supply the 
foundationalism generally denied by postmodernism. The spiritual allusions of alterity 
will lead me through a discussion of the theological heritage of otherness to claim that 
far from disrupting all logocentricities, alterity actually reactivates notions of the 
oldest logos in global thought. 
A brief history of alterity 
Before venturing into an overview of postmodern alterity, some definitions of the term 
might prove useful, though problematic. Defining alterity is awkward not so much for 
the claim that it is that which escapes representation (I do not believe this to be the 
case), but because it has co-opted such a variety of roles and capacities. However, for 
the time being, we can define alterity as that which eludes and unsettles the authority 
of totalising metanarratives, or, in Derridean tenns, that which occludes any final 
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confidence in a 'transcendental signified'. Alterity is always that which remains 
'other' than presence, a continual silence and absence which prevents the closure of 
language, meaning and reference. As such, it is a useful concept for postmodernism, 
for it can act as a guarantor to the open-endedness of postmodern play and jouissance. 
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Negativity suggests itself as an altemative term for alterity, though it possesses the 
theological aura which alterity ambiguously attempts to resist. Bearing in mind 
Christian traditions of negative theology, which I shall consider in more depth later in 
this chapter, negativity suggests a process of negating certain presences in order to 
attain some comprehension of that which is ironically beyond comprehension. In a 
postmodern context, Wolfgang Iser and Sanford Budick see negativity as speaking for 
a radically present absence within language: 
In its undetermined proliferation, negativity speaks for something that is arguably as real as 
anything else we know, even if it can only be located by carving out a void within what is 
5 being said. 
Iser and Budick have a strong regard for negativity as active influence, something 
which asserts itself as a functional quality within a text. Moreover, through a retrieval 
of absence from language, negativity becomes reified and determinable, an unusual 
presence in itself. This perspective speaks with all the mystical resonance of a 
negative theology, a perspective which Derrida initially resisted (though perhaps less 
so in recent work) when applied to poststructuralist textuality and diffirance. 61 shall 
suggest in this thesis that negativity and alterity, indeed all terms which allude to the 
aporiae within full presence, actually perform the same functions for the discourse of 
postmodemiSM. 7 Briefly stated, these functions are: 
1) to maintain the centrality of the subject; 
2) to retain a belief in meaning that accords with radical individualism; 
3) to replay theological themes as a way of protecting against nihilism and 
deriving ethical, social and psychological authority. 
Points 2) and 3) are linked by the argument that the return to metaphysical origins is 
part of postmodem theory's general complicity with capitalist economic philosophy 
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and an attempt to hold onto an authority protected from genuine social debate. 
Concentration on alterity and negativity is, of course, far from original to 
postmodernity. If we want to discover the roots of alterity, then it is to religion that we 
must look. Almost all religious traditions, be they oriental or occidental, mono-, poly- 
or non-theistic, have embraced or experimented with philosophies of negativity, or the 
via negativa. Veselin Kesick gives a sound working definition of the via negativa as a 
theology that 'refuses to identify God with any human concept or knowledge'. 8 
Digging into this definition, we can see that the negative theology is radically aware of 
the incommensurability between God, and our ideas and words about God. The 
negative divinity resides in a total transcendence and absolute silence that denies the 
possibility of union between the human concept and divine presence. Probably the 
earliest exponent of this theology in the Western world was the sixth-century Syrian 
philosopher Dionysius the Areopagite. 9 Building upon the Greek privileging of 'pure' 
spirit, Dionysius argued that as knowledge of God was always inadequate and partial, 
it was only through the 'silence of unknowing' that the divine could be intuited - 
though union always remained impossible. Dionysius proclaimed the trans-rational 
nature of a God that remained beyond the analogies of affirmative theology, but still 
paradoxically demanded the application of reason in worship and quest. Traditions of 
negative theology have been expressed by particular thinkers as Johannes Scotus 
Erigena (c. 810-880), Meister Eckhart (1260-1327), Nicholas of Cusa (1401-64) St. 
John of the Cross (1542-1591), yet entire faiths such as Hinduism, Buddhism and 
Judaism have always demonstrated negative tendencies in their systems of worship 
and epistemology. Though I will consider these beliefs in more detail below, it is 
worth remembering that postmodernism has not exactly exploded onto the scene with 
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groundbreaking originality. If anything, postmodernism has to be read within the 
context of aporetic traditions that have been around as long as the existence of 
recorded history. Remembering this fact helps us to discern which metaphysical 
premises have been carried forward within the postmodern sense of indeterminacy and 
othemess. 
However, to trace the theoretical particulars of postmodern alterity our starting 
points are far more proximate to our own age than the origins of the world's faiths. If 
we take our chronology back to the forefathers of postmodemism, Nietzsche and 
Heidegger, many of the mystical foundations of theories of absence and negativity are 
already laid. Both Nietzsche and Heidegger play with ideas of the loss of metaphysical 
certainty in such ontological mainstays as God and Self. With the death of these 
structures comes a consciousness of living under their absence, the logos being 
reduced to a ghost which haunts the way we construct meaning, but which can no 
longer assure that that meaning has an ultimate referent. 
In The Gay Science, Nietzsche's madman declares us all to be the murderers of 
God and unveils a vision of nihilism that prefigures the anxieties of the postmodern 
nomad and the ontologically disruptive confrontation with the other: 
Are we not plunging continually? Backward, sideward, forward, in all directions? Is there still 
any up or down? Are we not straying as through an infinite nothing? Do we not feel the breath 
of empty space? 'O 
Nietzsche's initial mood with regard to the disappearance of God is bleak and 
apocalyptic. The 'empty space' left after God's destruction is the absence of 
metaphysical security, though it is worth noting that such a void is described as a 
space in which we move and a 'breath' that we 'feel'. The important point, one which 
I shall develop as my analysis progresses, is that Nietzsche's theological absence, 
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though imaginative, possesses a cognitive tangibility to which we relate and respond 
in a newly defined ontological isolation. For in accord with Mark C. Taylor's 
definition of the 'philosophy of the subject', Nietzsche's 'creator God dies and is 
resurrected in the creative subject'. " The alterity that remains after the death of God 
becomes the key presence in a new history of selfhood. For Nietzsche relies on the 
presence of that which somehow remains after death. Though the traditional God of 
Judaeo-Christian metaphysics may have been negated, the activity of the negation 
always remains as a surrogate for the metaphysical inscriptions that have apparently 
been lost. Extending this observation into poststructuralist theory, Derrida makes it 
clear that the grave is not necessarily the end of life and influence: 
I do not at all believe in what today is so easily called the death of philosophy (nor, moreover, 
in the simple death of whatever - the book, man, or god, especially since, as we all know, what 
is dead wields a very specific power). 12 
At the core of Derrida's project is the revelation of metaphysical afterlives. 
Deconstruction proceeds by not only demonstrating aporiae in the text, but also by 
illustrating how metaphysical foundations emerge even from those texts that attempt 
to banish them. Thus what both Nietzsche and Deffida prove, in their different ways, 
is that the divine is never lost, even when it is murdered. 
Derrida's sensitivity to this issue led to his targeting of Heidegger as one 
whose entire philosophy is imprisoned within the ontotheological tradition it tries to 
escape. 13 Heidegger is particularly important when tracing any history of postmodem 
alterity because of his explicit use of death and absence as that which reveals the 
singularity of the individual. Rather than positing some explicit presence as the 
distinguishing mark of the character or the self, for Heidegger it is the ultimate void of 
death which defines our Being. The Heideggerian individual lives in an 'anxiety' that 
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reveals the nothingness governing the encounter with Being: 
The nothing that anxiety brings before us unveils the nullity that determines Dasein in its 
ground - which is its being thrown into death. 
14 
Heidegger's perspective on death is important because it advances non-presence as 
that which truly exposes the nature of selfhood, an idea which Derrida has expanded 
into an aporetic moral theory in The Gift of Death. For Heidegger, 'nothing' is 'the 
complete negation of the totality of beings' (Heidegger, Writings, p. 100) and death 
seems to offer the physical expression of this negation and yet, ironically, a certain 
sense of possibility and location. Derrida has accused Heidegger of building his 
conception of the dasein on an ontotheological. ground and of falling into 
transcendentalism. 15 Such accusations do seem easily vindicated, especially when 
considering Heidegger's intense religious involvement in ways of Buddhist spirituality 
and negative mysticism. The parallels between, for example, Heideggerian 
'authenticity' and Mahayanan Buddhism's practised 'self-emptying' are more than 
coincidental, so it is not surprising that Derrida has drawn a metaphysical subtext 
from Heidegger's work. 16 Yet Heidegger provides a model for the subsequent history 
of postmodern alterity. For I would argue that any discourse that focuses on alterity is 
intrinsically and overtly ontotheological. For once alterity is descriptively treated as a 
thing in itself, then it inhabits the transcendentalism of pure philosophy and 
theological purity. As we move on from Heidegger into the postmodern period proper, 
we shall see how alterity, otherness and absence act as figures of theological activity 
that ground meaning in a perfectly ancient mode of expression. 
Before launching into a description of postmodernism's 'theology of alterity', 
a note on periodisation is necessary. Defining the launch date of postmodernism is 
notoriously problematic, and my definition may appear as insecure as any other. 
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However, as I claim that postmodemism is founded upon theories of negativity, I 
resist drawing my start line across the industrial reflections of Toynbee and Hudnut in 
the 1930s and 1940s. Postmodernism, as we shall see, does ride on the back of a -, 
particular capitalist economy, but its theoretical perspective is defined by moments-, 
when alterity is judged as the telos not only of this economy, but also of all thought, 
action and presence. Thus my periodisation begins with the growing theories of 
indeterminacy and anti-humanism in the 1960s and 70s, theories marked by such 
voices as Hassan, Meyer, Olson, Lyotard and Derrida. Though these names cover an 
impressive diversity of styles and foci, they appear united through a common attempt 
to negotiate a world without the presences of metaphysical humanism. The dominant 
by-product of this negotiation is that concepts of absence become absolute: all thought 
must redesign itself under the realisation of a total ontological void. 
So postmodernism begins when alterity takes precedence over philosophical 
activity. Lyotard in particular makes alterity a cornerstone in his vision of a new 
socio-cultural praxis. From the anti-rational 'energetics' of Discours, figure and 
Economie libidinale to the postmodern sublime and the linguistic differend, Lyotard's 
theoretical trajectory is linked to a radical exposition of the 'unpresentable'. His 
concept of the postmodern sublime advocates the aesthetic representation of that 
which now exists beyond the structures of the metanarrative. So, for Lyotard: 
The postmodern would be that which, in the modern, puts forward the unpresentable in 
presentation itself; that which denies the solace of good forms ... that which searches for new 
presentations, not in order to enjoy them, but in order to impart a stronger sense of the 
unpresentable. 17 
Lyotard's famous association of the postmodern with the 'unpresentable' signals a 
general empathy between postmodernism and a visualised sense of the other. Lyotard 
does not see the recognition of the unpresentable as something to be feared but 
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something to be focused upon and explored. His paradoxical eulogy of that which is 
beyond presentation discovers a willingness to co-operate with the implications of 
absence and draw such absence out from within artistic form. Perhaps the significant 
shift from Heidegger and Nietzsche to postmodernism is that in postmodernism 
alterity is less about the absences beneath identity and more about playing within the 
void left by the disappearance of identity itself This leads to the 'schizophrenic' and 
'nomadic' personality advocated by Deleuze and Guattari, a personality based on the 
complete fragmentation of being: 
There is no being beyond becoming, nothing beyond multiplicity, neither multiplicity nor 
becoming are appearances or illusion. ' 8 
Deleuze's alterity is the temporality underlying all things which prohibits a solid 
identity or foundational concept. Alterity becomes that which denies permanence, 
though in the cases of Lyotard, Deleuze and Guattari this is not a cause for despair but 
an euphoric turn to play, jouissance and the sublime. Their celebratory affirmations of 
absence are shared with a whole community of postmodern theorists including 
Hassan, Meyer and Fiedler. 19 The space left by the death of the metanarrative becomes 
a space of political and social, even psychological, exploration as the now nomadic 
subject attempts to examine what is beyond conceptual 'territorialisation'. 20 of 
course, not all have seen joy and light in this shift. Balanced against utopian 
postmodem impulses are those voices who regard the arrival of the 'depthless' society 
(to use Fredric Jameson's term) as threat rather than liberation. Baudrillard's attention 
to the significance of surfaces leads through to such a darker perspective. 
Baudrillard's vision of the 'hyperreal' - 'models of a real without origins or realityv2l 
- positions the postmodern individual as a victim of representation, a subject 
dissolved into the new reality of the unstable sign. Alongside Jameson, Baudrillard 
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sees a postmodern society where absence is a dystopian condition that can leave the 
subject bereft of place or self-possession. 
The common ground of all these views is in the aporetic response to the loss of 
either God or Self, with the author also disappearing as a corollary of the two. 22 Thus 
we are left with a postmodern discourse which has assembled a collection of terms 
meant to underwrite every presence with the incomprehensible vacuum of an absent 
logos. As postmodern subjects, we live in a curious condition, fully aware of our own 
depthless world and nature. Thus we come under the jurisdiction of what Beckett 
termed the 'Unnameable': 
perhaps that's what I feel, an outside and an inside and me in the middle, perhaps that's what I 
am, the thing that divides the world in two, on the one side the outside, on the other the inside, 
that can be as thin as foil, I'm neither one side nor the other, I'm in the middle, I'm the 
partition, I've two surfaces and no thickness, perhaps that's what I feel, myself vibrating, I'm 
the tympanum, on the one hand the mind, on the other the world, I don't belong to either ... 
23 
The alterity of the Unnameable is the indefinable 'middle': a place which is no-place, 
caught within an unstoppable play of representation, surface and self. Yet Beckett's 
language masks a curious power of self-consciousness. The subject may be neither 
inside nor outside, but the product of not belonging is the ability to see all sides, to 
float in and out of worlds through the power of a realised alterity. I shall argue that 
alterity is just one of the many apophatic terms applied within postmodernism which, 
far from disrupting notions of self and God, actually retain a sense of ontological 
stability and even theological security. Alterity does not signify the limitless play of 
meaning, but an abstract foundation which serves to secure meaning rather than effect 
its disruption. I shall open this argument with an examination of theology's vigorous 
involvement with postmodern thought, especially its association with 
deconstructionist criticism. By exposing the metaphysical partnership between 
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postmodernism and theology, and through an analysis of the religious heritage of 
Derrida's thought, we will be able to read alterity not as the subversion of 
metaphysics, but as the repackaging of metaphysical priorities for a new age. 
Postmodern theology 
The term 'postmodem theology' suggests an instant contradiction. Postmodemism's 
unflagging war against totalising narratives has often meant that religious notions of 
God, Word, and Scripture appear as the most intolerable form of logocentrism. Why 
this is so, is clear from Derrida's definition of God as: 
the name and the element of that which makes possible an absolutely pure and absolutely self- 
present self-knowledge. (Derrida, Grammatology, p. 98) 
Though we shall see later that Derrida's theological critique is not strictly an assault 
on religion, this line from Of Grammatology neatly illustrates why theology has been 
targeted as an enemy of postmodemism. God appears to stand as the final, absolute 
presence where the signifier is promised an ultimate rest and the determination of 
meaning is guaranteed. For the postmodernist, God appears to tyrannise multiplicity 
with its endless hegemony over reference. In many senses, postmodernism does seem 
justified in this opinion, as divinity has frequently been summoned as the assurance 
that thought and theology are working in the confidence of some eternal and stable 
referent. Yet before we move on to examine the strategies and significance of strictly 
postmodern readings of theology, we must offer some cautions about interpreting 
traditions of religious thought. 
We have already seen how alterity has historical roots in negative theology, yet 
the religions of orthodoxy have had an equally important association with absence. If 
we approach religion in history, rather than as a philosophical abstraction, we find the 
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frequent realisation that God is as much to do with absence as presence. In the Judeao- 
Christian scriptures there are many references to the God who is forever absent and 
mediated. The Fall itself, so significant to Derrida's thought, 24 signifies that 
humankind no longer has unmediated knowledge of God and thus lives amidst the 
alterity of his withdrawal and the play of language later initiated at Babel. And in 
Exodus 33, Moses sees the glory of God pass by but is not allowed to see his face: the 
otherness of God remains assured and his presence is never complete or direct. The 
sense of God as otherness pervades the Pentateuch, the Prophets and in the New 
Testament, where we encounter Paul's most famous expression of the absence of God 
in I Corinthians 13: 12: 'For now we see through a glass darkly; but then face to 
face'. 25 Paul's God is always masked and mediated, a situation that places faith 
continually in the realm of what Kevin Hart terms 'a speculative discourse'. 26 Hart 
observes that Christianity dwells within the domination of signs resulting from the fall 
of man. So it is that St. Augustine describes humankind's imprisonment in a regio 
dissimilitudinis, a place which Hart translates as 'a land of unlikeness'. 27 In this land, 
detached from God's presence, all we have are signs which forever point to spiritual 
unity, but never close the immeasurable gap between the divine and the human. 
It may be objected that though knowledge of God is mediated through the veil 
of scripture, God still provides the reassurance that full presence does exist and 
unmediated reference is still possible. This objection is certainly true in that Western 
religion, especially Christianity, has often placed the operations of the spirit over those 
of the letter. Yet while the spirit can be vaunted over the letter, particularly in New 
Testament theology, there must also be the recognition that the Judaeo-Christian 
religions are undeniably temporal and eschatological. Biblical religions are 
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constructed upon the sequential movements of nation, community and historical 
redemption, a fact which often militates against the easy representation of the divine 
as a presence aloof from differentialism and temporality. Brian Ingraffia has argued 
that Nietzsche's, Heidegger's and Derrida's critiques of metaphysics are more centred 
upon the dualities of Platonic and Philonic thought than the eschatological and 
therefore temporal processes of Christian revelation. 28 Though Ingraffia is guilty of 
presuming an original Christianity detached from its post-New Testament 
development, his argument is a useful caution against equating God's transcendence 
with an unchanging presence. Instead, the concept of God demonstrates not only how 
temporality and logocentrism are perfectly compatible, but also how absence and 
metaphysics form an easy alliance. 
What is important here is that in many ways religion can accept absence and 
lack as primary constituents of the divine personality. Indeed, the alterity of the divine 
in many ways ensures the play between theological meaning and spiritual practicality, 
whereby the ambiguous logos explodes determination yet still supplies metaphysical 
reference, albeit in an negative form. It is at this point that we start to see how the 
apophatic elements of theology reveal important implications for postmodernity. For 
if religious alterity offers afoundational othemess, an othemess that locates as much 
as it disrupts, we might question whether postmodem alterity has accrued a similar 
function of centring postmodern ideologies and protecting its implicit claims to 
meaning. 
The similarities between poststructuralist notions, such as the trace and 
diffirance, and religious alterity have provoked various theological readings of 
postmodernism. 29 Critics such as Mark C. Taylor, John Millbank, Carl Raschke, 
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Thomas Altizer and John Caputo have explored the hazy middle ground between a 
sense of otherness and a sense of the divine. A distinctive trend has been to absorb 
Derridean theory into a form of non-theistic spirituality. Mark Taylor, for example, is 
famed for his 'a/theology', in which otherness is affirmed as a sacred space of 
difference playing between totalising metanarratives and the Other. Taylor's 
postmodern theology is not a worship as such, but a celebration of a postmodern 
Scripture that dances on the restless grave of totalities. Gillian Rose describes Taylor's 
theology as a 'nomadic ecstasy, and distinguishes it against John Millbank's more 
spiritually inscribed 'ecclesial eschatology'. 30 Millbank's Theology and Social 
Theory: Beyond Secular Reason, proceeds from a rather Levinasian concem with the 
violence he understands as intrinsic in secular ontology. Millbank sees postmodernism 
as a solution to such violence through a 'transcendental difference' and 'harmonic 
peace' that bring a new religious social ethics. Though Taylor and Millbank work to 
different theoretical ends, their ideas share a significant common ground. In both cases 
the postmodem heralds a realised liberty and a conceptual space that reoccupy the 
ethical directive of the divine. Thus their work is theological because difference 
becomes an act of faith: faith in the aporetic itself as the intuited presence that 
unsettles identity, interpretation and value. Ironically, the faith involved in the 
acceptance of postmodernism renders it indistinguishable from the faiths it juxtaposes 
itself against. For what postmodernism raises is an ancient religiosity, one that 
involves acknowledging the limits of understanding while making those limits a route 
to comprehending the unobtainable absolute. 
Many theorists have singled out the indebtedness of poststructuralism to 
Judaic forms of thought as evidence that postmodernism is a project informed by a 
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distinctly religious iconography. Much of Judaism does seem amenable to a 
postmodern philosophy, especially in Rabbinical and Kabbalistic attitudes to 
textuality where scriptural meaning, especially in the halacha, is infinite and God's 
presence is always deferred within the text. Thus Derrida has engaged with Judaism 
with some passion, and it is worth remembering that ecriture, a key term of Derrida's, 
can be translated as either 'writing' or 'scripture'. Kevin Hart has raised the issue of 
why the religious connotations of ecriture have been suppressed: 
To point out this difference within icriture is not to protest that Derrida has been ill-served by 
his interpreters and translators; it is to observe that the conception of icriture as 'writing', pure 
and simple, has been used to bring Derrida's text (and, implicitly, the text of deconstruction) 
completely in line with secularism. If we conceive icriture as 'scripture' a number of Derrida's 
remarks readily assume a different expression. We note for instance, how Derrida defines 
Judaism as 'the birth and passion of icriture' and that it is 'The Jew who elects icriture which 
elects the Jew'. (Hart, Trespass, p. 50)31 
Hart is right to argue that Derrida need not be an automatic example of secularism. 
Derrida appears to lean towards Judaism as a primary milieu of textuality, difference 
and the trace. So it is that postmodern theologians like Thomas Altizer have claimed 
that Derrida has 'unveiled his own ground in Lurianic Kabbalism, perhaps the most 
deeply postmodern of all forms of mystical thinking'. 32 Altizer goes on to link 
Kabbalistic alterity with Derrida's guiding concept of absence: 
A Kabbalistic vision of God's contraction or self-withdrawal (zimzum) is surely one decisive 
source of Derrida's ground in a groundless beginning, a preprimordial "hole" rather than a 
primordial plenum, which Derrida can speak of as the "original exile" from the kingdom of 
being. (Altizer, Deconstruction, p. 149) 0 
Altizer understands Deffidean alterity as extending from the absolute lack that is 
central in Lurianic notions of the self-hidden deity. Moreover, the 'original exile' from 
being is seen as Derrida's envisioning of alterity as both genesis and fall, the 
foundations of the conditions of language, self and meaning. With such connections 
between Derrida and Judaism, it is not arbitrary to compare the processes of 
deconstruction with the symbolic hermeneutics of Kabbalistic tradition. Altizer is far 
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from alone in his assimilation of poststructuralism and Judaism. Susan Handelman 
and Harold Bloom have also seen Derrida as following in Rabbinical and Kabbalistic 
traditions, with Handelman also including Freud, Lacan and Bloom himself as 
members of this following (Hart, Trespass, p. 66). Altizer will be increasingly 
significant for my later analysis, as he ultimately sees deconstruction as historically 
manifesting the death of God in a silence so absolute that it effects a return to 
theology. Suffice it here to say that what Altizer and his fellow postmodem 
theologians demonstrate is not only the possibility of an allegiance between religious 
presence and poststructuralist absence, but also the untenability of associating 
deconstruction with an exclusively atheistic philosophy. 
In addition to poststructuralist connections with Jewish and Christian 
negativities, it is important to widen our perspective beyond the remit of Western 
theology. Several 'postmodem theologians' have turned towards the eastern faiths of 
Buddhism 'and Hinduism as examples of theologies which are ill-at-ease with 
logocentric structures. Much oriental spirituality evinces a structural likeness to the 
textual strategies of poststructuralism. In particular, Buddhism and Hinduism often 
reject the easy association of language with reality, instead offering a view of the 
world based on difference and aporia and the rejection of metaphysical constructions. 
In such faiths, the divine either does not exist or is veiled behind the play of signs. It is 
this theological structure which has attracted many postmodern thinkers. Perhaps one 
of the most vivid postmodem debates has surrounded the Buddhist thinker Nagarjuna, 
an Indian mystic of the second century C. E. whose radical techniques of negating 
language have attracted the attentions of Robert Magliola, Harold Coward and David 
Loy. Nagarjuna is interesting for deconstructionists owing to his rigorous assault on 
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metaphysical identity and linguistic presence. Following a principle of reductio ad 
absurdum, Nagarjuna posits reality as the ultimate realisation of difference within and 
beyond language. No surprise, therefore, that in these claims several postmodern 
thinkers have seen a mirror of deconstruction and the possibility for reading a 
Deffidean spirituality. Robert Magliola has argued: 
that Nagarjuna's Middle Path, the Way of the Between, tracks the Derridean trace, and goes 
'beyond Derrida' in that it frequents the 'unheard-of-thought, ' and also, 'with one and the 
same stroke, ' allows the reinstatement of the logocentric too. 33 
Magliola equates Nagarjuna's ideas with Derrida's processes of destabilising identity 
and presence, though significantly Magliola also understands Nagarjuna's project as 
the reintroduction of a logocentric goal by way of the dissolution of metaphysics. Here 
we start to touch on how alterity functions as grounding metaphor rather than internal 
difference. David Loy interprets Nagarjuna as resolving the problem of a Derridean 
nihilism in a new experience of the world through a spirituality of negation. Loy 
suggests that whereas Derrida gets bogged down in the pursuit of difference, 
Nagarjuna actually deconstructs both identity and difference and so experiences a 
world and identity beyond language ?4 
Harold Coward's assessment of Nagarjunan and Derridean textuality offers a 
slightly more cautious opinion than those of Magliola and Loy. Coward acknowledges 
that Nagarjuna's ideas are not identical with Derridean poststructuralism, though he 
further points out that deconstruction by no means implies the nihilistic abandonment 
of empiricism and ethics. Yet Coward recognises that Derrida's discursive relation to 
alterity is replete with theological content as the trace becomes the absolute horizon 
and primordial origin of being, language and ethics. 
Here we reach an issue of fundamental importance not only to 
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poststructuralism, but to the way in which we evaluate the entire postmodern tendency 
to promote alterity in its theory and its fiction. What we have seen in negative 
theology is an expression of alterity that decidedly challenges referential certainty, 
while simultaneously providing a conceptual ground for a body of metaphysical 
foundations. Moreover, negative theology shows us that absence can reach an 
absolute state where it repeats the function of an absolute presence in its attributes of 
ubiquitous influentiality, disruption, confrontation and, above all else, transcendence 
across and within all moments of language and being. The claim I shall develop, 
therefore, is that it is not only justifiable but inevitable to invest postmodern alterity 
with the theological language of presence and metaphysics. This is because discussion 
of alterity centres absence in an absolute relation to being in all forms - physical, 
linguistic and conceptual. Alterity, in effect, becomes implicitly offered as the 
transcendental centre, of postmodernity, a space commanding both our ethical 
response and our philosophical expansion. Otherness is not that which unsettles 
totalisation, but is a thematic presence in postmodem discourse which replays 
theological absolutes and reinforces ontological security. Such a series of claims 
means that, in effect, we must look at alterity not as a disruption, but as a generic 
convention which is at heart a repetition of metaphysical force. I will develop this 
argument more closely by examining the theological language of Derrida himself, to 
see whether the similarities between deconstruction and certain theologies are merely 
structural or are actually thematic. This distinction will be assisted by returning to the 
theory of Thomas Altizer whose work, I shall argue, shows the way that alterity is able 
to be viewed as a grounding presence in the postmodem world. Finally, I shall 
consider the ontological and ethical functions of alterity revolving around a negative 
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challenge to self and morality. Thus we will be able to attain an overview of how 
theoretical notions of absence relate to broader social conditions, a perspective which 
shall question the pluralism supposed to reside in the heart of postmodemism. 
Derridean religion 
The extent of the debate concerning Deffida and theology is huge and convoluted and 
it would be difficult to do full justice to its scope here. Thus, in this section, I shall 
limit myself to two main claims about Derrida and his theological tendencies: 
a) Though Derrida resists the assimilation of cleconstruction into negative 
theology, his theoretical bias is increasingly theological in context and 
language. This tendency is not merely due to the inescapability of metaphysics, 
but manifests itself through the attempt to elicit the absolute alterity of 
absence, diffWrance and trace; 
b) Derrida's thought is saturated in Judaic philosophies of textuality and 
divine presence. The combination of mutability, creativity and morality in this 
theology has led Derrida to Levinasian developments where the Other 
becomes an explicit theological ground and alterity achieves a metanarrative 
status of its own. 
These two claims may seem a theologically partisan interpretation of Derrida's 
aporetic programme, as they centralise him within the ontotheological tradition which 
he has tried to unsettle (though not deny). Yet both Derrida's relationship to theology 
and postmodernism's relationship to metanarratives are ambiguous. My arguments 
propose that Derrida's grammatology is structurally similar to negative theology 
because both are concerned with the extraction and distinction of alterity as a 
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metaphysical presence at the heart of all reality. By providing alterity with an almost 
transcendental scope of influence, Derrida is able to give diffirance an ethical potency 
by replaying the numinous encounter with God. As we reach texts like The Gift of 
Death, we find that the theological links become more explicit and less unsettled as 
Derrida seems to embrace the spiritual heritage behind the discourse of otherness. 
What this examination of Derrida will provide is the understanding of how alterity 
grounds rather than deconstructs, something which is evident in the broad language of 
postmodernism beyond Derridean theory. 
In his review of The Gift of Death, Benjamin Hutchens contends: 'In a sense if 
[Karl] Barth tried to get out of theology Derrida is to some extent trying to get in'. 35 
Such a claim may seem precarious when applied to a philosopher who is accredited 
with being one of this century's most wily saboteurs of logocentrism and metaphysics. 
Of Grammatology is quite explicit in its argument that the divine has been central to 
the construction of totalising binaries and the acceptance of a determinable presence 
and secure referentiality within the structures of meaning: 
The difference between signified and signifier belongs in a profound and implicit way to the 
totality of the great epoch covered by the history of metaphysics, and in a more explicit and 
more systematically articulated way to the narrower epoch of Christian creationism and 
infinitism when these appropriate the resources of Greek conceptuality. (Derrida, 
Grammatology, p. 13) 
Derrida here sees Christian theology as a force that presumes fixed and eternal 
presences beyond the play of meaning and in so doing divides word from object into 
separate ontological categories. As Of Grammatology is concerned with breaking 
down of the signifier/signified division, then metaphysical theology appears as an 
obvious target of Deffida's deconstructive technique. For God represents the desire to 
totalise in its most distinct form, especially visible in the notions of inerrancy which 
privilege the totality of the infallible Book over the multiplicity of the Derridean text. 
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Yet Derrida's critique of Christianity is directed towards religion under 'Greek 
conceptuality', not towards faith as a generality. Both Kevin Hart and Brian Ingraffia 
have argued, though to different ends, that Derrida's targets are not religion and God 
as such, but more the transference of the divine into an absolute presence under Greek 
transcendentalism. So are there other forms of religion more amenable to Derrida's 
perspective? It is here that we must turn to Deffida's most persistent sources of 
religious negotiation - negative theology and Judaism. 
One of Derrida's most direct confrontations with negative theology is 
contained in his essay 'How to Avoid Speaking: Denials'. He initially registers a 
resistance to the assimilation of negative theology into deconstruction, stating that 
such a combination would tend towards the 'hyperessentiality' from which he has 
always tried to escape: 
I thought I had forbid myself to write in the register of 'negative theology, ' because I was 
aware of this movement towards hyperessentiality, beyond Being. What differance, the trace, 
and so on 'mean' - which hence does not mean anything - is 'before' the concept, the name, 
the word, 'something' that would be nothing, that no longer arises from Being, from presence 
or from the presence of the present, nor even from absence, and even less from some 
hypcressentiality. Yet the onto-theological reappropriation, always remains possible - and 
doubtless inevitable insofar as one speaks, precisely, in the element of logic and of onto- 
theological grammar. 36 
Derrida is clear on the point that diffirance and the trace are not to be equated with 
either absence or presence in absolute forms. To make such an association is, 
according to Derrida, to treat diffirance and the trace as objects and presences in their 
own right rather than terms characterised by indefinability. And yet Derrida is equally 
clear that the 'onto-theological reappropriation' is always a part of the discourse about 
otherness, as metaphysical concepts are writ large upon the very terms with which 
alterity is discussed. 
However, I would suggest that the alterities of the trace and diffirance are 
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more to do with the re-packaging of metaphysical priorities than the deconstruction of 
those priorities. The metaphysical presence of alterity is the result of themes of 
absence attaining an absolute significance within poststructuralist discourse and thus 
replaying the absolute presence of God and the Logos. So in his essay 'Edmond Jabes 
I and the Question of the Book', Derrida repositions God as an originary silence which 
draws forth language and action while, implicitly, retaining the ontological guarantees 
of full presence. Language: 
starts with the stifling of his [God's] voice and the dissimilation of his face. This difference, 
this negativity of God is our freedom, the transcendence and the verb which can relocate the 
purity of their negative origin only in the possibility of the Question. 37 
In this passage we see absence and silence reaching a form of apotheosis in the 
capitalised 'Question'. It seems that, for Derrida, God needs to exist, if only in 
negation, for there to be the possibility of defining our own sphere of moral, linguistic 
and ontological action. 38 The silence of God somehow precedes language and so, in J 
the praxis of Derrida's message, the alterities of diffirance and the trace act not as 
irreducibilities, but as transcendental presences grounded upon an absence deified in 
ontological and theological roles. Derrida's Jewish heritage emerges forcefully in his 
association with negative theology, especially where the absence of God becomes in 
some way a 'pure' absence which confronts us with all the attributes traditionally 
associated with the Jewish deity: transcendence, infinity, influence and 
incommensurability. So Derrida, again writing on Jabes, speaks of the poet and the 
Jew as encountering the numinous silence within language represented by the 
apophatic landscape of the desert: 
The poet - or the Jew - protects the desert which protects both his speech (which can speak 
only in the desert), and his writing (which can be traced only in the desert). That is to say, by 
inventing, alone, an unfindable and unspecified pathway to which no Cartesian resolution can. 
impart rectilinearity and issuance. 'Where is the way? The way is always to befound A white 
sheet ofpaper isfull of ways. ' (Derrida, Writing, p. 69) 
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The physical specificity of the desert and the 'white sheet of paper' is significant. The 
desert and the paper are both locations of alterity which limit the limitless space of 
writing and spirituality. This space belongs to the Jewish prophet or the poet because 
both of these figures seem to acknowledge metaphysical lack and linguistic play rather 
than attempting to pin down the divine into a theological rigidity. What needs to be 
remembered, however, is that the desert and the paper give a metaphorical site to 
alterity. The absence within metaphysics is given shape and presence in Derrida's 
language as the site of an expanded critique of totalising thought and a place of ethical 
demand. Moreover, alterity is defined using religious language not because of the 
internal resistance towards metaphysical terms, but because theology enables Derrida 
to ground alterity, diffirance and trace as obligations to which, like God, we must 
respond. In a sense, theology saves deconstruction from meaning nothing. 
Derrida's ethical theory contained in The Gift of Death illustrates, perhaps 
more than any other text, the way that alterity can shift from inaccessible principle to a 
thematic presence dependent upon religious codes. Written in response to the Czech 
intellectual Jan Patocka, executed by the Conununist government for his support of 
the Charta 77, The Gift of Death speculates upon the ethical implications of death and 
the history of religious thought. What is perhaps most interesting about this text is the 
way that Derrida starts to gravitate towards a more conventional depiction of theology 
as a way of representing an apophatic morality. The foundations of Derrida's 
argument is that the presence of ethical codes and prescriptions actually works as a 
distraction from the genuine complexities of ethical decision. Revisiting the Abraham 
and Isaac narrative, Derrida demonstrates how moral activity is based upon the 
silences of God and death which enforce our absolute responsibility for our own 
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actions. Abraham obeys the command to sacrifice Isaac not because of the demand of 
ethics but contrary to the ethics sanctioned within communal codes. Abraham's 
actions obey the singularity of his relation to the mysterium trentendum, the silent gaze 
of the absolute Other which isolates his ethical moment. Derrida argues that for 
Abraham ethics actually function as a 'temptation' away froin responsibility into 
codification, a temptation which must be resisted to preserve a non-mediated 
relationship with personal morality. The iffesolvable space between the codified and 
the absolute results in an ethics which is capable of assaulting moral norms, yet which 
also has a practical familiarity: 
This is ethics as 'irresponsibilisation, ' as an insoluble and paradoxical contradiction between 
responsibility in general and absolute responsibility. 39 
Derrida's ethics of 'irresponsibility' offer a moral domain constructed upon the mute 
presence of the divine. Indeed it is notable that The Gift of Death seems to dwell more 
on God's silence rather than his absence. By the implication that God is not speaking 
rather than not actually there, Derrida's theory makes deeper resonances with negative 
theology, maximising the failures of representation to reach an incommensurable 
presence. The Gift of Death welds together religious universality and the apophatic 
gift into a paradoxical emblem of responsibility. What this mixture produces, through 
a strange mixture of Heideggerian, Levinasian and Judaeo-Christian associations, is 
an alterity that appears as a common property in the same way as the divine awe of 
Rudolph Otto's mysterium tremendum. 40 The alterity of absolute responsibility is 
reified itself into a unifying awe rather than a pluralising difference. So Deffida is able 
to see the story of Abraham and Isaac as more than just a parable of individuality: 
The sacrifice of Isaac belongs to what one might just dare to call the common treasure, the 
terrifying secret of the mysterium tremendum that is a property of all three so-called religions 
of the Book, the religions of the races of Abraham. (Derrida, Gift, p. 64) 
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The 'common treasure' to which Derrida 'dares' to refer is that alterity which is 
shared by all faiths regardless of scriptural doctrine. Deffida speaks of the alterity of a 
silent God, because this alterity still provides the functions of the divine in its 
presentation of an unknowable space which permeates all being and draws mankind 
into a moral relation with the Other. The example of Abraham's casuistic dilemma 
shows that there 'is no longer any ethical generality that does not fall prey to the 
paradox of Abraham' (Derrida, Gift, p. 78). The gift of death, its gift of absolute 
responsibility, is a common gift whose presence, like that of the silent, shapeless 
YHWH, constantly returns morality to silence and secrecy. Derrida extends the 
demarcations of this gift beyond the confines of a Judaic, Christian or Islamic ancestry 
to embrace all others in the relationship to the Other. For the gift of death: 
stands for Jews, Christians, Muslims, but also for everyone else, for every other in its relation 
to the wholly other. We can no longer know who is called Abraham, and he can no longer tell 
us. (Derrida, Gift, p. 79) 
Abraham is unidentifiable because he is representative of all others while attesting to 
the fact that he cannot speak for others. Hence he too becomes an alterity. Derrida's 
transformation of Abraham into a certain anonymity may seem to prevent the re- 
scripting of his ideas into the structures of logocentric religion. For example, when 
Derrida comes to re-appraising Christian irresponsibility, he sees Christianity as no 
longer in need of the event of revelation, but only the deferred possibility of that 
event: 
It [Christianity] needs to think the possibility of such an event but not the event itself. This is a 
major point of difference, permitting such a discourse to be developed without reference to 
religion as institutional dogma, and proposing a genealogy of thinking that doesn't amount to 
an article of faith. (Derrida, Gift, p. 49) 
By insisting on the possibility of revelation rather than revelation itself, Derrida shows 
that religion has a deferral at its 'centre' which maintains moral urgency within the 
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secrecy of death and the infinite. Derrida goes on to say that the gift of death 
"'repeats" the possibility of religion without religion' (Derrida, Gift, p. 49) as the 
mysterium tremendum gestures within religion to that which religion cannot contain. 
Thus the mysterium tremendum seems to function as what Derrida has elsewhere 
called the 'ghost of the undecidable', a ghost that 'deconstructs from within any 
assurance of presence, any certitude or any supposed criteriology that would assure us 
of the justice of a decision. 41 Yet Derrida's resistance to an 'article of faith' can seem 
somewhat misplaced after arguments that have offered alterity itself as an assurance 
of responsibility. Just as John Caputo understands deconstruction as necessitating a 
very religious act of faith, so alterity gains our faith by offering a common (and 
capitalised) Other which secures a moral source in an attestation to the supposedly lost 
divine. 42 Caputo makes the link between Derrida and negative theology in the faith of 
the impossible, the desire for the advent of the impossible that can never be achieved. 
Negative theology and deconstruction have the same stake in preserving the aporetic, 
for once the aporetic is realised, then the impossible and ineffable become 'a 
dangerous absolutism' (Caputo, Prayers, p. 47). Caputo does credit deconstruction 
with the qualities of negative theology, but, I would argue, for the wrong reasons. 
While Caputo points to deconstruction's theological drive towards the impossible, he 
ignores the fact 'the impossible' has a burden of communication which resides in a 
reasonably limited arena of conceptual space. Deconstruction has theological 
tendencies because its conceptions of diffirance, the trace and so on, are theological in 
their scope of influence, performance and trans-rational genre. The nature of the 
poststructuralist other bears all the hallmarks of a metaphysical absolute: general 
influence, ethical obligation, an unknowable force, subjective isolation. 
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So what are we to conclude from Derrida's intimacy with religious language 
and thought? My broad argument is that for Derrida, religious otherness and 
poststructuralist alterity are partners in a project that seeks to continually challenge 
conventions of thought while offering the stability of a reified and absolute alterity. 
This reification occurs on several different levels. Perhaps most important is that 
alterity is discussed as an absolute silence or absolute absence of the divine, the 
portentous quality of the absolute simply reinscribing alterity with the authority that 
belonged to the original trope of the divine logos. That Derrida would deny the 
absolute quality of alterity is largely unimportant, for it is the register of the absolute 
which supplies his theories with the ethical and ontological profundity they depend 
upon. 
Thomas Altizer, one of the 'death of God' postmodern theologians along with 
people like Mark C. Taylor and Carl Rasche, is useful to consider here. Altizer 
understands that throughout history humankind has been steadily realising the absence 
of God and thus the absence of any total presence within history. The comprehension 
of the absolute absence of the divine, according to Altizer, reaches its conclusion in 
our present time. Yet it is this historical moment of recognition that effects a 'grace' 
by revealing the pure absence of the God that was always masked in logocentric 
language: 
So it is that it is the death of God which makes possible the return of difference-itsetf, a pure 
difference which is lost with the advent of history or consciousness, and a difference or 
differance which is the true 'other' of God. That which can be known by both a metaphysical 
and a biblical theology as the Nihil can be known by a 'new' Kabbalah as the absolutely 
unnameable because it is 'older' than language. (Altizer, Deconstruction, p. 155) 
Altizer equates the death of God with the return to the original absence that was the 
divine before 'his' naming. Ironically the naming of God in language effected the 
steady cleconstruction of this name, ultimately working towards the realisation of the 
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original divine absence. 43 Altizer sees Deffida's diffirance as the full presence of 
absence in history and the focus of a "'new" Kabbalah' that returns to that which 
existed before language. 
Altizer's analysis differs in many ways from that of Derrida. Yet Altizer is 
useful not so much for the coherence of his argument, but for the suggestion that the 
contemporary age, the age of postmodernism, is that which recognises absence as the 
'true' basis of language and identity. Alterity in Derrida, and postmodernity in 
general, has become a thematic visibility, a conceptual motif which operates as a 
discursive presence with surprising authority and jurisdiction. In Derrida, absolute 
absence squarely repeats absolute presence by reapplying the limited discourse of 
infinity and transcendence which is common to both. So it appears that alterity is 
reffied by simply taking over the role and language of the absolute presence which it is 
meant to destabilise. It may be argued, as Kevin Hart has done, that the similarities 
between deconstruction and negative forms of theology are a matter of structure rather 
than theme, but I would argue that the former inevitably leads to the latter. For the 
structuring of deconstruction works by distinguishing alterity as the motif that centres 
a particular text or debate. Once alterity makes this step of thematic power then its 
inconceivability becomes a presence, a paradox which has always been a part of 
religious language. Moreover, Derrida makes this present absence an ethical space 
which self-consciously relies upon the obligation and responsibility contained in the 
mysterium tremendum of theology. Such a step seems to draw Levinas and Derrida 
much closer together, as Derrida's discussion of the Other shares with Levinas a sense 
in which alterity pushes the individual towards a very rabbinical set of ethical 
realisations. Indeed, Levinas does reveal the very clear roots of negative ethics in 
31 
biblical theology, thus suggesting that genealogies of postmodem ethics and discourse 
can be found in the oldest traditions of Western metaphysics. Levinas's philosophy, 
by his own admission, attempts to weld a Greek rationality to a Jewish theology in 
which God remains as Other; the result being an immanent trace which redirects the 
subject to an encounter with ethical interiority. " Such an encounter with the Other is 
not intended by Levinas to be foundational in the sense of grounding. Yet the base of 
Levinas's theory, that the Other cannot be reduced to the Same, runs counter to my 
argument here. For the motif of the Other is itself a condition of the Same as it seeks 
to define the conditions of ethical experience and then transfer them into a community 
(Jewish) perception through discourse. Returning briefly to my emphasis on the 
performativity of language, the Levinasian other makes alterity a centre for 
philosophical direction and action, just as the absolute Other of YHWH makes alterity 
the source of religious community. In fact, the Other must become the Same to 
transfer its obligation into a communal praxis. What Levinas gives us is an overview 
of the religious iconography and world perception that has to inform any philosophy 
of alterity or otherness, for absence, like truth, has a history. 
My brief analysis of Derrida and theology has taken us to the point where three 
claims can be made: 
i) Alterity shares a structural and ontological foundation with many forms of 
theology, particularly Judaism and negative theology; 
fi) Alterity is a metaphysical trope which relies upon theological language to 
retain an ethically, ontologically and philosophically meaningful discourse; 
iii) Alterity's metaphysical content is not just part of the inescapability of 
metaphysical language. Rather, alterity is a distinct and limiting philosophical 
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theme which provides metanarrative functions within a classically 
ontotheological discourse. 
From these three basic conclusions, we can now proceed to assess the role of 
alterity as a presence in the general expressions of postmodernism. Before making this 
step, however, an important clarification should be made. Throughout this thesis, my 
focus on alterity is more in terms of presence than of absence. This position of course 
begs the question as to whether I am endorsing the belief that full presence in language 
and referentiality is possible. Firstly, I fully concede to the argument that language and 
meaning are forever shifting with the multiplicities of different viewpoints and different 
combinations of signifiers. However, language is always within the performative 
expectations of social communication or meaning in production. The consequence is 
that presence always has a de facto status in the relationship between social discourse 
and social action. Even in vacillation between two contrasting viewpoints there 
remains the sense in which undecidability is generative of meaning rather than having 
absolute sway. So the alterity of postmodern philosophy does not cleconstruct 
discourse into multiple forms but, as this thesis itself exemplifies, produces a fairly 
limited range of textual presentations grounded in the acceptance that alterity is a 
presence for the particular (usually academic) community which is being addressed. 
Alterity is produced on the basis of a social agreement of what it can mean within the 
textual codes of its practical performance. Derrida would agree that there are codes 
and structures (albeit metaphysical) in society that stop language scattering into 
impracticality and nonsense. However, I would suggest that in actual fact discourse 
consists of nothing but presences. Adopting a more Bakhtinian position, a 
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position I will fully expound in Chapter 5,1 would argue that the multiplicities of 
language can only be negotiated as a dialogic exchange of presences rather than an 
acceptance of an alterity. Crowning alterity as sovereign merely enacts a moment of 
adjusted priorities for interpretation which produces its own set of guidelines and 
thematic expectations. 
A brief return to postmodern. theology may make this point somewhat clearer. 
45 The effect of deconstructive theology is best visualised, following Jean Luc Marion , 
as the word 'God' with a cross placed through it (GOD). This symbolism holds both 
the term and the negation of that term together in a dialectic of absence and presence. 
Yet it must be recognised that the actual crossing out of the term is an action which 
requires a hand to make the negation. The cross through the term is not self-existent; it 
is a symbol which is used as a conceptual indicator in the same way as 'God' beneath 
it. Consequently, both term and negation indicate the performative action making a 
conceptual relation between the two symbols. The position of this is paradoxical. As 
we perform the negation of the word 'God' there is the awareness that this is an action 
of which we are not capable, that is, we cannot erase the function of the term as it 
remains active beneath the negating mark. The incapacity to conclude the relationship 
between term and erasure manifests itself in the production of the concept of alterity, 
for the two symbolic presences become a single relationship with the 
acknowledgement of their interaction. What is important is that as we have produced 
this conceptual discourse there is a sense in which alterity has a social presence rather 
than an aporetic play; and by implication, otherness is always being appropriated into 
the positivity of a discourse which has no possibility of using alterity except as a 
conceptual presence. 
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In conclusion, much of my argument is based on the de facto expectations of 
presences in language. The sign may be protean, but this may only mean that language 
has to be fluid enough to keep equivalence with the possibilities of physical existence. 
I readily admit that there is no total summary of human existence which holds good 
for all people in all places. Yet this view in itself needs to acknowledge that it is part 
of a network of discourse which relies on its own expectations of what is present in 
the world to actually offer itself in meaning. 
The next step in my analysis is to see how alterity relates to the 'postmodem 
condition' in general. This shift is necessary because I do not believe that the 
implications of alterity are confined to theoretical contemplation. If, as I am arguing, 
concepts are always related to social conditions, then it is right to question whether 
alteritY accords with certain moods or tendencies in contemporary culture. I shall 
firstly argue that alterity is used as a way of returning the idea of the Cartesian subject 
while appearing not to jeopardise the politics and philosophy of multiple selves. The 
connection between this subjectivity and my religious theme is that the mysticism of 
alterity is the ideal spirituality for the capitalist individualism of the contemporary age. 
By seeking to represent otherness instead of others, postmodernism. implicitly 
advocates a metaphysics that is a spiritual equivalent of the capitalist market's 'let-it- 
be' policy, giving priority to subjective individualism while cautioning against 
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overarching applications of social theory. Living in an age of seemingly endless 
problems in identity, economics, politics and race, we can perhaps argue that 
postmodemism has simply tried to make a spirituality that will give some 
metaphysical locus in a confusing world. As we will now see, however, 
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postmodernism's tendency towards the transcendental can make for a very 
questionable social contribution. 
Social alterity 
Moving our perspective from postmodem theory to perceptions of postmodem 
culture, we still find a preoccupation with the absent. Toffier, McCluhan, Bell, 
Jameson and Baudrillard, amongst others, have characterised much of postmodemity 
as the dissolution of reality within the technologies of representation operating within 
late twentieth-century capitalism. As the image becomes the reality, the world 
fragments into a self-consciously shifting play of signs, where reality is itself alterity, 
an indecipherable trace amongst nervous and unpredictable surfaces. David Harvey's 
persuasive overview of The Condition of Postmodernity describes a society which 
now functions within the loss of permanent social presences and personal identity. 
With the shift from Tordism' into 'flexible accumulation' comes the effects of 'time- 
space compression' (Harvey, Condition, pp. 284-307), where the experience of living 
is possessed by a massive acceleration in the speed of lifestyles and working 
conditions. The results are shorter vocational contracts with longer working hours; the 
need for multiple skills and social flexibility; the constant requirements for re-skilling 
individuals to match technological change; and the shrinking relevance of distance 
under the power of telecommunications. Such social effects extend themselves across 
both ideology and practicality: 
The first major consequence has been to accentuate volatility and ephemerality of fashions, 
products, production techniques, labour processes, ideas and ideologies, values and established 
practices. The sense that 'all that is solid melts into air' has rarely been more persuasive. 
(Harvey, Condition, pp. 285-6) 
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Harvey's postmodernity is a familiar emphasis on continual dispersal and 
impermanence. As social mobility and vocational transience increases, identities, both 
communal and individual, are endlessly caught in the act of reformulating themselves 
to match sociological instability. The consequence is that identity never seems to 
achieve a full presence or ontological satisfaction. Indeed the notion of permanent 
identity, a basic tool of self-reflection, seems to deconstruct itself towards a social 
alterity across which identities are continually written and rewritten. 47 As the self 
vanishes under its pluralisation there is a pronounced dilemma of Being, for the 
subject is caught between the loss of identity and the social language of selfhood 
which enables the subject to inscribe her loss within discourse. 
Yet I shall argue that the recognition of ontological alterity does not diminish 
the authority of the subject, but in many ways confirms the metaphysical subject and 
leaves the much assaulted Cartesian perspective unchallenged. The effect of alterity, 
and arguably the effect of social instability, is primarily one of self/social- 
consciousness. Postmodernity functions by offering a dispute to basic ontological 
assumptions. Yet the intention behind this challenge seems curious as it also produces 
an individual subject conscious of her own lack of stable identity. The paradox here is 
that subjective alterity then becomes a self-reflexive tool for the deepest ontological 
awareness. The otherness in our selves and in the world becomes a visible space 
demanding the reorganisation of the way we look at ourselves and the world. 48 
Moreover, alterity places the subject in an ontological isolation by making her aware 
of the individual responsibility for meaning requisite in this conscious juxtaposition of 
being and non-being. Consequently, postmodernism. backs towards reaffirming 
essentialist conceptions of a subject which reflects upon itself and stands in a 
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possessive relation to meaning. So Kate Soper has described the postmodern subject 
as a conscious centre gathering fragments into an ontological order: 
even as we acknowledge ourselves to be decentred and fragmented subjectivities, the gendered 
constructs of patriarchy, and the mouthpieces of a discursive ventriloquism, we also seem to 
rediscover a centre, the existential, angst-ridden self who must also make sense of it, and seek 
to reorganize desire, reread the world, adjust behaviour and so on, in the light of that 
awareness. As anti-humanist approaches present us as splintered, we feel a very humanist 
splintering between the self who acknowledges the Freudian or feminist challenge to 
autonomy, and the self who feels called upon to act as a morally responsible agent of self- 
change. 49 
Soper sees in postmodernism not the splintering into an anonymous 'fragmented' 
subject, but the continuation of a sense of individual agency, an agency made more 
acute by the demand for interpretative action which is central when indeterminacy is 
foregrounded. Postmodern alterity functions as a reaffirmation of ontological stability 
because it impersonates the mechanisms similar to traditions of the divine 
confrontation with the self. For like Moses's confrontation with otherness on Mt. 
Sinai, alterity is presented as the absolute quality which should disrupt our entire 
sense of being and yet re-empower the way we see the world and our identity. Perhaps 
we could simply say that the postmodem subject affirms ontotheology by continually 
offering itself as something profound, rather than as the proclamation of 
indeterminacy. 
We can see an illustration of how social alterity valorises the metaphysical 
subject in the theorisations of Barbara Claire Freeman on the 'feminine sublime'. 
Forming an allegiance between feminism and Lyotardian theory, Freeman argues in 
semi-mystical terminology for a 'feminine sublime' which: 
is neither a rhetorical mode nor an aesthetic category but a domain of experience that resists 
categorisation, in which the subject enters into relation with otherness - social, aesthetic, 
political, ethical, erotic - that is excessive and unpresentable. The feminine sublime is not a 
discursive strategy, technique, or literary style the female writer invents, but rather a crisis in 0 
relation to language and representation that a certain subject undergoes. 50 
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It is evident that my general argument questions the whole premise of Freeman's 
sublime politics. I have contended that alterity, and equally the sublime, are both 
'rhetorical modes' and 'aesthetic categories' which attempt to transfer a specific 
conceptual content. Freeman's hope for a sublime space, an airy liberty in the other, 
appears split by a subjective contradiction. Though Freeman contends that the 
feminist sublime is an 'excessive and unpresentable' experience, it seems her idea of 
the sublime confirms the rational subject's jurisdiction over ontological issues. For 
Freeman's sublime is an attempt to resist categorisation, yet it is also the force by 
which 'the subject enters into relation with otherness'. The implication of this is that 
the sublime distinguishes the subject in all her isolation and the other then becomes 
the object of this self-identifying relation. 
The mystical suggestions of the word 'sublime' are not to be overlooked here. 
Sublimity connotes transcendence and suggests the spirituality of a subject who is 
capable of a perceptual hovering over all restraints and logocentrisms. Indeed, it is 
interesting to see how unions between overt mysticisms and alterity are becoming 
more common in the marketplace of postmodem theories. The 'Goddess' movement 
of feminist religion is a good example of spiritualities which understandably reject the 
autocratic tendencies of patriarchal theology for faiths ostensibly based in the haunting 
non-place of otherness. This is evident in the short text 'Candlemas in Cymru' by 
Monica Sj66. The following passage is not without concrete political engagement, 51 
performing this activity through the summoning of 'ancient' spiritual powers which 
are potent by their indefinability: 
To me, feminism means the rebirth of the Goddess ... she who is our infinite Self. For this to 
happen we must act politically to throw of the shackles of capitalist and imperialist patriarchy . 
.. so as to free ourselves and to set free again our Mother, the Earth. We are slowly beginning to regain some of our ancient menstrual, psychic, bisexual, 
visionary collective Womanpowers. 
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It is slowly beginning to hum within us ... deep, deep within ... slowly, slowly we are 
reawakening ... 
52 
The play between the singular and the plural in this passage is revealing. The political 
activity which Sj66 recommends belongs to the plurality of the pronoun 'our', for 
there must be a gathering together of individuals to enact social objectives. However, 
66 s summoning o the collective seems to apply itself through a mystical alterity 
which actually absorbs difference in a figured absence. The 'our' is directed 
continually towards the essential 'She', 'She' being the mystical properties of earth 
and the female physique. The problems for political action arise in the fact that Sj66 
validates female identity under the 'ancient' aspects of a feminine alterity and a 
spiritual future yet to be fully realised. Thus the time-frame of Sj66's ideas is one 
which depends on an ahistorical aesthetic which appeals to a transcendent core of 
53 identity in the elemental 'truths' of the earth . The consequence 
is that social 
difference actually seems negated in a common principle of apophatic being. 
What undermines Sj66's argument the most is an awkward relation between 
spiritual truth and political action. Environmentalism has become a common feature 
of much postmodem spirituality, an understandable event in the light of the twentieth 
century's appalling environmental mis-management. Yet environmentalism is not free 
from the philosophy of individualism which has itself contributed to the historical 
progression of ecological disaster. On a social level, Sj66's type of spiritual 
naturalism is generally composed of those with marginal relations to the actual living 
conditions of the natural world. Angela West draws attention to this as she casts a 
critical eye over what she terms 'back-to-nature' feminism. 54 Her criticism of this 
movement is of its class structure: 
Working-class people are not to be found in these movements in any significant numbers; nor 
are the nations and races of the Third World. The fact is, I suggest that Goddess/Nature 
worship, in all its forms, mild and extreme, is in no way an alternative to western bourgeois 
religion, but simply another manifestation of it. (West, 'Faith', p. 75) 
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West's accusation of the goddess being complicit with the prevailing structures of 
western society is a fundamental criticism of postmodern spirituality in general. 
Whether or not we see the celebration of the Other as 'spirituality', postmodernism 
tends towards subjugating physical existence under the pure philosophy of negative 
theory. Hence the social composition of 'Goddess/Nature worship' sees the nostalgic 
reconstruction of the earth's benignity, rather than having a direct encounter with the 
physical environments of the planet. The spirituality of Otherness appears to be more 
about transcending the physical sphere in a combination of mysticism and 
romanticism, a transcendence which takes us back towards the spiritual/physical 
duality which is perhaps the psychological root of humankind's mishandling of 
planetary resources. 
West claims much contemporary feminist religion as 'a child of the 
Enlightenment' (West, 'Faith', p. 78)55 because it draws plurality back towards a 
transcendental rationality. Indeed, the appeal to a kind of primordial identity connects 
with theories which actually formed some of the Enlightenment's most prestigious 
voices. As West again points out: 
quite a lot of the new feminist spirituality is 'woman-made' in the sense that it is a second-hand 
version of this eighteenth-century man-made tradition of the Noble Savage. (West, 'Faith', 
p. 78) 
West here implies that the political action of some postmodem feminist spirituality is 
merely a confirmation of an existing order and that its radical qualities are dispersed 
in its hunt for a 'pure' subject. West's parallel between Rousseau's Noble Savage and 
the Goddess defines the possibility that philosophies based within a resistance to 
metanarrative discourses are actually replaying a distinctly Enlightenment rationality. 
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I am not necessarily critical of the Enlightenment, the metanarrative, 
logocentrism, or the idea of the subject. What I do not accept is that postmodern 
theory offers something different to these ideas, since in fact it exercises the same 
tendencies towards pure philosophy, and hence theological aspiration, that have been 
inherent in the last three centuries of thought. What my brief journey through 
postmodern feminist spirituality illustrates is that a politics of alterity is absolutely and 
inevitably subject-based. As I have just said, my problem is not with the subject or the 
metanarrative; both are, I believe, politically and socially grounded and it is unhelpful 
to deny them. My concern is more with the type of subjectivity recommended by 
postmodernism. Alterity changes the subject into a space in which meaning is 
processed and through which temporality moves without settling into self-presence. 
This may produce the 'absolute responsibility' described by Derrida, but it also 
relocates obligation to meaning within the individual rather than within the 
individual's context. The upshot is a kind of Cartesian solipsism where the subject 
focuses on herself as the central, temporal conduit for the creation of meaning. Such a 
solipsism has recognisable relations with capitalist individualism, where managing 
value-free power relations between individuals is a much more tangible goal than 
attempting to create trans-social systems. 
To clarify this point, we should look at how postmodernism has structured 
itself politically within the confines of late-twentieth century capitalism. The 
concentration upon otherness and absence has produced several dangerous tendencies 
in postmodern politics. The first danger is that far from opening up our consciousness 
to the needs and differences of others, postmodemism simply forms its own linguistic 
binaries. Hence, feminist voices have frequently cautioned that the discourse of 
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difference actually prevents the construction of meaningful dialogues between groups 
56 
rather than assisting such understandings. Likewise Terry Eagleton has contended 
that: 
for all its talk of difference, plurality, heterogeneity, postmodern theory often operates with 
rigid binary oppositions, with 'difference', 'plurality' and allied terms lined up bravely on one 
side of the theoretical fence as unequivocally positive, and whatever their antitheses might be 
(unity, identity, totality, universality) ranged balefully on the other. [. I In its more refined 
theoretical reaches, postmodern theory acknowledges the mutual interdependence of terms like 
identity and non-identity, unity and difference, system and Other; but in terms of sensibility 
there is no doubt on which side its sympathies lie. 57 
Eagleton's reference to the 'sensibility' of postmodemism is warranted, for 
postmodernism has often constructed an intellectual piety which gives designations 
such as otherness and alterity a prescriptive presence veiled by their own terminology. 
Far from liberating discourse, postmodernism adjusts the weighting of its binaries to 
favour a mystical exclusion of that which searches for the homogeneous or 
unificatory. It is when this exclusion is combined with the nature of the postmodern 
subject that the real dangers emerge. 
I would argue that the postmodem subject, as characterised through the 
presence of alterity, is built upon the politics and economics of contemporary 
capitalism, though this allegiance is veiled through the mystical medium of its 
language. The complex connections between religious language, subjectivity and 
capitalism can perhaps be made a little clearer by a brief detour through some of the 
early ideas of Ihab Hassan. Hassan famously labelled postmodemism as 'the new 
gnosticism', a period in which human subjectivity becomes 'its own reality. 
Consciousness becomes all. 958 Translating Gnosticism's' mind-over-matter theology 
into a postmodern experience, Hassan took what he saw as the 'indeterminacy' of the 
present age and posited a new manner of self-sufficient human ontology. For Hassan, 
human beings can now see themselves as 'gnostic creatures constituting themselves, 
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and increasingly their universe, by symbols of their own making' . 
59 The leap that 
Hassan makes from an indeterminate age to a theology of self is of paramount 
significance to my argument here, not least for the fact that the aporetic is converted 
into a spiritual essentialism. Yet Hassan also implies that the postmodern world has 
given birth to the self-constituting subject as a way of meeting the demands, the truth, 
of indeterminate culture. Though Hassan's humanistic persuasion makes him an 
awkward benchmark for all postmodemism, 60 he does acutely illustrate how social 
fragmentation and the culture of contemporary capitalism, can result in a metaphysics 
of those conditions that serve an individualist ideology. By spiritualising the essence 
of the indeterminate, then alterity becomes the deity that sanctions such conditions 
and blesses the individualistic, self-creating subject. 
In short, postmodernism constructs an ideal ontology for capitalist 
individualism. We have already seen how an attention to alterity and absence creates a 
postmodern subject built upon the traditional metaphysics of self and philosophy. I 
extended this position by suggesting that postmodernism is inherently solipsistic and 
metaphysical, as it deifies the subject as an organising centre while reifying the 
negativity that sanctions such an ontology. This subjectivity is sympathetic with 
capitalist individualism because both capitalism and postmodernism posit a freedom 
where large scale social metanarratives are inappropriate and individual responsibility 
within power politics becomes sovereign. Postmodernism is ideally suited to capitalist 
economics because it backs away from judgements about social or human 'nature', 
emphasising value-free causality and the power of the sign; and all the while it retains 
an effective philosophical sanctuary in theories of anti-foundationalism. 
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Terry Eagleton argues that with the fragmenting forces of late twentieth- 
century capitalism, the ideology of anti-foundationalism is an ideal way of preserving 
a market pragmatism while at the same time protecting oneself from criticism. Should 
any direct political assault manifest itself, then the postmodern subject is able to 
retreat into a philosophical dialogue about the paucity of totalities, even though 
totalities may be firmly in place in the experiential content of people's lives. So 
postmodern alterity provides a transcendent attitude towards social policy which can 
in turn protect capitalism from any sort of incisive dialogue. Eagleton further argues 
that the postmodem emphasis on incommensurability: 
serves to swaddle the dominant system from any sort of searching criticism, at the same time 
as it serves to enhance its liberal credentials. The more conservative forms of postmodernism 
represent the ideology of those who believe that, if the system is to survive, truth must be 
sacrificed to practice, a move which would have been mystifying to Jefferson or John Stuart 
Mill but not in the least to Friedrich Nietzsche. (Eagleton, Illusions, pp. 40-1) 
Eagleton's reference to Nietzsche suggests that the postmodern subjectivity is 
appropriate to, and protective of, contemporary power-based economic morality. The 
security of this subjectivity is described by Eagleton as a retreat into a selective anti- 
foundationalism which can kick into action when justification has to be transcended. 
Eagleton could further his argument by pointing to this postmodern security as more 
reliant on metaphysics than market-driven cynicism, for absence and otherness are 
reified into absolute categories somehow above the engagement with the social and 
political presences of the immediate and global environments. By returning to 
metaphysical and theological strains of language, postmodernism effects judgements 
which go beyond particularities and place the abstract well above the physical. 
I am not suggesting that all postmodem criticism is politically bankrupt. The 
postmodern community has produced many fruitful insights into injustices across all 
social ideologies, including capitalism. Yet the explicit or latent insistence on figures 
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of alterity and absence is actually returning to an unproductive type of metaphysical 
attitude that embraces difference only in the abstract. Postmodernism has always 
struggled to transfer an ethics of difference into an operational social praxis. David 
Harvey contends that postmodernism has adequately produced a response to debates 
of multiculturalism and gender, but this awakening is enfeebled by the inability to 
engage itself with general politics of working conditions, economic policy or class 
oppression. Harvey quotes S. White who seeks to define the new performativity of 
postmodem justice: 
One sees [. ] in Derrida's declaration that 'Deconstruction is justice' [. ] that one can 
neither speak directly about nor experience justice. In answering the sense of responsibility to 
otherness one serves justice but one does so with a sense of the infinite, open-ended character 
of the task. 61 
The open-endedness of postmodern justice ironically prevents an engagement with 
politics of class and occupation, because the theoretical basis of such an engagement 
is seen to belong to a tradition of totalising ideas. So Harvey points to the way that 
issues of occupational injustice rarely generate the same response as issues of identity. 
He exemplifies this argument by detailing the fire in 1991 at a chicken-processing 
plant of Imperial Foods, in Hamlet, North Carolina, in which twenty-five people died 
owing to dangerous working conditions and inadequate safety measures. The fire 
produced almost no media or intellectual interest in contrast to the explosive response 
that the Rodney King incident produced soon after. Harvey goes on to describe the 
deliberate governmental weakening of agencies such as the Occupational Safety and 
Health Administration and the National Labour Relations Board in the United States. 
Enervated by the non-interventionist policies of Reagan, these organisations illustrate 
for Harvey the increasing difficulty of working-class politics to make itself heard 
through the language of the politics of difference. Harvey seems to raise the important 
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consideration that the appreciation of difference and possibility may be a class luxury 
in a world where certain capitalist sectors become increasingly expensive, exploitative 
and controlling. We do live in a world of local needs and the needs of difference, and 
these must be respected and protected. Yet, Harvey implies, theorising on the basis of 
locality can overlook the broad-based presences and systems of capitalism which 
deserve an intense and searching critique postmodernism often seems unable to 
provide. 
Ultimately Harvey does want to retain some sense of difference. Yet he also 
accepts universals as 'necessary' (Harvey, 'Class, p. 112) because we live in a world 
where presences are established and ingrained into the experiential content of our 
daily lives: 
While identity does not rest upon sameness or essence, it does acquire durability and 
permanence according to the stories we tell ourselves and others about our history. Although 
identity internalises otherness, it nevertheless delimits and renders relatively durable both the 
field of 'othernesses' brought into play and the relation of those other to a particular sense of 
self-hood. (Harvey, 'Class', p. I 10) 
Harvey sees the need to accept those social presences which are always discursively in 
place. These presences are multiple but with a real location in the world; they cannot 
be de-valued by incorporation into a general theory of multiplicity. The other is not a 
semi-mystical abstraction that subsumes the reality of a different frame of experience. 
Harvey seems to want a shift back into a less purist use of difference and a willingness 
to engage with concrete metanarratives because they are there in place in the way lives 
are lived. This, I believe, is a much more credible, and productive way of engaging 
with the conditions of the contemporary world. Difference, alterity, the trace and so 
on, are concepts which bring back a metaphysics and transcendentalism that is not 
suitable for effective social action. Alterity is not an idea which de-stabilises totality, 
but a metaphysical reification which is more suited to offering support to capitalist 
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multiplicities than unsettling capitalist totalities. Thus alterity subtly escapes social 
commitment for a return to a quasi-mystical subjectivity and an easy-working anti- 
foundationalism. 
This chapter has had several purposes. Firstly I have shown that alterity is an 
aesthetic and philosophical theme which retums to metaphysics via a theological type 
of discourse. Secondly, alterity enables the preservation of an Enlightenment sense of 
identity rather than the destruction of such a notion. Finally, I have attempted to 
demonstrate that the postmodern subject, governed by a reified alterity, is in 
accordance with capitalist structures and ideologies. In the following chapters, I shall 
move into a consideration of postmodern fiction to assess how the reffication of 
negativity and alterity alters the politics and philosophy of postmodern writing. My 
critical objective in all the subsequent chapters will be to see how texts that ostensibly 
pursue indeterminacy and alterity actually structure themselves upon a foundational 
metaphysics of negativity. Many such works are living within a recognisable, even 
overt, theological heritage of the Other, where alterity acts as a reified 'god' over 
characters, plots and themes. Indeed, many of the novels I shall examine, some of 
which are central to the postmodem fictional canon, can almost be described as 
religious fiction in its purest sense. As a major element of my argument is that alterity 
falls naturally into transcendentalism, I have arranged the chapters into evaluations of 
the most important metaphysical repetitions of the role of the other. In Chapter One, a 
focus on characterisation will lead to the conclusion that far from radicalising the 
nature of the fictional character, postmodern indeterminacy actually sustains the 
importance of the individual as a spiritual/psychological entity defined in relation to 
an absolute Other. Chapter Two will expand this theme of the fictional subject by 
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arguing that in many ways alterity is simply a thematic negotiation and understanding 
of mortality, even a way of transcending death's threat through a kind of imagined 
afterlife. Moving from ontology to history, Chapter Three will assess the problematic 
relation of alterity to time. Here I will suggest that postmodern indeterminacy 
reapplies the theological language of infinity and eternity to give a transcendentalist 
viewpoint over time rather than a temporal involvement within time. In Chapter Four, 
I shall turn my focus to postmodernist allegories to demonstrate that alterity acts as a 
new allegorical centre in the same way as God functioned within religious allegory 
and parabolic teaching. Finally, in Chapter Five, I devote the whole chapter to Salman 
Rushdie as an example of what I see as the way out of the impasse of postmodem 
transcendentalism. Applying a Bakhtinian perspective, I argue that Rushdie forges an 
equal bond between sociological foundation and spiritual impulse that avoids the 
theoretical detachment implicit in much postmodem fiction. Thus we are able to see 
the transcendental brought down to earth, whereas in many postmodem novels the 
earthly is always made unreal and shadowy by the all-powerful presence of alterity. 
Whatever my particular objective, this thesis strives towards one proof: alterity is a 
metaphysically and theologically informed theme and concept which grounds 
meaning, rather than deconstructing that meaning. 
To return to where we started, this thesis is written in what I consider as the 
last days of confidence in postmodern politics. Much of the shift away from 
postmodernism has seemed instinctive rather than reasoned, perhaps because the 
world that has recently produced hideous genocides, economic crisis, environmental 
disaster and adapting exploitation, cries out for a pragmatism and realism that 
postmodernism does not seem to achieve. Postmodernists may point out that many of 
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the intolerable situations that the world provides have been directly caused by the 
structures of logocentrism that they attack. They are right. Yet to appeal to a lack of 
totalities is no answer, as that can soon lead back to an impotent form of discourse 
that attempts to purify itself from presence while engendering unproductive presences 
of its own. Perhaps postmodemism should more readily admit its metaphysical 
persuasion and define itself as a distinct ideology rather than insisting on the 
deconstruction of foundations. The liaison between Christianity and radical politics in 
places such as South America, South Africa and Poland demonstrate that the most 
philosophically presence-based ideas need not disregard the temporal and physical 
situations of the real world. 62 If postmodernism were to acknowledge its own 
metaphysics, then its politics may be able to develop with more confidence. As it is, 
postmodem alterity produces a metaphysics which it continually masks and denies, 
and a presence which is frequently hidden behind the rhetoric of otherness. 
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Chapter 1 
The Metaphysical Self in the Postmodern Novel 
In my introductory chapter, I developed the claim that the notion of alterity actually 
denies indeterniinacy because of its absolute sway within postmodern meaning and 
language. The rest of this thesis is devoted to exercising this premise in the complex 
domain of postmodern fiction. My project of treating alterity as metaphysical presence 
could appear immediately compromised by the burden of generalising the volatile 
styles within postmodern writing. For in the postmodem literary landscape, textual 
definition often appears limitless and unfettered, with many novels ranging through an 
astonishing file of genres, motifs and references seemingly without rest or centre. 
Postmodem fiction seems to literalise the absence of grounding presence, as it offers a 
confusion of voices which suggest that it is only within the priorities of one's reading 
that ephemeral meanings emerge. Brian McHale, in his treatment of the 
characterisation of Anna Livia PlurabeHe at the end of Finnegmis Wake, gives a neat 
summary of this literary instability: 
there is no stable world behind this consciousness, but only a flux of discourse in which 
fragments of different incompatible realities flicker into existence and out of existence again, 
overwhelmed by the competing reality of language. 
Postmodernist fiction, in short. ' 
The lack of a stable referential world and the primacy of the unstable sign is the 
dominant equation of postmodern fiction. Taking as read the Foucauldian premise that 
'truth has a history', postmodern writing sketches realities without foundations which, 
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as McHale describes, compete with one another to temporarily assert dominance 
without the capacity to assert truth. As these realities 'flicker', meaning becomes trace 
and the book descends towards an alterity that resists the reductions of a dominant 
thought or theme within the text. 
However, building upon the groundwork laid by my introduction, I shall 
question the basis of this interpretation arguing especially that the stylistics of 
indeterminacy do not lead to an inevitable vacuum in the place of textual foundations. 
I shall argue that we must look at the alterity of postmodern fiction as a structuring 
device which denies indeterminacy through the offering of indeterminacy as theme. 
Furthermore, I shall move from the introduction's examination of the postmodern 
subject to the claim that character is still a central priority in the apparently anti- 
identity strategies of many postmodem works. Tying these themes of character and 
indeterminacy together will be my emphasis on the mystical, religious and spiritual 
presences common to much contemporary writing. By examining the connections 
between fictional indeterminacy and a religious aesthetic, I will provide an overview, 
to be expanded illustratively throughout this thesis, of the role played by mystical, 
religious or theological imagery in controlling the political and cultural message of 
postmodern fiction and stabilising the ontological threat generated by multiplicity. 
Postmodern characterisation 
Alongside postmodernism's largely ineffective incursion against the subject has been 
an equally direct attack upon the notion of character. As the concept of the 
determinable and self-consistent personality has been undermined, postmodernist 
fiction has responded by dissolving the individual character into multiple personae 
and constructed worlds. The characters created by such postmodem luminaries as 
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Pynchon, Coover, Carter, Auster and Barthelme appear as thoroughly temporal 
identities whose sense of self advances and recedes, unites and fragments, under the 
self-conscious fictional strategies of their creators. Such a perspective upon character 
is naturally compounded by a sceptical relation to the authoritative and omniscient 
author. Postmodern fiction attempts to draw the author into the status of fiction itself, 
and thus consign his or her intentional authority to a vacillation between fiction and 
reality. In the view of Roland Barthes, the movement from the Book to the Text has 
removed the author from his previous equivalence with a scriptural Father: 
If he is a novelist, he is inscribed in the novel like one of his characters, figured in the carpet; 
no longer privileged, paternal, aletheological, his inscription is ludic. He becomes, as it were, a 
paper 
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author, his life is no longer the origin of his fictions but a fiction contributing to his 
work. 
Barthes mixes any distinctive authorial mark into the 'ludic' quality of the language 
which the author uses. Thus the writer is soaked up by his own fictions and becomes 
subject to the reader's act of assembly. 3 Barthes's consignment of the author to the 
status of fictional play is a grounding link to the postmodem destruction of character. 
For as Barthes's author shares in the fictionality of a text dominated by the shifting 
signifier, the character's bond with intentionality is loosened and the idea of the self- 
consistent, essential character is questioned. Postmodernism seems to have completed 
a suspicion towards any representation of subjectivity that aims at psychological 
completion or verisimilitude. 4 Postmodern fiction steps into a world where the 
consistent character is displaced into fragments or confessed as a textual convention, 
rather than emerging from a general store of transcendent human characteristics. 
Finding fiction that exemplifies this positioning is not difficult. In John 
Barth's Lost in the Funhouse, Barth constantly draws the reader back from subjective 
identification with character through self-conscious digressions on literary technique 
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and narrative action. In 'Lost in the Funhouse', the story of the boy Ambrose's 
bewilderment in a disorientating fair-ground attraction is punctured by Barth's 
reflections on the obedience of his narrative to literary conventions: 
Description of physical appearance and mannerisms is one of the several standard methods of 
characterisation used by writers of fiction. It is also important to 'keep the senses operating'; 
when a detail from one of the five senses, say visual, is 'crossed' with a detail from another, 
say auditory, the reader's imagination is oriented to the scene, perhaps unconsciously. This 
procedure may be compared to the way surveyors and navigators determine their positions by 
two or more compass bearings, a process known 
5 
as triangulation. The brown hair on 
Ambrose's mother's forearms gleamed in the sun like. 
The return to the 'main' flow of the narrative in the last line of the quotation seems 
alienated by the prior revelations of characterisation technique. By confessing the 
fictional design which produces Ambrose and his family, Barth tries to steer the reader 
away from a depth model of character based on humanistic empathy, to a postmodern 
awareness of the superficiality and temporality of a character dependent upon 
narrative technique. Yet significantly, Barth seems also to be commenting beyond the 
limits of characterisation. His deconstruction of character extends to a general 
incursion into the assumptions which support ideas of the unique and continuous 
subject: 
No turning back now, we've gone too far. Everything's finished. Name eight. Story, novel, 
literature, art, humanism, humanity, the self itself. [ ... ] Who can say how near this universe 
has come to mere cessation? Or take two people, in a story of the sort it once was possible to 
tell. Love affairs, literary genres, third item in exemplary series, fourth -everything blossoms 
and decays, does it not, from the primitive and classical through the mannered and the baroque 
to the abstract, stylized, dehumanized, unintelligible, blank. (Barth, Fun House, pp. 104-5) 
Starting from the failure of the story, Barth works through to the disappearance of the 
self, as if the disintegration of fictional realism leads inexorably to the 'blank' of a 
world without ontological assurance. What is perhaps most intriguing about this 
passage, however, is the sense of teleological progression from the 'primary and 
classical' to the apocalyptic 'unintelligible, blank'. Barth seems to suggest that we 
have reached a kind of ontological terminus where all categories and subjects dissolve 
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into aporia and despair, and all that is left is Barth as a 'storyteller in an anxious 
time'. 6 What interests me here are the implications of this apocalyptic voice for the 
whole conception of the fictional subject. Barth's teleology is very reliant on notions 
of a rationality that comprehends an evolutionary historical development and self- 
consciously relates itself to that progression - in short, a subject. For I shall argue that 
postmodern fiction still relies on the idea of character because subjectivity is an 
essential component in presenting the meaningfulness of realised indeterminacy. 
Postmodern characters can appear fragmented and disparate. Yet these pluralised 
characters control the play of difference through a perspective which reasserts the 
philosophical salience of the detached creative individual in relation to a complex 
world. From such a vantage point, a metaphysics of self becomes essential to the 
emphasis on textual production and also limits the indeterminacy and alterity meant to 
reside within postmodem writing. 
To argue that postmodern fiction consolidates, rather than threatens, character, 
I shall stake my differences in relation to the more orthodox theory of postmodem 
character expressed by Thomas Docherty in his recent book Alterities. Docherty's 
argument is useful because his belief that postmodern writing reveals the fallacy of the 
coherent subject unwittingly seems to incorporate a revelatory teleology similar to the 
historical progression given by Barth. Docherty gives the postmodern reader, and 
therefore subject, a curious power by privileging his historical moment as one of total 
insight into ontological and epistemological history. 
Docherty proceeds from the basic opinion that: 
the primacy afforded to character in the novel has been a constant means of evading the 
temporality of character, the existence of character in and through time. [... ] This evasion of 
temporality has itself been instrumental in allowing criticism's evasion of history, in which 
criticism has 'bracketed off' characters from novels, and novels from their historical situation 
and ideological moment. (Docherty, Alterities, p. 39) 
58 
Docherty scans his eye over the novel from the eighteenth century up to the 
postmodern period and sees a type of characterisation that postulates an essential 
individual travelling though time, rather than a personality in constant mutation. He 
rejects the argument that the morally developmental themes of, say, the Victorian 
novel, offer early examples of a preoccupation with temporality. Docherty counters 
such examples by arguing that the characters they present are in a process of 'coming 
to being' (Docherty, Allerilies, p. 39), a process where time contributes towards self- 
realisation, thus asserting the belief that there is an intrinsic self to be realised. It is this 
type of transcendent characterisation that Docherty sees as ethically dangerous, for it 
suggests that the individual is detached from the material and temporal processes of 
life. Consequently, the material conditions of life become of secondary importance to 
psychological fulfilment, and Docherty consequently views any characterisation which 
does not take account of temporal difference as inimical to a sound historical 
materialism. In some of his earlier work, Docherty suggested that the poststructuralist 
shift away from the authority of the author not only resulted in a more liberatory, 
reader-centred approach to textuality, but also made character more related to surface 
rather than depth. The status of character as representational surface, however, is not 
perceived as a vacuity for the reader, but as a sense of ontological possibility in the 
7 
exploration of temporal identities. Thus postmodern characterisation, for Docherty, 
starts to tie in with an ethically motivated resistance to ideologies that seek to imprison 
identities in uniform models. 
Docherty's theoretical anchor is Foucault. Like Foucault, Docherty targets the 
eighteenth century as the moment where the modem subject is invented under the 
mythology of Enlightenment reason, a reason which in turn produced colonial 
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aggression tied to economic liberalism. The effect within fiction of such an ideology 
of the subject, particularly in the early novel, is that: 
the notion of character as locus of the revelation of an essential human nature provides a form 
which, while seeming to grant some measure of independence and a democratic equality to the 
individual, actually serves to proffer a normative legitimate role for the individual in a specific 
social formation: in short, the novel's characters enact certain practices as socially normative. 
(Docherty, Alterities, p. 44) 
The objection here levelled at traditional characterisation is that independent, self- 
determining character actually constrains identity by insisting on a human nature that 
sanctions capitalist liberal economy. Thus the pre-postmodem fictional character 
serves to naturalise a bourgeois ideology and make it appear as a groundwork of 
identity. 
Docherty presents postmodem writing as a release from humanistic 
characterisation, with Foucault again offering the key to this periodising shift: 
Foucault has argued that 'man is only a recent invention, a figure not yet two centuries old, a 
new wrinkle in our knowledge [who] will disappear again as soon as that knowledge has 
discovered a new form'. The delineaments of this new form are now being traced in 
postmodern modes of knowledge, narrative, and characterisation. (Docherty, Atterities, p. 42)8 
Supported by Foucault's exposure of the agenda and history behind the subject, 
postmodem literature can explore a characterisation which operates an 'economy of 
alterity' (Docherty, Alterities, p. 40). In such an -economy the character does not 
contain a map of human nature, but acts purely as 'a locus of temporal difference' 
(Docherty, Alterities, p. 45) which respects material temporality and social 
transformations. Postmodern fiction effects its disruption of the subject by 
fragmenting character through multiple identities and sources, by positioning 
characters in sites of contradiction or inconsistency, or by offering character sketches 
which disallow the formulation of identities free from representation. 
Postmodern narrative insists on offering the merest fragments of character, without ever 0 
allowing for a fully coherent construction of an identifiable whole; it is, as it were, like a series 
of torn photographs, a photo-montage; and frequently, in its narcissistic self-consciousness, it 
offers fragmentary portraits of the artist or writer. Postmodern narrative stresses the 
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'difference' from which an 'identity' is always recuperated, salvaged, or forged in those prior 
theorizations of the process of characterization. (Dochcrty, A Itefilles, pp. 45-6) 
Docherty perceives the value of postmodern characterisation as a dissolution of the 
'identifiable whole' which Docherty sees as underpinning centuries of colonial 
imperialism. As character disperses into difference, the reader is restrained from trying 
to process the text in line with a belief in novelistic unity and authorial mastery. In 
effect the postmodern character prohibits what Deleuze and Guattari might term the 
'territorialisation' of the text. 9 Instead, the reader is left with the process of reading in 
all its temporal mobility rather than its imperial presence. Docherty exemplifies this 
'temporal disposition or dislocation of the reading subject' (Docherty, Alterilies, p. 57) 
with Pynchon's Yhe Crying of Lot 49 and Borges's 'The Garden of Forking Paths' in 
Labyrinths. These texts, Docherty claims, decentre the act of giving priority to 
ontology which accompanied traditional expectations of character and provide multiple 
possibilities for character interpretation. The resulting textual alterity is offered as a 
distinctly ethical progression from previous forms of literature because it forces 
acknowledgement of historical motion and fluidity, rather than attempting to dominate 
history in transcendent or teleological narrative: 
Earlier modes of characterization are related to the imperialist and colonialist impetus of 
modernity's appropriation of space, and the grounds on which a position of intentional 
authority is afforded an imperial self through its 'knowledge' of and understanding of an 
oppressed charactcrological or epistemological Other. Postmodern characterization disturbs 
this position by the injection of a temporal component in the process of reading character, 
replacing the notion of 'position' with that of the poststructuralist displacement or 
'disposition'. In short, postmodern characterization seeks to return the dimension of history 
which earlier modes of characterization, or of the theoretical understanding of character as 
'identity', deny. (DochcrtyAltefifies, pp. 58-9) 
For Docherty, postmodern narrative is the most sincerely historical fonn of writing. 
With the advent of postmoden-dsm, Docherty argues that we have reached a much 
clearer perspective on the influence of time and multiplicity upon our much treasured 
history of identity. The 'alterities' which surround the postmodern character liberate 
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the reading subject from hegemonic ways of thinking and place them in touch with the 
temporality which is genuine history and the basis of what Docherty sees as a more 
promising historical materialism. 
Whereas Docherty sees the alterity of the postmodern character as a movement 
into a historical and ethical temporality, I shall argue almost the exact reverse. For it is 
my contention that postmodern narratives do not dispense with the expectations of 
identity or with the reader's sense of ontological hierarchy. Instead, alterity, which is 
offered as an almost transcendent motif of the stylistics of indeterminacy, actually 
reaffirms psychological and philosophical models as the primary focus of the fiction. 
Yet I shall begin my criticism of Docherty's theory of postmodcrn fiction by 
targeting his assertion that postmodern characterisation is inherently more 'historical' 
than previous forms of literature, a debate which I shall expand in Chapter 4. Firstly, it 
must be noted that the distinctions between postmodern and previous forms of 
literature, especially Modernist writing, are far from clear. Fokkema points out that 
criticism of Modernist characterisation by critics like Charles Glicksberg and Dennis 
Brown, has produced an analysis which likewise sees character as 'an absence, a self 
stripped of ontological truth'. 10 Modernist and postmodernist characterisation are 
often separated by the contention that modernism still holds to the idea of the unique 
subject and the 'inner reality of character' (Fokkema, Characters, p. 57), even though 
this subject is disordered and fragmented. Postmodernism, on the other hand, holds no 
such acceptance of the subject as the centre of experience and identity formation. Yet 
this distinction does not hold much coherence on account of the importance of the 
reader's subjectivity in a postmodern view of history. 
Docherty's account of the history of temporality in fiction is informed by a 
questionable teleology in which there is an ethical progression from the ignorance of 
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imperialistic identity through to the enlightenment of postmodern. alterity. If the 
characterisation of the past is exposed by Docherty as 'historically and culturally 
specific' (Docherty, Alterities, p. 37) then, by implication, postmodern characterisation 
is the coming into consciousness of this fault; postmodernism exposes the difference 
that has always been present. Thus what postmodern characterisation achieves is the 
revelation of the pre-postmodern ideological suppression of alterity, the subjugation of 
difference under totality. Equally, it reveals the alterity in the subject and history that 
was present even in times when alterity was not conceptually asserted or valued. 
Through the basic process of deconstruction, Docherty attempts to show up the 
aporiae that were 'present' in texts such as Defoe's Robinson Crusoe and Moll 
Flanders, Woolf s To the Lighthouse and The Waves and Proust's A la recherche du 
temps perdu, texts whose historical moment and literary form did not accede to a 
philosophy of implied absence but to an acceptance of core identity. 
At this point, Docherty's exposure of the alterity of character starts to strain 
itself against his contention that postmodern narrative is more open to the temporality 
of history than other forms of literature. The first problem is that the economy of 
alterity detaches itself from the temporal dimension that is meant to be its origin. 
Alterity is treated as an ahistorical reality which the pre-postmodern world suppressed 
in its domination of a difference that postmodernism's theoretical archaeologists have 
finally unearthed. By offering the indeterminate identity as authentic, Docherty is 
saying that postmodernism is the moment where the true nature of the being is 
discovered to a greater ethical satisfaction. Postmodern fiction, therefore, does not 
lead to the rejection of the unitary character, but actually converges on such a subject 
by both promoting ontological awareness as a major theme and by showing its 
subjectivity as an ahistorical condition. Aleid Fokkema holds a similar conviction: 
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By sitting in front of a miffor in order to 'tune in' to her or his multiple selves [ ... 1, by 
reading a book which forces its reader to take up a number of different positions of 
subjectivity, this reader will simply exchange the old ideology of the unified subject for a 
belief in the fragmented self. The point is, though, that character, once liberal and now 
liberated, is still seen as an autonomous agent. The celcbratory postmodernists arc therefore 
less radical than they seem: the liberal belief in the autonomy of character still holds sway. 
(Fokkema, Characters, p. 63) 
Fokkema deflates any revolutionary sentiments within postmodern characterisation by 
identifying its latent insistence upon subjectivity as an 'autonomous' sphere. It may 
well be that the character of postmodern fiction has lost the appearance of a consonant 
subjectivity, but the identity of such characters still coheres around their primary 
function of ontological illustration and subjective definition. It is not surprising, 
Fokkema argues, that postmodem writers such as William Gass and Raymond 
Federman move the postmodern dissolution of character closer to a 'quietist reverence 
of Being' (Fokkema, Character, p. 66). 11 Once language and indeterminacy become 
primary, then it is a short metaphysical step before subjectivity effects a 
transcendental orbit over materiality and celebrates purified being. In a theological 
step akin to that taken by Manichean dualism, fictional alterity acts as the trope under 
which an intimation of pure being can be experienced and the material and spiritual 
worlds are effectively separated. 
The economy of alterity cannot support its own time-frame and thus provides 
no basis for the argument that postmodernism is uniquely empathetic with material 
temporality. For by presenting alterity as an ontologically veracious concept, Docherty 
ironically subdues history in the confines of an ethical relation with difference, rather 
than seeing ideological moments whose content defines how the world is to be seen. 
To understand 'imperialist' conceptions of character as inadequate because of their 
suppression of temporality is to deny that the concept of alterity itself has a history. 
Alterity, like earlier notions of identity, is historically shaped into discursive and 
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dialogic presences which attain, however briefly, permanence and presence. Perhaps 
Docherty's mistake is to attempt to free the postmodern subject from being socially 
constructed, by finding a position which somehow does not belong to ideology. Once 
such a position is held, how can one resist the 'imperialistic' impulse toward history 
that was the original point of rejection? 
The pluralised and indeterminate features of postmodern fiction lead us not to 
an 'economy of difference', but to an inetaphysical aesthetic of difference that 
privileges alterity almost as a surrogate divinity. For in writing a novel essentially 
about the absolute influence of the negative, that negativity becomes the external 
horizon of being, ethics and epistemology. The aesthetic of alterity in turn enables the 
concept of character to be preserved because it maintains fictional multiplicity within 
the remit of dialogues in which the viewing subject is privileged and alterity is 
ontologically stable. Gerald Graff takes steps towards defining the nature of these 
dialogues, when he shows how postmodern writing easily makes the step from self- 
critical form to aesthetic 'pathos'. Graff uses Borges as a primary example and 
initiallY concludes that Borges shows: 
techniques of reflexiveness and self parody [which] suggest 
12 
a universe in which human 
consciousness is incapable of transcending its own mythologies. 
For Graff, Borges exemplifies what he calls the 'tragic' version of postmodemism. 
The tragedy is one of human imprisonment, where the human being, without an 
essence on which to balance and judge, is constantly trapped within the fictions and 
narratives which form its identity. The implication is that humans may be bom free, 
but their identity is always in chains. However, Graff then makes the step of outlining 
the aesthetic profundity on which this tragic perspective relies. The effect of the 
postmodern self-involvement is to 'generate a pathos at the absence of a transcendent 
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order of meanings' (Graff, Literature, pp. 55-6). With the creation of a mood of self- 
conscious loss, the 'memory' of the 'undistorted' world is aesthetically recalled from 
the postmodern distortions. Thus the 'critical power of absence remains intact, giving 
Borges a perspective for judging the unreality of the present' (Graff, Literature, p. 56). 
Graff suggests that the absences within postmodern writing do rely upon the 
logocentric ideas which they lament or disrupt. So the tropes of God, self, and 
identity, maintain their status and priority as postmodern fiction dwells upon their 
loss, simultaneously protecting against this loss by communicating the ontological and 
epistemological significance of the postmodern message. So in many ways, 
postmodern writing is a permanent inhabitant of metaphysical and humanist values. 
The important point for our assessment of character is that however 
fragmented the ontological order of a character may become, he or she still proclaims 
the centrality of the subject. Postmodem characterisation may well be stylistically 
different from the form found in novels in other literary periods. Yet what is not so 
unique is the way that it still maintains reflection on the nature of subjectivity as its 
primary feature. Indeed, most postmodern characters seem to offer little more than an 
abstract reflection upon the nature of subjectivity, its composition and reality. 
An excellent example of character basing itself upon a postmodern aporia is to 
be found in Fowles's The French Lieutenant's Woman. In the pivotal Chapter 
Thirteen, Fowles addresses the question as to who exactly is the character Sarah 
Woodruff, the enigmatic protagonist of the novel. The answers which are provided 
unsettle the relationship between fiction, subjectivity and realism: 
I do not know. This story I am telling is all imagination. These characters I create never 
existed outside of my own mind. If I have pretended until now to know my character's minds 
and innermost thoughts, it is because I am writing in Oust as I assumed some of the vocabulary 
and 'voice' of) a convention universally accepted at the time of my story: that the novelist 
stands next to God. He may not know all, yet he tries to pretend that he does. But I live in the 
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age of Alain Robbe-Grillet and Roland Barthes; if this is a novel, it cannot be a novel in the 
modern sense of the word. 13 
McHale has noted this passage as an example of postmodern 'frame breaking' 
(McHale, Postmodemist, pp. 197-8), where the author breaks the frame of the 
appearance of reality, thus exposing that the reader is not touching character or 
history in itself, but is actually living within a 'writing situationg. 14 McHale describes 
the factor of infinite regress involved in this fictional strategy. Once history is 
fictionalised, all realities, including those of the author and character, become open to 
an endless fictional relativity as signification becomes uncertain. There is a sense in 
which Fowles has deliberately divided the ontological substance of Sarah Woodruff. 
She has moved from being a character that promises to be fully revealed, to a fictional 
existence whose character is split between reality and representation. In such a 
position 'Sarah' is under erasure: she is flattened into the surface of the text, and her 
character is always the testimony to the linguistic alterity within narrative identity. 
However, after Fowles's typically postmodem destabilisation of character, he 
then seems to perform a rather strange volteface. Following from the assertion that 'a 
genuinely created world must be independent of its creator' (Fowles, French, p. 86), 
Fowles proceeds to claim that the author is now a conduit for the freedoin of 
characters outside of the old constraints of authorial supremacy: 
The novelist is still a god, since he creates (and not even the most aleatory avante-garde 
modern novel has managed to extirpate its author completely); what has changed is that we are 
no longer the gods of the Victorian image, omniscient and decreein ; but in the new 09 
theological image, with freedom our first principle, not authority. (Fowles, French, p. 86) 
Fowles admits to the fictionality of character, but implies that this fictional status can 
signify a liberation from the character's subservience to the author. The digressionary 
Chapter Thirteen introduces the 'new theological image' of a divinity that no longer 
offers itself as ground, instead permitting the character/subject to show its fictionality 
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and thus escape the naturalistic models of social order prevalent in the Victorian era. 
Fowles's ethical policy seems to be an urge to treat the characters as subjects in their 
own right, subjects who are self-determining beyond the pushings and proddings of 
the author. Thus the author is both an alterity, because he has declared the fiction 
independent of author, and the authority that allows alterity to be the guiding fictional 
regimen. In effect, therefore, alterity is not a 'new theological image' but new 
theology, a theology where abstracted negativity assures us of the integrity of the 
subjective self and the absolute jurisdiction of the author. By making characterisation 
more self-conscious in his fiction, Fowles ironically eulogises the independence of 
subjectivity from narrative and, in effect, the transcendence of social constraints. 
Having shown us the constructed nature of subjectivity in narrative conventions, 
Fowles goes on to show us that the alterity of a fictional character, one beyond the 
control of the author, indicates the route to a full experience of the independent self. 
On many levels Fowles is uncertain whether to retreat from the subjectivity of 
the liberal humanist tradition. Yet on the basis of my general arguments, I suggest that 
the problem is resolved for him by the postmodem stylistics that he applies. As much 
postmodernism theorises the historical subject, it keeps individual ontological 
integrity alive by giving priority to the significance of ontological questions, a fact that 
qualifies Linda Hutcheon's idea of 'historiographic metafiction'. Hutcheon interprets 
novels such as The French Lieutenant's Woman as works which: 
define the subject in terms that are rather different, in the end, from those of liberal humanist 
individualism and human essence. There is no transcending of the particularities of the 
historical and social system. The subject, in a novel like Midnight's Children, is constituted in 
a way that postmodern theory would define as 'the individual in sociality as a language-using, 
social and historical entity' (Coward and Ellis 1977,1) Such a definition almost must, if not 
preclude, then at least challenge, the humanist faith in the individual as free, unified, coherent, 
and consistent. 15 
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Hutcheon's postmodem literature leads away from liberal humanist notions of the 
individuated self towards a concept of the historically constructed and psychologically 
fragmented subject. The postmodem character, like Fowles's Sarah Woodruff or 
Charles Smithson, is a character who is not only a product of an age, but is also 
produced by the representations of that age. Thus for Hutcheon the self-reflexive 
characterisation we see in The French Lieutenant's Woman lays bare the process of 
construction and representation, and attacks the idea that there is such a thing as the 
Gnatural' or 'eternal'. Yet the techniques of this novel frequently mediate social 
reflections through ontological speculations and hence the material is kept subservient 
to an Enlightenment 'pure' philosophy. Hutcheon needs to give more consideration to 
the difference between reflecting upon society and engaging with society. 
Postmodernism tends towards the former activity, locking itself into an unproductive 
attempt to question representation while pretending to avoid any metanarrative 
commitment. 
There is, it would seem, a real problem with Hutcheon's argument that the 
liberal-humanist subject is disrupted by postmodern writing such as that of Fowles. 16 
Postmodern characterisation works by questioning the ontological securities of 
character and reader. Yet it also, by destabilising the metanarrative, prohibits the 
character's thematic role in the novel from reaching beyond the ontological impasse 
into socio-historical or psychological conclusion. There are many postmodem 
novelists who engage directly with historical subject matter, including such luminaries 
as Barth, Barthelme, Pynchon, Reed and Winterson. They strive for an alterity of 
character which cannot be included within metanarrative structures. Their characters 
appear to be figures of alterity, riddled with absence, otherness and multiplicity in 
worlds where historical forces are continually constructing and reconstructing the 
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subject. What occurs in this situation is a renewed, and to some extent valuable, 
consciousness of the relation between the subject and history. Yet what is reinforced 
is that the only possibility of the character reaching a metanarrative conclusion about 
the world in which they exist, is through the realisation of the presence of alterity and 
difference as a guiding philosophy. Consequently, the character's and the reader's 
condition becomes one distinguished by the self-conscious acceptance that one can 
never know the external world, but one can experience an awakening to the 
representational nature of that world. The effect of this realisation is actually grounded 
in the liberal humanist subject, as the function of character becomes that of revealing 
the centrality of the subject as the primary philosophical question. Seen in this light, a 
redefinition of alterity must be proposed. Defining alterity as the stylistic and thematic 
pursuit of otherness, I would argue that treating alterity as an indefinable play within 
the text is an unnecessary mystification. Alterity should be treated as a theme like any 
other, one that drives, contributes, limits. The alterity of the postmodern character is 
the theme of the fiction itself, a theme which relies on the humanist interest in the 
subject. Yet this motif seems to be more materially limited than the humanist 
philosophy it opposes. All postmodern characterisation is generally able to do is to 
discuss the subject's relation to representations of history; it is rarely able to 
recommend how the subject should then proceed in relation to that history. 
Postmodern characters rely upon the theme of the subject because, as I argued earlier 
in relation to Graff, they assert the need for the viewing subject to lift above history, 
representation, consciousness, and see the way that society and personality are 
constructed. Postmodernist fiction, perhaps more than any other form of literature, 
requires an almost transcendent subjective viewing position which enables either 
reader or character to perceive the alterity of character and translate this into an ethical 
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/ social message. Postmodernity is fundamentally an epoch which demands free 
subjects. 
We can now see that postmodern characterisation has driven itself into a 
theoretical cul-de-sac, trapped between dispersing the subject in representations and 
ideologies and privileging the subject which rccognises this situation to be so, thus 
asserting the conception of subjective freedom over representational imprisonment. 
Postmodern characters are topographically different from the characters of the 
eighteenth and nineteenth century novel, yet they are the same in that they still offer 
the common theme of the development or comprehension of human consciousness. 
Under this interpretation, the thematic boundaries of alterity do not engender a 
challenge to liberal humanism, but merely rephrase its concerns. Through the midst of 
various strategies of indeterminacy, emerges a basic and familiar concern with 
understanding the human situation and establishing philosophical understanding. 
Perhaps this is why the containment of postmodem nomenclature within academia has 
been so pronounced, as postmodernism continues a distinctly theoretical reflection on 
the broad content of existence, a traditional focus of liberal humanist education. If 
anything, postmodern fiction is the continuation of liberal humanism by other means. 
Perhaps what has been most overlooked in considerations of alterity in 
postmodern fiction is its role as a surrogate spiritual presence against whose aesthetic 
power the character understands the self. Critics like Patricia Waugh have noted 
distinct aesthetic similarities between postmodernism, modernism and romanticism. 
Waugh contends that postmodernism and romanticism share a reaction against 
Enlightenment forms of rationality by expressing themselves in a reinvigorated 
aestheticism which grants art 'a central place in the organisation of human 
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experience'. 17 Waugh senses in postmodernism an unwitting move from anti- 
foundationalism into a new aestheticism and metanarrative of self- 
Remove the forever and there is the spectre of solipsism; remove the inner self as a stable 
entity which can be looked into and there is Nietzschcan bodily driven aesthetic self- 
overcoming. (Waugh, Practising, p. 21) 
Here Waugh describes the result of a Romanticism which removed the divine I AM, 
but by so doing relocated the divine creativity within the aesthetic drives of the post- 
Enlightenment selL Waugh sees clear similarities between this Romantic aesthetic and 
the postmodern insistence upon alterity and the sublime. 18 Postmodernism, Waugh 
claims, is not a break with but a continuation of Romantic and Modernist movements 
that subscribe to an aesthetically self-defining character. 19 With the death of the 
metanarrative, truth and fiction merge and so the aesthetic 'has actually incorporated 
everything into itself' (Waugh, Practising, p. 6). Combining my views on 
characterisation with Waugh's ideas on the postmodern aesthetic, we can argue that 
what postmodem characterisation offers is an aesthetic of selfhood which reveals a 
total and creative cognition of being. This revelatory capacity of postmodem 
characters can be translated as a form of aesthetic epiphany: 
The epiphanic moment is supposedly immanent rather than transcendent, but similarly 
involving a return to a state of primordial unity before the division into subject and object, 
mind and body. (Waugh, Practising, p. 10) 0 
In line with Waugh's contention, I would suggest that postmodern characterisation 
races towards an aesthetic epiphany where the 'primordial unity' of the subject is 
established. By making indeterminacy and fragmentation a theme of the fictional 
character itself, postmodem novels strive towards an immanence that is rather a 
transcendence. For by making characters whofully experience their implication in the 
composition of the external world, postmodern fiction achieves a kind of subjective 
holism where the character becomes the nexus between external and internal worlds. 
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In addition, because metanarratives of the unified self still inform postmodern 
expectations, indeterminacy becomes a mode of living, a horizon for activity and a 
hidden creed for behaviour and perception. This is achieved, however, not by 
rationalistic dogma, but by offering a non-rationalistic knowledge of the self, an 
aesthetic instinct in which the 'truth' of the human identity lies beyond the restrictions 
of the conceptual in a moment beyond representation. This aesthetic describes a 
striking resemblance to the postmodem sublime, even though Lyotard cautioned 
against turning the sublime into an ideal category in itself. Yet once otherness takes 
the thematic centre ground, it cannot resist the metaphysical identity. The transference 
of the postmodern character, under what Docherty asserts as the 'economy of alterity', 
to an aesthetic of self, is due to a misguided resistance to foundations that only 
succeeds in giving a total focus on the nature of ontological identity. 20 
It is by such a route that the latent, or even overt, mysticism in much 
postmodern fiction emerges. Before examining these spiritual tendencies in greater 
depth, I shall give an illustration of how the aesthetic character operates within 
postmodern fiction. Milan Kundera's The Unbearable Lightness of Being, like 
Fowles's The French Lieutenant's Woman, deliberately confesses the fictional status 
of the characters, as we see here when he reflects on the image of his central character, 
Tomas, who stands looking out of an open window: 
And once more I see him the way he appeared to me at the very beginning of the novel: 
standing in a window and staring across the courtyard at the walls opposite. 
This is the image from which he was born. As I have pointed out before, characters are not 
born like people, of woman; they are born of a situation, a sentence, a metaphor containing in a 
nutshell a basic human possibility that the author thinks no one else has discovered or said 
something essential aboUt. 21 
Kundera reveals the provenance of his characters partly in linguistic and conventional 
constructs, thus disquieting the humanist character who emerges out of a slavish 
compatibility with the 'real' humanity external to a situated personality and language. 
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The insistence on the character as act of metaphor, however, sits awkwardly with 
Kundera's contention that the character contains 'a basic human possibility'. 
Poststructuralism insists on metaphor as representative of the arbitrary nature of 
language. 22 Thus when Tomas is described as metaphor, his identity seems consigned 
to a condition of signifying difference, rather than reaching out towards a prescription 
of human nature. Yet Kundera appears to hold out a certain confidence that Tomas 
does distinguish the real from the metaphorical. The metaphor is described as 
4containing' the 'basic human possibility', offering the image that some ontological 
reality can be reached by looking through the metaphor to its referent. Moreover, the 
aesthetic procedure of the metaphor, an artistic reconnection of signifier and signified, 
grants to both Tomas and Kundera the possibility of defining human identity through 
an aesthetic act. 23 As a result, resistance to social constraints is possible through the 
possession of metaphorical processes. 
Ultimately, Kundera's aesthetic prises itself away from the remit of 
postmodernism. His characters speak of a humanistic self-realisation that takes them 
beyond the confines of totalitarianism. Kundera's characters reach out towards the 
possibility of a liberated human essentiality: 
The characters in my novels are my own unrealized possibilities. That is why I am equally 
fond of them all and equally horri f ied by them. Each has crossed a border which I myself have 
circumvented. It is that crossed border (the border beyond which my own T ends) which 
attracts me most. For beyond that border begins the secret the novel asks about. The novel is 
not the author's confession; it is an investigation of human life in the trap the world has CP 
become. (Kundera, Lightness, p. 221) 
For Kundera, the characters of his novels project the liberation of a defined and self- 
determining subjectivity. His hostility seems mostly directed towards that which 
imprisons the T in 'the trap the world has become'. What his characters give, by an 
act of aesthetic envisioning, is a set of surrogate selves for the authorial subjectivity. 
Yet these selves are able to explore a multitude of ontological possibilities only by 
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virtue of their relation to a mystical 'border' where the individual reaches a position of 
fulfilment beyond social hegemonies. Kundera. hints towards an ineffable moment 
where the T dissolves and being becomes purified in a moment of unity with that 
which lies beyond all categorisation. The alterity that resides in the representational 
confessions of The Unbearable Lightness of Being does not act as the awareness of 
suppressed others, but gestures in the direction of an Absolute Other in all its 
theological overtones and epiphanic expectations. Alterity is not conceptually 
explained, but is used as a subjective border through which being is encountered, 
transforming alterity into an aesthetic compulsion with all the pathos and mysticism of 
the romantic exploration of self. 
Kundera's appreciation of character is far from typical of all contemporary 
writers, yet he displays an urge which is inherent in much postmodern fiction. 
Kundera explores characterisation, its voids and metaphoricity, in order to reach 
towards an intuitive conception of the self and its place in the world. The mystical 
resonance of the 'border' where the T dissolves is extremely significant not only in 
the context of my debate of the postmodem character, but for this thesis as a whole. 
The alterity sought through much postmodem characterisation is not an endless 
testimony to the processes of difference, but actually elicits an aesthetic ideal of self 
definition where subjectivity is retained, even heightened, by the ontological priorities 
of othemess. The voids of postmodem psychology are custom-made for a radical self- 
consciousness that relies upon trans-rational allusions in a foundationless context. 
This argument leads me back to the point I made in Chapter One: alterity is a specific 
theme which functions as an ontological stabiliser and quasi-religious experience. The 
indeterminacy of postmodern fiction, like the god of negative theology, keeps the 
characters in relation to an absolute that cannot be defined but which grounds the 
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interpretative process of understanding. My complaint is not that postmodern fiction 
produces this acute ontological consciousness. I believe that a confidence in the 
subject is an essential of inter-personal discourse. My main concern is that 
postmodernism's sense of moving beyond the traditional self produces an aporetic 
philosophy that transcends social content rather than engaging with it. Above all, 
postmodernist appeals to alterity and indeterminacy often belie the strict functions that 
otherness plays in revisiting and reinforcing traditions of omniscient subjectivity. The 
'border' to which Kundera refers seems a more accurate rephrasing of the term 
alterity, for negativity opens a borderzone that the subject must cross to understand its 
true ontological condition. This condition has more to do with sublimity and ideality 
than it does with temporality and fragmentation. Thus I shall now consider the relation 
between theology and alterity in postmodern fiction in particular, before offering a 
summary of what I see as the functions of this spiritual alterity within different 
postmodernist fictional settings. 
Fictional alterity and postmodern spirituality 
As I have made an explicit allegiance between postmodern alterity and metaphysical 
negativity, there is a primary problem which must be faced in applying this contention 
to a literary environment. The problem is essentially that of defining how alterity is 
reified within a postmodern text when terms such as 'alterity', 'other', even 
'postmodernism' are not actually present in the text. Many would claim that the 
typical construction of a postmodern novel prohibits reification and centralisation, and 
any attempt to discern a metaphysical master trope is somewhat missing the point. 
Fictional alterity, they might say, is not a thing or a theme, but the absence within a 
metafictional text that prevents the establishment of an interpretational ground with 
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which to totalise the narrative. Thus any spiritual or religious motifs produced by the 
postmodern text are relational not central and have their metaphysical security 
constantly eroded by the irrepressible 'presence' of alterity. By way of direct contrast, 
my argument shall be that postmodern fiction centralises alterity as that which visibly 
governs the priorities of style and content within the text, even to the extent of alterity 
receiving clear names, often capitalised, that signpost the development of the plot. 
Once it attains this visibility within the text, alterity can become a thematic absolute 
that dominates, contra Docherty, the other elements of the text. In short, alterity is the 
most important thing within the postmodern novel, as its conscious recognition is a 
precondition of the political, ethical and subjective content of the novel. I have already 
argued that postmodern alterity enhances rather than destabilises the priority of 
character and subject. Building on this contention, I shall argue that the intense 
relationship that postmodern fiction builds between a self-conscious subject and a 
visible theme of alterity explains the distinctly religious dimension in postmodern 
writing. Moreover, this metaphysical dimension is not merely something which the 
literary critic extracts, but is also a very explicit property of much contemporary 
writing. Part of my overall concern in this thesis is to show why the ostensibly anti- 
metaphysical stance of postmodern fiction has so consistently involved itself with 
spiritual motifs whose purpose cannot be explained away by parody or 
metafictionality. 
A useful way into the main body of my arguments is through the introductory 
chapter of Sanford Budick and Wolfgang Iser's Languages of the Unsayable: The 
Play of Negativity in Literature and Literary Theory. Budick and Iser posit negativity 
in fiction as that which 'in its very nature eludes conceptualization'. 24 Despite this, 
negativity retains a function as an opening up of the 'unsayable', with negativity 
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qualifying the static presences of language and placing the text within 'the sequential 
or temporal nature of the play movement itself (Budick and Iser, Negativity, p. xiii). 
Budick and Iser seem to align themselves with a typically Derridean position in relation 
to the negative, where negativity is not a thing in itself, but an operation of the text 
which opens up meamng to greater play and reveals that which is unsaid in the text. 
Throughout their introduction, they are insistent that negativity should never be treated 
as a thing in itself, and that the 'presence' of negativity is discernible only in terms of 
its effect: 25 
A negativity which is traceable only through its impact exists in marked opposition to an 
Hegelian negativity whose dialectical concept appropriates negativity for the purpose of 
bringing about self-consciousness. Indeed, in the modem post-Hegelian tradition there is a 
tendency to reify negativity by conceiving it as a determined negation or even as a kind of 
ordained enabling structure. Alternatively, it is defined as an antithesis to the empirical 
world which, as antithesis, incipiently affirms something that is as yet absent, though 
heralded. (Budick and Iser, Negafivity, p-xiii) 
Budick and Iser are resistant to a Hegelian negativity on the grounds that it treats the 
negative as a dialogic element which manoeuvres the subject towards synthetic goals. 
Thus Hegelian negativity is reified and transfonned into either an essential principle or 
a transcendental category, both of which operate as foundations. It is the dialectical 
concept of reification which Budick and Iser assault that I find most convincing when 
trying to understand tendencies of negativity and alterity in postmodern fiction. What 
Budick and Iser need to explain is how negativity can resist becorning a reified and 
dialogical quality once it enters into conceptual discourse. Budick and Iser give 
fictional negativity a metaphysical edge by paradoxically locating it beyond rational 
appropriation while strenuously attempting to define its scope of effect, its antitheses, 
and its descriptive shape. In saying that the concepts of negativity are always 
inadequate, Budick and Iser imply that the assignation of presence to alterity, 
something inevitable in fiction where alterity is top of the novelistic hierarchy, is 
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somehow inauthentic to the 'real' nature of the negative. The problem then becomes 
one in which the fictional content is rendered subservient to an all-powerful alterity to 
which the subject relates, but at the same time says it cannot grasp. This denial of 
perception in effect brings about the suspension of social commitment and the free- 
floating subject which I noted in my introductory chapter, as alterity leaves its effects 
at the level of cognitive disruption without proceeding to social recommendation. 
Returning to the 'dialectical concept' which 'appropriates negativity for the 
purpose of bringing about self-consciousness', I believe that this is in fact an accurate 
description of the way that alterity functions in postmodern fiction. For what most 
postmodern fiction achieves is the gathering of all the elements of the novel under the 
umbrella of alterity. Reified by its own metaphysical packaging, alterity then becomes 
a site in itself which starts to work like the endlesslY deferred God of the via negativa: 
the silence that never reveals itself but which is always in dialogue with the subject's 
consciousness of its own spiritual condition. Returning to Altizer, we could also argue 
that postmodern alterity reaches towards an apocalyptic moment of history where the 
negative is faced in all its absolute sway and potency and all metanarratives collapse. 
Thus postmodern fiction's play upon images of social collapse and degeneration can 
be interpreted as a stripping away of the socially extraneous in the hunt for the tense 
confrontation with otherness. 
A fictional example will help illustrate these points. As I said above, alterity is 
merely a label for the postmodem stylistics of indeterminacy. These stylistics equal 
the standard package of postmodem writing strategies described by McHale and many 
others, strategies which disrupt conventional expectations of linearity, chronology, 
subject matter and intelligibility. Yet, indeterminacy is used not so much as the 
process within language, but route for a pilgrimage towards a final confrontation with 
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the eternal negative. In Paul Auster's The New York Trilogy, we have a text layered 
with all the circuitous trappings of the detective novel, with the appropriate emphasis 
on the activities of deduction. Yet the rational security usually found in deductive 
activity is undermined by a continual pull into the total negativity of an arbitrary and 
uncontrollable expansion of signs and worlds. In 'City of Glass', Quinn, the self- 
styled detective, is one who initially holds out a confidence in the integration of signs 
into meaning: 
The detective is the one who looks, who listens, who moves through this morass of objects and 
events in search of the thought, the idea that will pull all these things together and make sense 
of them. In effect, the writer and the detective are interchangeable. 26 
Quinn's definitions of the detective and the writer depend on a belief in a stable world 
of evidence comprised of present elements capable of being drawn. together into a 
coherent and definitive d6nouement. However, once Quinn accepts the job of 
protecting the psychologically damaged Peter Stillman from his potentially murderous 
father, any analytical confidence collapses and structural confusion mounts in both 
reader and character. Quinn impersonates the detective named as Paul Auster, who 
ultimately turns out, not surprisingly, to be a writer rather than a detective. His 
subjective integrity split by this metafictional device, Quinn's attempt to pursue Peter 
Stillman senior is further hampered by two identical Stillmans appearing at New York 
Grand Central Station, the place where Quinn is meant to pick up Stillman senior's 
trail. Quinn's selection of which one to follow is thus an arbitrary selection. The clash 
of arbitrariness and significance is continued in Quinn's physical representation of 
Stillman's wanderings about New York. By drawing on a map Stillman's movements 
around the city, Quinn starts to see patterns of letters developing which, after several 
days of charting, appear as the sequence 'OWER OF BAB'. Quinn deduces that this 
sequence is part of the phrase 'The Tower of Babel', a theological preoccupation of 
80 
the young Stillman senior who as a religious writer was obsessed with the Fall from 
God's original language. It was this language that he attempted to discover by 
imprisoning his son in complete solitude for the early years of his life, hoping for the 
spontaneous manifestation of original speech in the absence of social corruption. 
'City of Glass' is principally preoccupied with the status of words and their 
(in)ability to connect with reality. Signifying connections are questioned by Stillman 
junior's absurd, self-contradictory speech, the historically documented obsession with 
the original language of God, and Quinn's growing awareness that the patterns he 
discerns may be his act of writing where words shift in a contingent and volatile 
assembly. As Quinn contemplates the words drawn from Stillman's urban 
wanderings, the credibility that he attaches to referential fixity becomes increasingly 
agitated: 
But the letters continued to horrify Quinn. The whole thing was so oblique, so fiendish in its 
circumlocutions, that he did not want to accept it. Then doubts came, as if on command, filling 
his head with mocking, sing-song voices. He had imagined the whole thing. The letters were 
not letters at all. He had seen them only because he has wanted to see them. And even if the 
diagrams did form letters, it was only a fluke. Stillman had nothing to do with it. It was all an 
accident, a hoax he had perpetrated on himself. (Auster, New York, p. 7 1) 
Quinn's doubts about words and world having any necessary connection are not 
resolved in the story. The recurrent blending of fact, fiction, presence and absence 
eventually lead Quinn, and the reader, into the predictable postmodern impasse where 
no narrative centre seems possible. By the end of the story, the case of Peter Stillman 
and his father have receded behind the issue of Quinn's steady psychological 
disappearance into the vacuity of assumed personality and uncertain meaning. Quinn 
rapidly becomes uncertain of who he is, to which sector of society he belongs, how to 
interpret his plight, and where lies the kernel of his identity. 'City of Glass' seems to 
be a story charged with the negativity described by Budick and Iser and the alterity 
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understood by Docherty, for it reveals nothing but the temporality, alterity and 
difference within meaning and language. 
And yet this is not the full picture. There is a metaphysical dimension to 'City 
of Glass' which cannot be overlooked, even though the novel's epistemology would 
appear to be in the radically anti-metaphysical stance of much postmodern fiction. In a 
theology based upon a via negativa, God is always sought by way of negation. 
Through the continual rejection of the sufficiency of signs, the religious aspirant is 
able to move closer towards the encounter with the ineffable which is the truth of 
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existence, albeit an inconceivable truth. As we saw in my introduction, theology has 
aligned itself with poststructuralist theory because it perceives the latter as moving 
towards an absolute recognition of alterity and absence; in a sense, the negativity left 
by God's demise is so absolute that it becomes a new centre, or truth, of meaning. 
Auster's 'City of Glass' is self-consciously related to poststructuralist linguistics in its 
content, but I also believe that the theological elements of the story are part of the 
general postmodern presentation of alterity as an absolute, reified centre which 
unwittingly attests to the presence of meaning and the necessity of metanarratives. 
'City of Glass' is framed by the impossible quest for the original Word of God. 
The elder Peter Stillman locked his infant son away in solitude in the hope that he 
would produce evidence of an uncorrupted language direct from the divine. Quinn's 
further investigations into the history of this quest show Stillman to be one of a long 
line of people to be obsessed with those detached from all social contact, hoping to 
obtain an unmediated contact with the divine. A connection between theology and 
poststructuralism emerges from Stillman's belief that with the fall of humankind from 
the grace of God, comes a severance of word from object and a loss of defining power 
initially established by Adam: 
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In that state of innocence, his tongue had gone straight to the quick of the world. His words 
had not been merely appended to the things he saw, they had revealed their essences, had 
literally brought them to life. A thing and its name were interchangeable. After the fall, this 
was no longer true. Names became detached from things; words devolvcd into a collection of 
arbitrary signs; language had been severed from God. The story of the Garden, therefore, not 
only records the fall of man, but the fall of language. (Auster, New York, p. 43) 
The movement from the fall of humankind to the fall into arbitrary signs brings to 
mind Derrida's claim that 'The sign is always a sign of the Fall' . 
28 'City of Glass' 
seems to be a fictional illustration of this claim. Stillman's failed experiment results 
not in an original divine language, but in the random patterns of his son's speech. 
Furthermore, Quinn's attempt at detective work leads to epistemological doubt rather 
than deductive satisfaction. 
However, the lapsarian theme of the story means that alterity and 
indeterminacy which Auster pursues is focused into a thematic presence by the 
dependence upon divine imagery and allusion. What seems to be a priority in 'City of 
Glass' is that the ineffable divine and absolute alterity are commensurable, for both 
place being into a metaphysical relation to the absolute other of what is beyond the 
text. Reflecting upon the nature of Quinn's epistemological journey, we find some 
quite distinct parallels can be made with the spiritual journey of negative theology. 
Quinn starts out with a belief in the total sufficiency of words, yet becomes aware of 
the Fall and its disruptive effects upon language. After this point, Quinn's identity 
becomes more vacuous and shapeless, mirroring the traditional self-emptying of the 
negative pilgrim. The processes of cancellation and negation go on until Quinn finally 
meets his creator, the 'Author', Paul Auster. This meeting is unsettling for Quinn 
when he finds out that Auster is a writer rather than a detective, the writer's profession 
tying Quinn back into the impossible world of words. The meeting is also unsettling 
for us as readers, for we see Paul Auster as both the ironic creator of the text and a 
fictional character. The pull between these two ontological conditions places the 
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Author in the absolute negativity which has been the steadily revealed throughout the 
novel. 'Paul Auster' is the alterity between the internal and the external, but therefore 
his negativity extends over both worlds in a heightening of negative power. My 
argument, therefore, is that 'City of Glass' is not a story which assaults the 
metaphysics of presence associated with postmodernity. Instead, the story 
teleologically leads the reader up to a recognition of negativity itself embodied 
through the absolute negativity of God/Author. The reader guided through various 
patterns of indeterminacy to the point where indeterminacy itself is recognised in the 
trope of the negative author and so meaning is returned and alterity becomes a 
thematic visibility. Irena Makarushka has argued that: 
Though the gods have fled, the need to create meaning out of chaos remains a compelling and 
immediate concern, a concern common to both literature and religion. 29 
What the indeterminate features of postmodern writing achieve is the ultimate 
satisfaction of the concern to create meaning. By pushing deeper and deeper into an 
exposure of the effects of alterity, postmodern fiction makes the whole process of 
indeterminacy meaningful and visible. For like the negative divine, alterity stabilises 
chaos as it becomes a significant location in itself and a challenge to the nature of 
being. 
Going back to the 'dialectical concept' attacked by Budick and Iser, we can 
also say that the steady revelation of the negative is an alteration in the relationship to 
both historical and subjective consciousness. Alongside the theme of the fallen sign in 
'City of Glass' runs the theme of Quinn's psychological transformation and social 
displacement. With every aporetic deduction, Quinn experiences a mental 
deterioration and a plunge into an isolated, vagrant lifestyle. Yet because this social 
disintegration is primarily illustrative of the negativity in culture, language and 
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representation, the social content of the novel is dominated and even devalued by the 
discourse of otherness within which it is framed. Negativity constantly distinguishes 
Quinn's subjectivity in an epistemological plight that reaches an epiphany of the 
negative as the absolute absence of God throughout the history of humankind's search 
for His voice. The multiple social elements of this story, and the postmodern novel in 
general, are ultimately restrained by the overall preoccupation with evoking the 
negative, as the alterity of such fiction stands out as the meaning of the novel itself. 
Thus there is much critical agreement in postmodern literary criticism about what 
postmodern fiction means and suggests, maybe not in terms of the minutiae of the 
plot, but certainly in terms of what general principles are illustrated. (General 
principles are, after all, what postmodernism has been most keen to disturb. ) A terity 
is now a qualifying thematic code which must be included in the dialectics of 
discursive presences; instead it is treated as an ineffability which must be preserved. 
What is important in Auster's theological preoccupations is the fact that 
postmodern fiction and religious negativity offer the same goal: confrontation with 
alterity. As we shall see, the religious imagery that appears with an insistent frequency 
in postmodern writing is symptomatic of the desire to encounter the 'purity' of what is 
beyond language, or what cannot be contained in language. Postmodern writing does 
not disorganise metaphysical absolutes, but hints at the absolute alterity of the divine 
to give negativity the almost metalinguistic status of the absolute, and capitalised, 
Other. 
Postmodem literary criticism has overlooked what Steven Connor calls the 
'addressivity' of the novel, a term which refers to the novel as an act of 
30 
communication between subjects. Rather than focusing on the postmodem novel as 
an abstract resistance to totality, it can be more useful to voice the question: What is 
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this novel trying to communicate? Placing this question around the theme of alterity 
can yield some significant results, because in many ways the techniques of 
indeterminacy in postmodem fiction seem to be trying to communicate not only 
alterity itself, but also an inviolable ethics within such alterity. Texts do not exist in 
vacuums, and postmodem fiction must develop, if not start with, a particular 
communicative aim, or otherwise it would not become a publication event or a literary 
entity. This communicative aim, I would suggest, is to promote the independence of 
the individual through an empowering alterity. By ostensibly deconstructing values 
and metanarratives, while using mystical overtones to transform alterity into a potent 
symbol, postmodern fiction celebrates the revelation of a new meta-linguistic centre 
for action. For by offering alterity as a mystical property which is able to suggest a 
new ethics without ethics, postmodernism is able to intellectually hedge its bets, with 
alterity offering a meaning which supposedly cannot be stated. (The resilience of 
deconstructive theory is a good indicator of why mysticism has been so perennially 
successful. ) What is important here is that negativity in postmodern novels has its own 
communicative project; thus it is either implicitly or overtly reified as a thematic 
quantity. Part of any process of reification is the search to find appropriate analogies 
and metaphors with which to express the quality of the object which is described. In 
the case of alterity, the analogous material is to be found ready-made in the 
metaphysical negativities of religious and theological language and imagery. 
What we have in much postmodern fiction is access to a centralised negativity 
which is frequently sculptured out of the icons and allegories of the religious. John A. 
McClure is a theorist quick to point out that postmodem writing is far from secular 
either in social project or literary tone. 31 McClure indicates that although the last two 
or three decades may not have seen an increase in formal attendance at religious 
86 
institutions, they have seen a general resurgence of interest in the more mystical and 
alternative branches of spirituality. In particular, Eastern religions, feminist 
spirituality, ecological mysticism and New Age faiths have taken a hold over large 
communities of individuals. McClure contends that postmodern fiction seems to be 
exploring such new spiritualities (new in Western terms), and in so doing offer 
alternative ontologies to that secured by western capitalist rationalism. Using such 
texts as Thomas Pynchon's Gravity's Rainbow, Ishmael Reed's Muinbo Jwnbo and 
Don Delillo's Mite Noise, McClure shows that postmodern fiction is soaked in 
religious, supernatural and mystical allusion. These allusions draw upon both 
fundamental and alternative faiths, as well as creating new spiritualities which are 
mediated through the language and imagery of media religiosity. McClure goes on to 
argue that while postmodern fiction does not explicitly propound or defend spiritual 
perspectives, it at least offers them as challenges to the ontologies of secularism: 
Wild and defiantly unrealistic exercises in irreverent citation, genre-splicing, excess, 
caricature, and the grotesque, they [postmodern texts] run so against the grain of realistic or 
even modernist seriousness that it seems absurd, at first, to treat them as taking any issues 
seriously. And yet if they seem cosmically irreverent, they are also comically cosmic: they 
address sacred alternatives to secular constructions of reality in ways that invest these 
alternatives with a certain authority and invite us to reflection. If we accept this invitation, of 
course, the joke may be on us: there's always the suggestion, in these texts, that any kind of 
faith, secular or spiritual, is folly. But if we refuse the invitation, the case is the same: for the 
texts also suggest that secularism is a form of mystification and that those who accept its 
definition of possibility are victims of a world historical ruse. (McClure, 'Post-Secular', p. 149) 
McClure suggests that postmodern fiction uses spirituality to embrace a cosmic 
panoply of alternative ontologies. By being involved with such ontologies, the 
metanarratives of secularity are underrnined and we are faced with a 'polyontological 
cosmology' (McClure, 'Post-Secular', p. 149), where mechanistic and rationalistic 
totalities are faced by the other of instinct and mysticism. The emphasis which 
McClure places upon the cosmic is significant, because he implies that the spirituality 
of postmodern fiction is part of a motivation towards a more holistic recognition of 
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multiplicity than secularism can allow. In particular, McClure offers postmodern 
writing as a testing ground for ontological constructions and ways of perceiving 
reality. 
In the case of a text such as Gravity's Rainbow, McClure contends that its 
Gontologically plural and undecidable world [. ] might for instance be seen, 
paradoxically, as both the "foundation" for and the product of a specifically 
postmodern quest for something like truth' (McClure, Post-Secular, p. 150). As I 
argued above, postmodern fiction contains its own version of the traditional 
epistemological quest for truth and consequently forms the association between 
alterity and religious language. Furthermore, postmodern fiction attempts to confront 
the subject, either character or reader, with alterity itself. This confrontation, I would 
suggest, not only challenges the subject's self-perceptions but also enforces the need 
for the subject's exploration of the various surrounding ontologies. Life, once 
confronted by alterity, becomes a form of pilgrimage through a world of multiple 
ontologies in which the negative acts as a constant, judgmental presence which 
questions the seeker's conclusions, yet also promises the 'truth' of a foundational 
negativity. John Barth's character Henry Burlingame in The Sot-Weed Factor is a 
prime example of this postmodem quest, as he joumeys through the New World, 
trying on different personalities, all the time recognising the absolute void which 
hangs beneath identity and reality. 
My own explanation of the rationale behind postmodem spirituality goes 
somewhat against that of McClure's. I would argue that the spirituality in postmodem 
fiction is not simply the attempt to provide alternative ontologies to those of western 
commercialism. If we consider, say, New Age religion, it is ironic that an ostensibly 
anti-commercial philosophy has become such a major appropriation of business 
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enterprise. Successfully marketed on the basis of its intuitive, non-rational content, 
New Age faiths have provided a wealth of commercial offshoots ranging from 
mystical books to healing crystals, all of which have a distribution base that extends 
across the entire range of social categories. What is intriguing about this situation is 
the easy alliance made between a mainly aporetic mysticism and capitalist venture, an 
alliance that indicates capitalism's usual flair for absorbing alternative ontologies. In 
an age when the market and its concomitant individualism are dominant, aporetic 
religions form ideal spiritualities because they create a faith out of the individualism 
of intuition while rarely intruding upon the social policy of capitalism itself. So what 
is the significance of this state of affairs for the analysis of postmodern fiction? 
McClure is surely wrong in seeing postmodem spirituality as a resistance to 
capitalism. Instead, the religious mood in much postmodern fiction enshrines the 
individuality on which capitalism thrives by presenting alterity as a kind of divinity 
that locates meaning only within separate selves. Postmodem literature can, and often 
does, launch into criticisms or parodies of the capitalist system, but in the end the 
foundations of the market are left untouched by a religiosity that implicitly advocates 
systems of self, rather than social, government. 
From a more structural angle, postmodem spirituality can be seen as part of the 
quasi-mystical dialogue which results when alterity and negativity become reified 
themes within themselves. Returning to Connor's theme of the "addressivity' of the 
novel, we can say that alterity, when communicated through techniques of narrative 
indeterminacy and juxtaposed worlds, maximises the religious themes of the ineffable 
and the indescribable, while also positing this indescribability as the reality about the 
nature of meaning and being. A more compact way of saying this is that postmodern 
negativity, and postmodem fiction, leads us back to the great subjects of God and self. 
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On such a basis, we can also debate whether postmodern literature's absorption of 
popular forms is a sincere attempt to break the hierarchies of language, or merely the 
attempt to embrace all in a philosophy of negativity. 
An alliance between poststructuralism and religion has been solidly forged 
over the last thirty years, so it is hardly surprising that novels written under the 
auspices of contemporary theory should produce distinctly mystical images and 
themes. 32 What these images and themes actually are will be a dominant concern of 
this thesis, with the following chapters offering close analysis of particular writers and 
their relationship to theology and alterity. Before moving on to this examination, 
however, it is important to spell out some of the general images of postmodern 
spiritual representation and describe some of the functions which alterity can perform 
in various fictional settings. 
Religious representation in postmodern fiction can come in as many forms as 
religion itself, both in terms of style and spiritual content. The range of religions 
which are encountered extends across the entire theological spectrum, with texts such 
as Rushdie's Midnight's Children, Pynchon's Gravity's Rainbow and Vineland, and 
Barth's Giles Goat-Boy representing all manner of faiths, oriental and occidental, 
alternative and orthodox. Other texts, an early postmodern example being Gaddis's 
The Recognitions, keep more closely to a single religion: in Gaddis's case his entire 
epic is mysteriously hung together upon Christian iconography. Often in these texts, 
religion is treated to a searching critique of its relation to various mechanisms of 
oppression in a particular culture. So in Rushdie's Midnight's Children and The 
Satanic Verses, the fundamentalist manifestations of Hinduism and Islam are treated 
to a critique of their ability to quash dissenting voices and standardise culture. 
However, the critique of orthodoxy has never been an enemy to the more mystical and 
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negative forms of spirituality, and even in the midst of postmodemism's direct 
political writing, there is a sense in which the desire for a world without totality 
produces a more mystical yearning for the indefinability of self and existence. What 
links much of postmodem religious representation is the attraction towards the 
peripheries of orthodox faith, where, in line with postmodern anti-rcpresentationalism, 
language and reality are treated as mobile qualities and truth is forever mediated but 
constantly sensed. By utilising mysticism in its fiction, postmodernism is able to grant 
alterity the place often left by the demise of the 'direct, epileptic word. 33 For 
mysticism presents little threat to poststructuralist sentiments. It allows negativity a 
spiritual authority by alluding to foundations of reality while confessing the vacuity of 
those foundations. What is left is a resonance where the intuitive and irrational aspects 
of faith come to the fore. The situation arises in which alterity and religion meet in the 
common ground of deferral and ambiguity, both offering up the anchor of a centre, 
but a centre which pretends to retreat into ineffability and silence. So the primary 
function of alterity is to ground the postmodern novel with a meaningful centre. Often 
this involves giving alterity some motif that represents the aporetic middle. These 
motifs are varied and can involve either a physical object, such as the rocket in 
Gravity's Rainbow, or a human condition, such as death in Delillo's Mite Noise. 
Another typical strategy is to capitalise negative words in the same way as capitalised 
deities, with tenns such as 'Nothing' and 'Silence' changing alterity into a potent void 
that terrorises or inspires the subject. With these systems of imagery, alterity can 
function in all manner of roles, but commonly it seems to be representing the 
nummous presence of absent meaning, which functions in every way as ineffable 
meaning. 
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What we shall see repeatedly throughout this thesis, is the reapplication of 
religious alterity to present the profundity of postmodern alterity. As I have claimed in 
my introductory chapter, postmodernism is an epoch which works within certain 
metaphysical boundaries and expectations. In postmodern fiction, metaphysical and 
mystical themes are unavoidably produced when indeterminacy is pursued as a 
communicative presence within itself. Once alterity becomes a reified focus, then a 
suitable system of imagery and language is required to convey the inessage, or 
ontological impact, of alterity. Religious language provides this system because it is 
able to secure a profound expectation of meaning, yet apparently defer the final 
encounter with the source of meaning. 
Postmodern fiction displays a deeply mystical aesthetic, because any text 
which uses alterity, otherness and negativity as structural principles is inherently 
moving in religious language. I am not suggesting that the postmodem tendency 
towards religiosity is always unwitting. As we shall see in the cases of John Barth, 
Peter Ackroyd and Don Delillo, there is a sense in which the postmodem encounter 
with absence is the intense realisation of a fundamental spiritual condition. Alterity's 
primary function is as a stabilising factor in the apparently aporetic text. Postmodem 
fiction seems to be a world of fleeting fragments and broken signs, an anarchic textual 
world where foundations are not to be found. However, the total play of meaning 
within a postmodern text is restrained by alterity itself because the ontological 
confrontation with negativity, made infinitely more profound by the religious 
language carried within, keeps the text within the familiar obligations of referential 
meaning. Therefore, fictional alterity is essentially an act of liberal humanist 
communication, a communication which constructs the indeterminate aspects of the 
text as gestures towards the demand for making meaning. With its subsequent 
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reffication, alterity operates as a quasi-mystical property which gives the text a code of 
discursive identity and generic communication while always masking such identity in 
the appearance of void and aporia. Alterity in postmodem fiction is a disingenuous 
void, and its primary function is to maintain the importance of meaning and identity, 
not to disrupt it. 
In the chapters that follow, I shall take alterity to be an umbrella under which 
the attempt is made to create a contemporary spirituality. In Chapter Two, I shall look 
at alterity in the symbolic function of representing mortality, focusing particularly on 
the images of death in selected novels from Thomas Pynchon, Don Delillo, and Kurt 
Vonnegut. Chapter Three will see a shift from the symbolic to the allegorical, using 
John Barth, Angcla Cartcr and Pynchon's The Crying of Lot 49 to show how the 
alterity of such texts enables the postmodem allegory to retain the allegorical function 
of spiritual or psychological lesson by maintaining the reference to 'real' world 
revelations. In Chapter Four, I shall present alterity as a trans-historical judgement. 
Here the striving for negativity in historical narrative unwittingly leaves the individual 
with a subject-centred power over historical meaning. Key authors in this chapter will 
be Peter Ackroyd, Umberto Eco and Toni Morrison. In all these chapters I will 
distinguish those authors who actually embrace foundational impulses and thus strain 
against their incorporation in the postmodem canon. These authors are important not 
only because they reveal postmodern theory's tendency to misappropriate certain texts 
to its sympathy, but also because they demonstrate the alternatives to an anti- 
foundational approach. My final chapter will focus exclusively on Salman Rushdie. In 
Rushdie I see one of the best alternatives to the postmodern obsession with otherness 
without declining into an unwelcome dogmatism. Using Bakhtinian ideas of 
dialogism, I shall claim that Rushdie uses religion to contemplate a human identity 
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half-way between materiality and spirituality, a blend that protects against some of the 
excesses of postmodern individualism. 
Linking all these chapters together will be a preoccupation with the religious 
content of the visions of negativity. Postmodern writing, I believe, is generally a 
collection of genres which insist upon the philosophy of human existence rather than 
the content of human existence. There is a latent transcendentalism in fictional alterity 
which can be seen as an explanation of the persuasive presence of religious codes and 
voices within postmodern fiction. I shall not argue against the acceptability or 
credibility of such spirituality. What I shall question, however, is the common 
acceptance of postmodem fiction as resisting foundations and metanarratives when, in 
actual fact, the techniques of indeterminacy produce fundamental ontologies and a 
sense of the absolute which overrides any aporiae within the text. 
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Chapter 2 
On the Edge of Death: Mortality and the Postmodern Imagination 
[I]nsofar as postmodernist fiction foregrounds ontological themes and ontological structure, we might 
say that it is always about death. 
(McHale, Postniodemist, p. 23 1) 
No art is possible without a dance of death. ' 
Brian McHale's argument that postmodernism is 'always about death' has 
implications which probably exceed the intended controversy of that statement. 
McHale insists that inasmuch as postmodernism is formed upon the 'ontological 
dominant', then death as the ultimate qualification of ontology must form the ever- 
visible horizon of postmodern thought. Vonnegut's sonorous declaration that art and 
the 'dance of death' are emphatically linked, offers a different angle to that to 
McHale. Whereas McHale suggests that postmodernist fiction involves death because 
of its ontological priority, Vonnegut alludes to death as the primary condition for the 
expressions and concerns of art. Could it be said that the temporality and 
ftagmentations sought by postmodern fiction are partly a response to the metaphysical 
gravitas of death? Is postmodem writing simply a way of trying to visualise death, to 
make it more manageable, even transcend its threat? Throughout this chapter, I shall 
argue that the alterity of postmodernist fiction is often an attempt to represent death 
and speculate upon its significance. Moreover, through my interpretation of such 
writers as Kurt Vonnegut and Don Delillo, I shall contend that the treatment of death 
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often removes from the postmodern canon authors who previously formed its 
backbone. For death, though a realm of speculation and absence, is a common human 
destination that can easily expand into broad metanarratives about existence and the 
unknown. What I shall suggest throughout this chapter, is that alterity is frequently 
just another way of envisaging mortality. In fact, I would go as far as to say that 
alterity is about conquering the threat of death through an artistic application of 
negativity. In its negotiation of death, postmodem fiction produces some of the most 
visible connections between itself and theology. For in many ways, postmodern 
otherness seems to represent a manner of negative afterlife, moving from ontological 
threat to metaphysical deliverance. In key postmodern texts, we shall see that 
visualising death through alterity not only renders plain postmodemism's theological 
heritage, but also evinces an unusual soteriology geared up for the contemporary age. 
Postmodernism and death 
Understanding postmodem appreciations of death is a fundamental destination of my 
argument. In my introduction, I loosely sketched the origins of postmodern negativity 
in the historical 'death' of the authority of several concepts central to western history: 
God, Author, Self and Truth. Catherine Belsey's insistent claim that the 'epoch of the 
metaphysics of presence is doomed, and with it all the methods of analysis, 
explanation and interpretation which rest on a single, unquestioned, pre-Copemican 
centre', is part of a general attempt to erect a gravestone over all that was previously 
held to ground thought and being in the external world. 2 According to Belsey and 
many others, postmodernism's language and focus live in the 'afterlife' of the 
metanarrative: the metanarrative may live on in various (necessary) ghosts, yet these 
ghosts are 'always already' reflecting upon the conditions of their own demise. 
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Simultaneous with this desire to describe a death of totalities, postmodemism 
also posits redeeming qualities that emerge from the demise of the metanarrative. The 
postmodern 'salvation' lies not in the rediscovery of a saving totality, but in the 
embrace and affirmation of the very conditions of difference and volatility arising 
from the death throes of metaphysics. Postmodemism seems to have acceded to Saul 
Alinsky's aphorism that 'Once you accept your own death then all of a sudden you are 
free to live'. 3 How to live is another question. 
In attempting to formulate a postmodem praxis, theorists have frequently 
returned to Nietzsche as one who provides a potential model for individual ethics and 
action. Derrida, whose The Gift of Death we have already seen to be a celebration of 
the confrontation with absence, tends towards an embrace of 'Nietzschean 
affirmation', where the loss of the centre allows praxis and interpretation to assert 
themselves merely on the fact that there is no absolute to which they now surrender: 
Turned towards the lost or impossible presence of the absent origin, this structuralist thematic 
of broken immediacy is therefore the saddened, negative, nostalgic, guilty, Rousseauistic side 
of the thinking of play whose other side would be the Nietzschean affirmation, that is the 
joyous affirmation of the play of the world and of the innocence of becoming, the affirmation 
of a world of signs without fault, without truth, and without origin which is offered to an active 
interpretation. This affirmation then determines the noncenter as otherwise than as the loss of 
the center. And it plays without security. For there is a sure play: that which is limited to the 
substitution of given and existing, present, pieces. In absolute chance, affirmation also 
surrenders itself to genetic indetermination, to the seminal adventure of the trace. (Derrida, 
Writing, p. 92) 
Derrida's vision of 'affirmation' is an interesting counterbalance to his later statement 
that 'The sign is always a sign of the Fall'. Derrida's loss of centre, the fall from 
presence and reference, need not be a fall into a postlapsarian guilt where society and 
individuals punish themselves for the 'murder' of God and Truth. Instead, if the loss 
of centre is received as the attestation of 'sure play', then that loss can be embraced as 
the commendation that there is no original blame in the world, but 'signs without 
fault'. Consequently, the Fall becomes an 'affirmative' moment because there is the 
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release from a slavery to an 'origin' which is actually not present, into a groundless 
experience of 'the seminal adventure of the trace'. 4 
Jay Bernstein is a critic who has used Derrida to springboard into an extended 
examination of the affirmative legacy that Nietzsche has bequeathed to 
postmodemism. In particular, Bernstein tums to the theorist Peter Sloterdijk, who 
explores Nietzsche as a celebrant of foundationless living. Rather than seeing 
postmodernism as a degeneration into despair at the absence of ideals, Sloterdijk 
understands the possibility of a 'cynicism' where the subject consents to life, truth and 
reality as an illusion. This illusion, Bernstein goes on, is the ironising of 'Apollonian' 
foundations under the 'Dionysic' impulse of a centreless and fragmenting play: 
The text is not a Dionysian manifesto, a defence of Dioysius against the serene authority of 
Apollonian vision, rather the polarity between Dionysius and Apollo is a stationary one 'that 
leads to a clandestine doubling of the Apollonian. The Apollonian Unified Subject (Eine) 
makes certain, through the mechanism of the silently established axiom of balance, that the 
Dionysian Other never comes into play itself, but only as the dialectical or symmetrical Other 
to the Unified Subject' (Sloterdijk 1989, p. 25). This is necessary because a pure eruption of 
Dionysic forces would entail the utter dissolution of self and world; thus Dionysic rapture can 
be re-presented but never presented. It is the foundation, the force that makes Apollonian unity 
possible, while the Apollonian Unified Subject is forever compromised by a ground 
incommensurable with its ideals of reason, clarity, unity and completeness. 5 
What is affirmed by the reciprocity of metanarrative and Other is the potential for 
nihilism to be overcome by the aesthetic creativity of a re-doubled metanarrative. The 
metanarrative, through having its foundations ironised by the Dionysic urge, loses its 
transcendent substance and becomes the property of those who see their responsibility 
in designing narratives with no meaning outside the locality of performance. Thus 'the 
existence of the world can be justified only as an aesthetic phenomenon' (Sloterdijk, 
Thinker, p. 78). In a world which is tottering over the acceptance of despair, we can 
find a source of affirmation in the presentation of life as a creative milieu 'without the 
ontological commitments typically assumed by it' (Bernstein, 'Whistling', p. 260). 
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Bernstein offers Theodor Adorno's Critical Theory as a significantly different 
theory to Sloterdijk's affirmative postmodernism. Unavoidably implicated in a world 
'guilty' of the crimes of both rationalism and nihilism, Adorno sets himself against 
transcendental forms of morality and also against the 'affirmative trans-valuation of 
morality of Nietzschean postmodernism' (Bernstein, 'Whistling', p. 262). Adomo 
balks at affirmation because of its tendency to erect a view of the whole that absorbs 
the particularities of existence, as well as because affirmation post-Auschwitz seems a 
practice in either bad-taste or naivete. 6 Adorno wants a moral code that acknowledges 
the incommensurability of thought and praxis, generality and particularity, and by so 
doing, promotes an instinctive morality resistant to rational reductionism. The crimes 
of the twentieth century prevent Adorno from reaching towards affirmative theory; 
instead, he adopts a dialectical process where thought and concept are constantly 
suspended from being permanently identified with the object for which they strive. 
Thus the object or moral code, though never satisfied, are the silent presences that 
demand response, but which stipulate that thought always turns back on itself in 
criticism: 
If negative dialectics call for the self-rcflection of thinking, the tangible implication is that if 
thinking itself is to be true - if it is to be true today, at any rate - it must also be a thinking 
against itself. If thought is not to be measured by the extremity that eludes the concept, it is 
from the outset in the nature of the musical accompaniment with which the SS liked to drown 
out the screams of its victims. 7 
The 'negativity' of Adorno's brand of dialectics lies in the assault on rational 
confidence in the face of the irreducible Other, the 'extremity'. Perhaps the 
affirmative is pejorative for Adomo, because of its attempt to escape from self- 
deconstruction and so wilfully forget moral urgency, a forgetting seen in the 
smothering music of the SS murder squads. Adorno's dialectics move away from a 
Hegelian desire for synthesis and recommend a dialogue between the concept and the 
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anti-concept which forever refuses resolution. This dialogue must always guard itself 
against the pull into an affinnative practice which blindly steamrollers the 'context of 
guilt' (Bernstein, 'Whistling', p. 262) in which post-Auschwitz society finds itself 
So what is the significance of these two brands of postmodern thought - the 
affirmative and the negative - for our discussion here of the representation of death in 
postmodern fiction? For all their genuine divergence, Adomo and Sloterdijk share a 
certain amount of common ground. What seems to unite their theories within a 
recognisably 'postmodem' category are two essential relations to ontological activity: 
1) Both critics proceed from an absolute loss of foundations, yet seek to transform this 
loss into a praxis whose basis and drive is the challenge posed by otherness; 
2) Alterity becomes a dual attestation: it focuses on the presence of death and 
degeneration in a world of decayed foundations, while simultaneously suggesting a 
regenerative promise in the attempt to purify fife through an immanent praxis and 
through the constant rejection of conceptual self-sufficiency. 
On these two premises we can see that the alterity of the lost metanarrative offers a 
double potential. On the one hand, alterity attests to the thematic of death which 
dominates a culture which is hyper-aware of the passing of metanarratives and the 
presence of an apocalyptic history (Adorno). On the other hand, alterity also stands for 
a life-affirming sentiment that resides in the acceptance of the immediacy of living and 
objects which are unmediated by rational language (Sloterdijk). s Thus it is no 
coincidence that many early postmodernists such as Olson celebrated a new 
'immanence' whereby objects claim more sensory authority through the lack of 
narrative domination. 9 In a single trope alterity can encompass both fall and salvation, 
blindness and insight, as it comprehends the absolute nature of death and a way of life 
and moral awareness. More importantly, however, is the transcendental aura 
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surrounding otherness as alterity attests to both the universal presence of death and the 
universal solution to death in the Other. This is what Spanos referred to when he 
claimed that the postmodem literary 'aesthetic of de-composition' produces the 
sensation of 'the primordial not-at-home, where dread, as Kierkegaard. and Heidegger 
and Sartre and Tillich tell us, becomes not just the agency of despair but also and 
simultaneously of hope, that is, of freedom and infinite possibility. "O In my 
introductory chapter, I described how Derrida looks upon the 'gift of death' as a 
common gift which incorporates all in a responsibility to the absolute Other. I would 
argue that alterity in postmodem fiction particularly, often functions as the attempt to 
visualise and experience this common gift and, by way of sublimation, to transform 
death into a positive backdrop that emphasises the liberty of the existential self. In 
short, postmodern fiction describes both the fear and conquering of death. In the 
process, alterity acts as a linguistic and cognitive disruption, but is then turned into a 
stable metanarrative of human and social realisation. I shall illustrate this argument 
through several key postmodern texts, continually returning to the contention that 
alterity is a figure that centres and controls. Alterity is applied to the impossible task 
of visualising death as it tries to manage the threat that death poses to a culture 
profoundly conscious of the battle between mortality and consumer-designed health. 
Within this scenario, I will once again insist that postmodern fiction returns itself 
squarely to metaphysical forms of security, as the language of death becomes mingled 
with the language of ineffability, religious vision and salvation. 
Mortality and the limits of representation 
The quotation from McHale with which I opened this chapter is the basic starting 
point for my examination of death in postmodem fiction. With McHale's now familiar 
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argument that postmodernism signals the shift from the epistemological to the 
ontological dominant, comes a new, perhaps more absolute, relation with death. 
McHale contends that literature and death have always been in alliance, with the 
theme of mortality in a work of fiction gesturing to 'the limits of representation' 
(McHale, Postmodernist, p. 228), the horizon beyond which language and thought 
cannot proceed. Furthermore, the reading of a work of fiction seems to confess the 
author's death at the turn of every page, as the writer's existence is threatened by the 
inevitable conclusion and closure of the book. After taking a brief tour through the 
history of fictional death, McHale suggests that with postmodernism comes the 
'foregrounding' of death with an intensity not previously seen in the Modernist 
defiance of fate: ' 1 
Of course, like the correlations between eros and writing, these correlations between death and 
writing are permanent features of all literature, in all periods. But just as in the case of love, 
they have traditionally remained in the background, below the threshold of fictional self- 
consciousness, except in postmodernist fiction which thrusts them into the foreground. Indeed, 
insofar as postmodernist fiction foregrounds ontological themes and ontological structure, we 
might say that it is always about death. Death is the one ontological boundary that we are all 
certain to experience, the only one we shall all inevitably have to cross. In a sense, every 
ontological boundary is an analogue or metaphor of death; so forcgrounding ontological 
boundaries is a means of foregrounding death, of making death, the unthinkable, available to 
the imagination, if only in a displaced way. (McHale, Postmodernist, p. 231) 
Note that McHale highlights not only the confrontation with death in postmodernist 
fiction, but also a negotiation of death through its visualisation. Characterising some 
postmodernist fiction as pursuing the 'flight from death' (McHale, Postinodemist, 
p. 229), McHale reads the indeterministic manner of postmodern writing as a way of 
approaching, even transcending, the experience of death. By taking the reader beyond 
the ontological certitudes of existence into the void of non-existence and the 
consciousness of the aporetic, postmodernist fiction allows the reader to imagine the 
nature of death and experiment with the final absence: 
Gabriel Josipovici said it one way: the shattering of the fictional illusion leaves the reader 
&outside' the fictional consciousness with which he or she has been identifying, forcing the 
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reader to give up this consciousness and, by analogy, to five up her or his own, in a kind of 
dress-rehearsal for death. (McHale, Postmodernist, p. 23 1) .2 
Josipovici's contention that the reader is left 'outside' fictional consciousness and so 
experiences a closer intimacy with death is proximate to the argument I have made 
throughout this thesis, namely that postmodem fiction leaves the reader in a state of 
hyper-reflection where the subject becomes a transcendent centre for consciousness. 
The essential element in this 'dress-rehearsal for death' is that the individual 
recognises itself as a subject, whose identity is unique in relation to a unique death. 
McHale needs to address the fact that death, like Sloterdijk's use of alterity, can be 
turned into an affirmative theme which implicitly depends upon the metanarrative 
constructions of subjectivity that postmodernism has set out to avoid. 
Both McHale and Josipovici indicate, though withdraw from directly stating, 
that the alterity in postmodernist fiction is actually an attempt at reifying the state of 
death. With postmodernism's endeavour to 'imagine a posthumous discourse, a voice 
from beyond the grave' (McHale, Postmodemist, p. 230), comes the aspiration to 
transcendence, where the subject is able to use the destruction of 'fictional illusions' 
to see into the world beyond discourse and so lose fear of that world. So McHale 
proceeds to claim that postmodem writing has a seriousness which has often been 
overlooked: 
So perhaps this reputedly nonserious and irresponsible form of writing turns out to be 'about' 
something after all, and something supremely serious, at that. Postmodernist writing models or 
simulates death through confrontation between worlds, through transgressions of ontological 
levels or boundaries, or through vacillation between different kinds and degrees of reality. 
(McHale, Postmodernist, p. 232) 
The key words here are 'models' and 'simulates'. By attempting to replicate or 
objectify death, postmodem fictional alterity is a restraining of narrative play, rather 
than the initiation of that mobility, as the narrative is channelled towards an analogical 
centre in the theme of death or related ontological speculations. Moreover, alterity 
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becomes a universal figure as it attempts to represent the common experience of 
humankind -a death metanarrative. 
13 1 would go further than McHale by suggesting 
that 'transgressions of' should be replaced by 'transcendence over', for alterity 
embodied in death becomes a means by which we can see into life beyond praxis and 
beyond language. In the rest of this chapter, I shall discuss a collection of texts which 
have death as their symbolic centre. The use of death as a centre is, I shall 
demonstrate, used alongside religious imagery to give alterity the function of a 
soteriological experience, a saving insight into the world outside of verbal and 
conceptual play. More than anything else, the postmodernist approach to death bears 
all the hallmarks of a negative theology, as the subject attempts by way of negation to 
have union with the ineffable or that which is beyond existence. Alterity offers a 
common ontological message of inevitable mortality, but balances this message by 
giving the subject the power to comprehend the world of death and thus break its 
power. 
Kurt Vonnegut - Slaughterhouse Five 
Slaughterhouse Five is a novel in which meaningful narrative and purposeless death 
brutally collide. The subtitle of the novel, 'A duty-dance with death', heralds a work 
in which death is an ever-present qualification of physical life and liberal optimism. 
The autobiographical centre of Slaughterhouse Five - Vonnegut bearing witness to 
the destruction of Dresden as an Allied prisoner of war - is a motif for the sheer 
limitations placed on existence by a world technologically capable of producing its 
own annihilation. In addition, Vonnegut is quick to remind us that apart from the most 
extreme encounters with mortality and imposed mass-extinction, 'there would still be 
plain old death' (Vonnegut, Slaughterhouse, p. 3). 
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Can there be any redemption in such a novel, where progress and 
enlightenment are engaged in a seemingly futile battle against inevitable decay and 
failure? One of the most memorable qualities of Slaughterhouse Five is its aura of 
inexhaustible cynicism, a voice which Salman Rushdie describes as 
a sort of hip, cynical world-weariness, his tone halfway between jeremiad and shrug. He is the 
only important and original writer in the world whose entire Ceuvre can be summed up in three 
words: 'So it goes. ' 14 
The compact philosophy that Rushdie ascribes to Vonnegut's entire creative output is 
accurate in that an advanced fatalism does seem to accompany most of Vonnegut's 
speculations on the human condition. 'So it goes, ' as Bo Petterson has pointed out, 
occurs almost every time a reference to death is made in Slaughterhouse Five; thus, 
Petterson concludes that the novel is ordered upon the principle of 'cosmological 
determinism'. 15 Whether we accept fatalism as Vonnegut's dominant mood, or ascribe 
the 'cosmic cool' perceived by Raymond Olderman, 16 we must be careful not to see 
Vonnegut as one who has lapsed into a passivity after the events that he has 
witnessed. In this chapter, I shall re-engage with the argument that Vonnegut is an 
inherently metaphysical writer, regardless of his advanced scepticism about religious 
and theological thought in general. Vonnegut's extreme awareness of death leads not 
to a psychological void, but to a potentially redemptive metaphysics of narrative and 
time. Applying the contentions contained in Robert Detweiler's work of 
theological/literary criticism, Breaking the Fall, I shall suggest that the postmodem 
qualities of Slaughterhouse Five are directed towards a rediscovery of social morality 
through the transcendence of narrative over blind causality. Peter Freese, in his essay 
on Vonnegut's GaIdpagos, proposes that many postmodern novelists 
are interested in how to survive the end, that is, in the new beginning to be wrested from the 
all-embracing apocalypse, in the redirection of evolutionary processes, and in the halting of 
thermodynamic and informational entropy. 17 
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Kurt Vonnegut is one such novelist. Though he never falls into the trap of facile or 
idealistic sermonising, Vonnegut constructs a metaphysics which admits both the 
appalling ugliness of modem methods of death, while suggesting that through the 
sheer impact of death can come a new sense of human identity and a realisation of the 
almost mystical possibilities within narrative. In the context of my thesis as a whole, 
Slaughterhouse Five illustrates perfectly that the aporetic form of the postmodem 
novel can actually be a representation of mortality and the provision of a stable 
ontology. The void into which Vonnegut gazes is not the abstraction of meaningless 
play, but the deepest sense of the limits placed on our very existence. Little surprise, 
therefore, that works such as Slaughterhouse Five seem to fit rather awkwardly in the 
category of 'postmodem'. There are distinctly postmodern traits in Slaughterhouse 
Five, mainly within its structure and composition. However, Vonnegut's direct 
purpose is not an assault upon metaphysics and totalities, even if he is cynical about 
many metaphysical ideas, but a desire to explore the human capacity for meaning in 
the face of certain extinction. In this regard, Vonnegut is my first example of a 
novelist who has been appropriated into postmodemism while having a project that is 
actually contrary to that of postmodernism. Yet it is because of this theoretical fracture 
that Vonnegut is valuable, for he clearly shows how a novel with an aporetic form 
uses alterity to drive a metaphysical theme. 
Bo Petterson has defined three main characteristics of postmodem American 
fiction, all of which are displayed in Slaughterhouse Five: 
(1) a deep scepticism of ontological explanations as well as (2) of bourgeois values and 
socioeconomic forces in society, and (3) confronts the outside world by a playfully innovative 
and self-reflexive use of literary tradition and technique. (Petterson, World, p. 15) 
Using this sort of criteria, we can easily place Slaughterhouse Five in a postmodem 
pigeon-hole filled with the repetitive 'radical skepticism of ultimate questions'. 18 
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Petterson, however, is reluctant to go down the path taken by McHale which reduces 
Vonnegut's work to a mere display of the total presence of fictionality, where history 
and reality are reduced to the width of a page and the temporality of a word. 19 It is 
understandable why Slaughterhouse Five has been sectioned in the postmodern camp: 
there are chronological contradictions, 20 the 'real' world and the world of the 
Tralfwnadorians is confused, as is the distinction between fact and fiction, and time is 
volatile, non-sequential and plastic. 21 Yet all these features are fundamentally 
connected with Vonnegut's relationshiP to death. The fragmented nature of 
Slaughterhouse Five does not pronounce a judgement upon metanarratives of death, 
but actually has its source in the all too real confrontation with death. Mortality is the 
centre of the novel, and Vonnegut's style is a way of negotiating the tumultuous 
confrontation with the silence of a single corpse, such as Edgar Derby, or a city of the 
dead, such as Dresden. 
Jerome Klinkowitz has argued that the rather indirect treatment of Dresden in 
Slaughterhouse Five is a way of by-passing the conventionalities of traditional war 
writing and offering a more human engagement with the absolute silence of Dresden 
and the general inhumanity of war: 
Facing the silent challenge at the center of all his work so far, Vonnegut has to embark on a 
new way of writing, factual and fantastic, dislocating and displacing reportage toward the 
functions and possibilities of the imagination, which might speak in the necessary silence, 
make pathetic, console. 22 
Slaughterhouse Five fits awkwardly into the postmodern category because of the 
obligation implicit in the 'necessary silence' and the 'silent challenge' which form the 
kernel of its theme and structure. Dresden is in many senses a trace in the novel, as its 
destruction is always related through a confusing veil of fiction and autobiography. 
Yet the fact that Dresden never seems to be directly touched is, I would argue, an 
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attempt to preserve the physical reality of death that so massively occurred in that city. 
In the indirection of its telling, the narrative surrounding Dresden fundamentally 
denies any theory of groundless existence by evoking the silence of death that equally 
asserts the massive value of human life and the crime of violent death. The alterity of 
Slaughterhouse Five, the void at its heart, is not a nameless absence, but a place, a 
time and a death-toll of 135,000 individuals. Dresden is the metanarrative of the 
novel, a metanarrative the indirect telling of which does nothing to lessen its reality. 
Yet the big problem for Vonnegut is what to say about this metanarrative, and whether 
there can be any redemption in the face of such death. 
It is steadily apparent in reading Slaughterhouse Five that alongside the 
tremendous encounter with mass killing, there is an equally vigorous consciousness of 
life, especially life as a holistic process or cycle. The void that is created by Dresden, a 
void consisting of the failure of humanity and the absolute silence of a dead city, is a 
generative absence that forces the central character, Billy Pilgrim, into an acute sense 
of his own existence and the intuitive morality that accompanies this existence. 
The first significant episode in Billy Pilgrim's ontological expansion comes 
when he is lost in the Ardennes forest following the German offensive in northern 
Europe in late 1944 - early 1945. In a weakening state, pushed along by the mounting 
annoyance of three aggressive companions, Billy stops momentarily in the vast forest 
and experiences a dislocation within time and space: 
This was when Billy first came unstuck in time. His attention began to swing grandly through 
the full arc of his life, passing into death, which was violet light. There wasn't anybody else 
there, or any thing. There was just violet light - and a hum. 
And then Billy swung into life again, going backwards until he was in pre-birth, which was 
red light and bubbling sounds. And then he swung into life again and stopped. He was a little 
boy taking a shower with his hairy father at the Ilium Y. M. C. A. He smelled chlorine from the 
swimming pool next door, heard the springboard boom. (Vonnegut, Slaughterhouse, p. 3 1) 
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At this moment when Billy comes 'unstuck in time', Billy's 'present' in the Ardennes 
forest is contextually frozen between the twin voids of pre-consciousness birth and 
post-consciousness death. We might simply say that the vision that Billy has of birth 
and death can be interpreted as 'the craziness of a dying young man with his shoes full 
of snow' (Vonnegut, Slaughterhouse, p. 35). 23 Yet such an interpretation, if allowed to 
become central, does not do justice to the metaphysical register which attends Billy's 
hallucinations, nor to the autobiographical input of Vonnegut himself. Whether Billy 
is hallucinating or not, by no means alters the fact that what is offered at this point in 
the novel is an augmentation of spatial and temporal consciousness. Instead of the 
novel denying causality by its fragmented chronology, it actually seeks to show the 
sean-fless interconnections between events and thoughts in the life of an individual and 
a society. What Billy experiences in the above passage is the equality of pre-life and 
after-life: the red and the violet lights. Only with the near encounter with death, 
freezing and weak in a murderous environment, is Billy able to see with any real 
intensity his life as a totalised event between two definite poles of existence. His is a 
humanistic and holistic vision, in which time is capable of being transcended so that 
all events are seen in their proper significance, rather than being seen as infinitely 
divisible units which lose their existence with the passage of each fleeting moment. 
What I am suggesting is that the encounter with death that is so central to 
Slaughterhouse Five, is an encounter with a physical absence that produces a more 
developed consciousness of the life process. This consciousness does not remain 
trapped in solipsism, however, as Vonnegut also reflects upon our responsibility to 
historical and personal experience within a social history. Vonnegut offers a 
metaphysics of death by proposing a spatial time in which the Dresden bombing is 
never finished nor completed. Dresden is set as an eternally recurrent event, the 
silence of which permanently attests to the lives of those who were destroyed there. 
So in the alien world of Tralfamadore, a society wholly based upon the simultaneity of 
time, Billy discovers a metaphysical message that places a new responsibility upon the 
act of narration: 
There isn't any particular relationship between all the messages, except that the author has 
chosen them carefully, so that, when seen all at once, they produce an image of life that is 
beautiful and surprising and deep. (Vonnegut, Slaughterhouse, p. 253)24 
With this address from the Tralfamadorian to Billy Pilgrim, we can perhaps start to 
appreciate the significance of the autobiographical element in the novel . 
25 The 
Tralfamadorians convince Billy that the genesis of patterns of meaning lies with 
authorial selection. With the selection and presentation of these events in an overall 
model of significance rather than a pure exercise of linearity, then the momentary 
becomes part of the holistic. Through Billy's time-travelling exploration and 
presentation of Vonnegut's fiction and autobiography, Vonnegut shows the 
importance of narrative compilation as a way of uniting fragmented 'messages' into a 
pattern that can attest to all that is 'beautiful and surprising and deep' in life and thus 
refuse a fatalistic resignation to the finality of death. 
26 Vonnegut demonstrates that his 
experiences, represented through those of Billy Pilgrim, are always kept alive in an act 
of narrative that accepts that events are always kept alive in the retelling. For narrative 
is a way in which time can be cognitively transcended, a form through which moments 
can be reclaimed and replayed, and thus our obligation to events like Dresden never 
recedes 
The responsibility inherent in narrative is an important counter-balance to the 
undeniable mood of cynicism within Slaughterhouse Five. Vonnegut is certainly 
pessimistic about the human capacity to fight against the more deterministic trends in 
human nature. So Billy Pilgrim, and the soldiers that surround him, are the radical 
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antithesis of the heroic models of Hollywood soldiery, as they display failings and 
aggressions which control their personalities with a blind propulsion. Kathryn Hume 
has argued, from a distinctly psychoanalytical angle, that Vonnegut's experience has 
destroyed for him the literary conventions of the 'hero monomyth', and the moral 
dichotomies of 'saint/sinner', 'hero/monster'. 27 Hume states that Vonnegut's evident 
dialectic between religious and classical mythology does not provide a way to redeem 
the violence that he has witnessed: 
If the land of the dead provides the landscape for the ordeal, death and rebirth begin and end 
the sequence. That symbolism does not work well for Vonnegut. In the initiation ordeals he 
describes, innocence is not laid aside, to be replaced in the natural course of things by 
knowledge and maturity; innocence is murdered, and only a void remains. (Hume, 'Myths and 
Symbols', p. 437) 
Hume is right that Vonnegut does not revisit mythic models in order to contain and 
ennoble events such as Dresden. Yet Hume seems to underestimate the productive 
potential of the 'void' which remains in the silence of 'murdered innocence'. If 
Dresden is a void, a silence, it is silent only because its capacity to speak has been 
destroyed. Slaughterhouse Five addresses the responsibility to fill the void with an 
obligation to speak in the silence of the dead, while acknowledging all that legislates 
against facile ideals. So, after the war, when Billy goes to visit his war comrade 
Bernhard V. O'Hare with a view to gathering memories for his novel, Billy is made 
painfully conscious of the ethical burdens resting upon his narrative acts. O'Hare's 
wife, Mary, gives Billy a frosty reception which she eventually explains as her anger 
against any narrative that glorifies and perpetuates conflict: 
'You'll pretend you were men instead of babies, and you'll be played in the movies by Frank 
Sinatra and John Wayne or some of those other glamorous, war-loving men. And war will look 
just wonderful, so we'll have a lot more of them. And they'll be fought by babies like the 
babies upstairs. ' 
So then I understood. It was war that made her angry. She didn't want her babies or anybody 
else's babies killed in wars. And she thought wars were partly encouraged by books and 
movies. (Vonnegut, Slaughterhouse, p. 11) 
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Mary's fears stem from the belief in the interconnectedness of narrative and future 
action. For Mary, the void that remains after murdered innocence is not a void of 
fatalism, but a moral lack in narrative itself. The silence of death can give narrative a 
blank sheet which is quite capable of forgetting the causes behind the silence and the 
potential for creating future voids. Billy's response to Mary's anxiety is moving: 
So I held up my right hand and made her a promise: 'Mary, ' I said, 'I don't think this book of 
mine is ever going to be finished. I must have written five thousand pages by now, and thrown 
them all away. If I ever do finish it, though, I give you my word of honor: there won't be a part 
for Frank Sinatra or John Wayne. 
'I tell you what, ' I said, 'I'll call it 'The Children's Crusade. " 
She was my friend after that. (Vonnegut, Slaughterhouse, p. I I) 
Billy / Vonnegut's decision to sub-title Slaughterhouse Five 'The Children's Crusade' 
unsettles the presumption that the novel is drowning in a fatalism about human action 
and human meaning. What clearly emerges in this quotation is that Billy understands 
the atemporal value that narrative exercises within past, present and future moments. 
Narrative and time share in the future of those who are yet to be and the past of those 
who have ceased to be. The collections of historically factual war narratives that 
Vonnegut includes towards the end of the novel (Vonnegut, Slaughterhouse, pp. 135- 
37), demonstrate the sanitising power of narratives when narratives dissociate 
themselves from present implication in past events. The refrains of 'So it goes', and 
'And so on', that follow these passages, are not necessarily a numb resignation to the 
'facts' that these narratives contain. Instead, we can interpret these sayings as a 
judgement upon 'historical' narrative voices for their perpetuation of war as grandeur 
and pathos. Thus 'So it goes' and 'And so on' might be blended together into the 
phrase 'And so it (the Voice which dignifies war) goes on. ' 
Vonnegut may be realistic about the weak chances for reformation, but he also 
sees that the transcendence narrative performs (crossing barriers of time in the 
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replaying and projection of moments), means that narrating the bombing of Dresden 
does contain the possibility of redeeming both past and future events. 
Such a holistic lesson comes in part from the novel's surreal dimensions. As 
we have seen, much of Billy's education in the nature of temporality comes from the 
Tralfamadorians. This alien people instruct Billy in the belief that: 
All moments, past, present, and future, always have existed, always will exist. The 
Tralfamadorians can look at all the different moments just the way we can look at a stretch of 
the Rocky Mountains, for instance. They can see how permanent all the moments are, and they 
can look at any moment that interests them. It's just an illusion we have here on earth that one 
moment follows another one, like beads on a string, and that once a moment is gone it is gone 
forever. (Vonnegut, Slaughterhouse, p. 20-1) 
The Tralfamadorians' relation to time closely corresponds with Vonnegut's narrative 
spatiality. With the ability to see all moments at once, without any teleological 
preoccupations, the Tralfamadorians seem to urge an envisioning of our own history 
in these terms. For by understanding all moments as 'permanent', our ethical 
responsibilities broaden to include the events of history as well as future actions. 
There is a strong dose of humour in Billy's sci-fi journeys, but there is also the impact 
of awakening the reader to new temporal/ethical relations. Vonnegut does appear to 
adhere to a less than conventional view of time in many of his other works. He has 
elsewhere remarked that: 
Anybody with any sense knows that the whole solar system will go up like a celluloid collar 
by-and-by. I honestly believe, though, that we are wrong to think that moments go away, never 
to be seen again. This moment and every moment lasts forever. 28 
Vonnegut's perspective upon time, though displaying a rather other-worldly quality, 
illustrates how his fragmented narrative and style can still possess some degree of 
commitment to a moral framework. If every moment lasts in an 'eternal present, then 
we are always under the obligation to respond to all events in all moments of history. 
Billy's narrative, if anything, questions the nature of our relationship to the silence of 
Dresden, as the reader is not able to consign Dresden to history in a narrative that 
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negates historical boundaries. Vonnegut's intention in the novel seems to revolve 
around forcing us into an encounter with the void left after Dresden, to make us 
conscious of how this event is being replayed in narrative and whether such narratives 
do justice to the demands of the dead. Vonnegut does not dictate strict moral 
answers. 29 He offers instead the recognition that we have responsibility for our present 
world, the world that has been and the world that is to come because of the 
transcendent capacity of narrative. So Billy, though usually quite absorbent when it 
comes to the views of the Tralfamadorians, does show a doubtful resistance to their 
idea that because of the simultaneity of time, we need only look at the good moments 
and ignore the bad (Vonnegut, Slaughterhouse, pp. 84-85). Fatalistic dismissal or blind 
ignorance are not part of the moral scheme of Slaughterhouse Five. Slaughterhouse 
Five is a genuine attempt to engage with the human responsibility for historical 
failings, with a distinctive spatio-temporal awareness that focuses upon our continual 
implication in eternally present events. 
Because of Vonnegut's singularly metaphysical notion of time, it is inevitable 
that he has been read with an eye to mystical and religious content. Critics such as 
Robert L. Nadeau have seen in Vonnegut's structural fluidity a combination of the 
'new' physics of chaos and relativity and a holistic brand of mysticism: 
Although Vonnegut's fiction has always tended to read like messages from Tralfamadore, his 
use of short passages and crude illustrations - both which serve as clumps of symbols that are 
not 'ordered' in the Newtonian sense - becomes increasingly more pronounced beginning with 
the publication of Slaughterhouse Five. It is, I think, clearly Vonncgut's hope that these 
scattered lumps will no only eventually cohere in the mind of the reader, producing an 'image 
of life that is beautiful, surprising, and deep, ' but also that the experience will convince us of 
the possibility of knowing the 'depths of many marvellous moments seen all at once. ' In terms 
of the mctaphysic derived by Vonnegut from the new physics, that moment allows us to sense 
communion with the alpha and omega of all being which is every conceivable moment of 
time. 30 
Nadeau's communion with 'the alpha and omega of all being' may overstate the case 
somewhat, but there is certainly an aspiration in Vonnegut's work to attain some 
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manner of ontological and spiritual overview of existence, even if such an aspiration 
is frequently parodied. Vonnegut's relation to orthodox religion, as we shall see, is 
mostly derisory. However, in keeping with the general argument of this thesis that 
postmodern texts are rooted in religious language and spiritual iconography, I shall 
suggest that Slaughterhouse Five has a theological commitment to the consistent 
imagery of Fall and Redemption which is played out against a backdrop of the 
expanded consciousness of being and time. I have already argued that Vonnegut 
senses a moral obligation in his narrative from the silence of the devastated Dresden. 
Extending this contention, I shall read Vonnegut against the religiously-based literary 
theory of Robert Detweiler in order to argue that Vonnegut hints at a humanist 
metaphysics, one that embraces a universal sense of the human identity and mortal 
predicament. 
Vonnegut's relation to religion has always been ambiguous. The ambiguity 
does not lie in his relation to orthodox religion, which Vonnegut has always tended to 
parody in his fiction. 31 Rather, what is uncertain is Vonnegut's attitude towards the 
more esoteric peripheries of faith and the value of aspirations to a more spiritually 
directed consciousness. Though Vonnegut has written novels of more direct relevance 
to religion than Slaughterhouse Five, I shall remain with this particular novel because 
of the implicit relation Vonnegut creates between the encounter with death and the 
yearning towards a redemptive message. My basic argument is that Vonnegut accepts 
the incredible limits placed on faith in an apparently random and frequently cruel 
world, but also suggests that a spirituality based on a lack of knowing can be a 
primary and productive, even necessary, impulse. Moreover, Vonnegut avers that 
religious world views are inevitably entangled in the human impulse to create 
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meaningful narrative, an impulse that attempts to fill the void which death can forge 
in an individual and social psychology. 32 
Vonnegut's front-line of comment on religious and mystical ideas is a 
conspicuous and grimly humorous parody. One of Slaughterhouse Five's most 
memorable religious episodes is the re-reading of gospel morality contained in 
Kilgore Trout's work The Gospelfrom Outer Space. Passages from this text are read 
to Billy by Eliot Rosewater, a fellow patient in a veteran's hospital, passages that 
represent Vonnegut's irreverent sense of critique: 
The flaw'in the Christ stories, said the visitor from outer space, was that Christ, who didn't 
look like much, was actually the Son of the Most Powerful Being in the Universe. Readers 
understood that, so, when they came to the crucifixion, they naturally thought, and Rosewater 
read out aloud again: 
Oh, boy-they sure picked the wrong guy to lynch that time! 
And that thought had a brother: 'There are right people to lynch. ' Who? People not well 
connected. Sq it goes. (Vonnegut, Slaughterhouse, p. 79) 
This satirical transformation of the gospel narratives not only picks upon the unwritten 
implications of biblical morality, but also tends to show the terrible strain under which 
orthodox faith is placed in a society unused to certainty and adept in ridicule. 
Vonnegut, in the company of many postmodern writers, repeatedly turns a satirical 
voice upon traditional religious language and doctrine to show contemporary 
expectations of meaning are not suited to authoritarian structures. This type of voice is 
equally found in the works of Joseph Heller, especially in the extended tabloid-style 
text, God Knows: 
'You want me to tell them You're I AM THAT I AMT 
'I AM THAT I AM, ' repeated God. 'And from the Pharaoh, ' He went on, 'I charge you to 
get permission to journey into the wilderness for three days to make sacrifices to Me. Tell him 
to let your people go. ' 
'Let my people goT 
'Let my people go, ' spake the Lord. 
'Will he let my people goT 
11 will harden his heart. ' 
'So he won't let my people goT 
'Now you've got it. I want to show what I can do. I want to trot out my stuff for the children 
of Israel. 33 
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In this dialogue between Moses and God, Heller portrays Moses as the ironising 
victim who finds himself in a fatalistic relationship with an egotistical deity. The 
familiar words of the bible are transformed by their inclusion in a dialogue no longer 
governed by an axiomatic reverence for the dictums of Yahweh. The use of 'trot out 
my stuff' by the divinity deconstructs scriptural thought in contemporary language and 
acknowledges the death of old perceptions of spirituality. God Knows may be free of 
the weight of Dresden that burdens Slaughterhouse Five, yet the thought behind the 
treatment of religion is similar. By ironising biblical history and precepts through 
contemporary language and attitudes, Vonnegut and Heller invoke a mood that 
encompasses both liberty and resignation: liberty, because the author's humour 
testifies that human wit is finally detached from the legislation of divine authority; 
resignation, because any hurnour is enacted within a universe that has lost its 
foundations for meaning and security. 
The aspiration to hang on to some belief in meaning and system is a vigour, 
however, that does rise to the surface through Vonnegut's persistent satire on religious 
life. Describing himself as a 'Christ-worshipping agnostic', 34 Vonnegut's private and 
public life has exhibited a paradoxical compound of atheism and reverence, where 
declarations of life's meaningless nature are qualified by practising Unitarianism and 
an instinctive attraction toward religious themes. 
35 Some of Vonnegut's clearest 
articulations upon religion can be found in his work of criticism Wampeters, Foina 
and Granfallons. Vonnegut moves that religion, for all its possible pointlessness, may 
have its value in the generation of moral force and philosophical direction: 
'Thou shalt not kill. ' That's a good lie. Whether God said it or not, it's still a perfectly good 
lie. And if it gives it more force to say that God said it, well fine. (Vonnegut, lVampeters, 
p. 215) 
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The blunt style here adopted by Vonnegut belies the subtlety of his ethical ideas. 
Vonnegut reconunends the divine not as a centre of unshakeable belief, but as a 
symbol through which morality can be invested with a more efficacious property. The 
actual content of the notion 'God' appears as relatively unimportant next to the fact 
that divine symbolism can provide morality the requisite security of a foundation or 
origin. Whether the foundation or origin is substantial in itself is not an issue. What is 
important is that morality has an adequate symbolic structure to transfer ethical ideas 
with the influence of external obligation. As religion is historically adcpt at 
gnaturalising' morality, Vonnegut argues for an application of spirituality even in a 
world where science has ostensibly eroded the possibility of faith: 
A great swindle of our time is the assumption that science has made religion obsolete. All 
science has damaged is the story of Adam and Eve and the story of Jonah and the Whale. 
Everything else holds up pretty well, particularly the lessons of fairness and gentleness. 
(Vonnegut, Wampeters, p. 160) 
In a world where moral orientation is desperately required under the shadow of events 
such as Dresden and Auschwitz, Vonnegut sees some validity in the practice and 
content of religion. Though Vonnegut has always maintained the futility of trying to 
reach truth, 36 he does accept the need to aspire towards meaning and to search for 
moral definition. Thus the function of religion becomes one of enabling such quests 
and symbolically assisting the construction of identity and reality. 
So if, according to Petterson, 'The nonexistence, or at least passivity of God is 
an axiom for Vonnegut' (Petterson, World, p. 62), then how does this spiritual 
positioning emerge in a text such as Slaughterhouse Five? Throughout this thesis, I 
have looked at various texts to evaluate how postmodem negativity is directly 
comparable with notions of religious negativity. Vonnegut, too, pursues a principle of 
negativity in his thought and narrative structure. Yet as the void at the centre of his 
text is a physical and historical event, he more successfully resists the trans-social 
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tendencies which I have frequently criticised in postmodern fiction. Vonnegut regards 
absence as a very clear demand on morality and meaning. Alterity, for Vonnegut, is 
already reified in the silent bodies of the Dresden corpses, and it is this absence, like 
the absent God who stiH commands symbolic authority, that urges us towards 
ontological clarity rather than ontological ftagmentation. 
To clarify my views on this issue, and to close my section on Slaughterhouse 
Five, I shall now briefly compare Vonnegut's strategies of negativity with the religious 
literary theories of Robert Detweiler. Of particular relevance is Detweiler's Preface to 
the Westminister John Knox Press edition of Breaking the Fall, which Detweiler 
added to the original text after he suffered a massive stroke in March 1995. 
Detweiler's brand of theological thinking is centred in Gelassenheit, a concept which 
founds itself in the subject's practise of kenosis, or self-emptying: 
Gekusenheit can be seen as a practical discipline, one that recognizes the irony of the 
operating principle: 'He that saves his life loses his life. ' The system of Gelassenheit as 
abandonment is what we continually struggle to work out, and it correlates with the operation 
of kenosis -a self-emptying, an outpouring of the self. It is a lying-down of life when one 
sees no other possibility. One stops to contemplate death in the midst of living. 37 
Gelassenheit, for Detweiler, implies a resignation before the experience of death which 
becomes a spiritual practice and means of deferred revelation. Detweiler acknowledges 
all that is absurd or ironic in life as valuable, because by experiencing the continual 
promise of death hanging over life, one becomes more involved in the act of narrating 
existence; indeed, narrative, with its expectations of beginning, middle and end, is, for 
Detweiler, an intuitive and necessary replaying of the life-cycle itself, a way of 
understanding death. The revelation produced by irony is a consciousness of narrative 
as the telling of life under the absurdity of death. Detweiler moves on by modelling a 
theology out of the union of suffering, death and narrative: 
What is the relationship between Gelassenheit and narrative theology? The conjunction is 
between suffering and narrative. Narrative theology presents the possibility of life after death: 
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"at else is there after God disappears? In a way, theology is necessitated by the death of 
God. The concepts to work out are these: faith, death, and Gelassenheit-and the dynamic 
whereby these are realized and actualized toward death. Above all, narrative theology and its 
relationship to irony is the key to the irony of death. I exist and yet I do not exist. I exist as 
ironic. That is why we tell stories. 
Narrative fiction, not at all secular to many, explores this relationship. Story is redemptive 
by nature, hoping against hope that one will yet be saved by and through the telling. 
(Detweiler, Breahng, pJx) 
Narrative theology becomes a way of asserting life in the face of death. Detweiler 
suggests that narrative has even taken the place of God: story-telling assimilates the 
role of redemption, with purposeful language redeeming us from the negativity of 
death. 311 In effect, narrative stops the collapse into nihilistic living and so performs the 
theological restraint of a foundation. Thus, Gelassenheit becomes an attitude whereby 
we both recognise the irony of our existence, yet also embrace narrative as a way of 
restoring vitality in the face of such irony. Significantly for our study of Vonnegut, 
Detweiler also sees the narratorial impulse as a moral urge which unites communities 
when individuals participate in a shared act of narrative. Thus Detweiler sums up his 
basic argument: 
religious reading at least in the Western world finds itself still entangled, in the late 
twentieth century, in the mythology of the Fall and seeks its fictions to brake/break the fall 
into meaninglessness and death. (Detweilcr, Breaking, p. xv) 
Fiction, for Detweiler, arbitrates between death and life by accepting the former as the 
end of the voice, but promoting the latter by telling the story of death, by moving death 
into the narrative activity of life. Likewise, Slaughterhouse Five offers a way of 
'breaking the fall' by shifting between the ironic confrontation with death and the 
narrative that can embrace such death in the potentially redemptive act of story-telling. 
That Slaughterhouse Five attests to some manner of fall is conspicuous within 
the novel's theme and style. Images of the massive failings of human morality fitter the 
text from the shooting of Edgar Derby for the looting of a teapot, to the mass killings 
systematically perpetrated throughout the Second World War. The effect on 
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witnessing such appalling forms of human brutality arguably finds parallels with 
Detweiler's Gelassenheft. The refrain 'so it goes', which usually follows any 
description of inhumanity in Slaughterhouse Five, ostensibly depicts a psychology that 
has given up trying to rationalise existence in the face of death and accepted the fact 
that the self is dominated by ineluctable absence. This form of kenosis is a much more 
psychologically fragile and disturbed Gelassenheit than Detweiler recommends, though 
both seem to understand bodily discomfort and extremity as ways of experiencing 
language and reality in a new way. However, like Detweiler, Vonnegut moves towards 
an ethical response to the ironic horror of mass death as the narrative begins to adopt a 
psychologically redemptive function. 
Early in the novel, Vonnegut describes the futility and silence after the Dresden 
massacre in a way that initially appears to acknowledge the failure of speech and the 
emptying of reason. When Billy offers Ms literary agent, Seymour (Sam') Lawrence, 
his latest book on the Dresden massacre, he issues the following caution: 
It is so short and jumbled and jangled, Sam, because there is nothing intelligent to say about 
a massacre. Everybody is supposed to be dead, to never say anything or want anything ever 
again. Everything is supposed to be very quiet after a massacre, and it always is, except for 
the birds. 
And what do the birds say? All there is to say about a massacre, things like 'Poo-tee-weet? ' 
(Vonnegut, Slaughterhouse, p. 14) 
Biffy Pilgrim describes the aftermath of a massacre as the deprivation of all the 
profundity that is usually sought by historical narratives. The birds' meaningless noises 
emphasise a human inability to make meaningful speech in the face of so much death. 
In effect, Dresden brings about a fall in both language and morality as language falls 
away from its ability to meet the ob . ect and morality fails because j of the distortions of 
power narratives. However, directly following this passage are two short paragraphs 
which puff against the fall being a total one: 
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I have told my sons that they are not under any circumstances to take part in massacres, and 
that the news of massacres of enemies is not to fill them with satisfaction or glce. 
I have also told them not to work for companies which make massacre machinery, and to 
express contempt for people who think we need machinery like that. (Vonnegut, 
Slaughterhouse, p. 14) 
These two pieces of moral advice fit into the general proposal of my analysis, namely 
that Vonnegut shows how humanity must accept responsibility for its narratives as 
these will cross time and influence future identities. The voids that Vonnegut evokes 
in Slaughterhouse Five are productive centres that morally ground the fragmentation 
from which they come. These voids suggest the fall of mankind, yet they also become 
the source of redemption in the rebirth of new narratives. Like the absent divine, such 
vacuums elicit a language that accepts its own inadequacy while feeling the presence 
that gives morality its assurance of value. Of equal interest here is the structural 
organisation of these two axioms in relation to the previous quotation. On the same 
page of the novel, we have a section dealing with the futility of any sort of rational 
response to the Dresden massacre, shifting to two sharp and well-defined paragraphs 
of moral prescription. This manner of juxtaposition is common in the novel and can 
lead to a distinct confusion about Vonnegut's positioning in relation to his fictional 
and autobiographical material. My interpretation, following on from Detweiler's 
thoughts on 'religious reading, is that Vonnegut's morality is based upon a semi- 
mystical combination of the following elements: 
1. An experience of death that necessitates a kenotic psychology because of the 
awareness of the limits placed upon human existence and the failings of 
human rationality; 
Narrative is accepted as a means by which morality and human meaning can 
be restored, though this morality must proceed from the inherent, and silent, 
ethics of mortality rather than from idealism; 
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3. Narrative is able, by its very nature, to transcend and contain time and place. 
Therefore, we are always implicated in the life-cycles and events of others 
through our powers of narration. 
Vonnegut's quite mysterious brand of new physics, philosophy of mortality and 
aggrandisement of narrative, 'breaks the fall' of the twentieth century injustices by 
using the physical silence of death as an ethical demand and a space for narrative 
transcendence. For Vonnegut, God may no longer exist but the otherness of absolute 
meaning and ethics remains with all its theological redolence and verbal imperative. 
Vonnegut accepts the origin of this challenge as residing in a world where death and 
narrative collide and inexplicably demand a meaningful product. To describe 
Vonnegut's work in this way may sound awkward when applied to the cynical tone of 
his works. Yet wherever Vonnegut's fatalism occurs, it tends to have a humanistic 
message and a spiritual tone lingering in the background of his dismissive mood. In 
the same way that Billy Pilgrim harbours 'a big secret somewhere inside' (Vonnegut, 
Slaughterhouse, p. 126), Vonnegut hints at a lingering theodicy that 'somewhere' 
brings together spiritual beliefs and ethical foundations. The narrative of 
Slaughterhouse Five is undoubtedly a dark vision into the effects of war. At the same 
time, Vonnegut provides a novel that attests to the unavoidable quest for meaning that 
humanity must embrace if it is to redeem itself. What is religious about 
Slaughterhouse Five is the combination of a holistic vision of time, a positing of death 
as a moral metanarrative and the use of language as a redemptive Word rather than a 
sign of the Fall itself. Supported by Vonnegut's ambiguous spiritual practices, I would 
suggest that Vonnegut is an inappropriate author to include in the postmodernist 
canon. 
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Don Delillo - White Noise 
Slaughterhouse Five is ultimately a text which escapes the category of the 
postmodem. The themes of mortality, morality and human nature in the novel proceed 
as metanarratives in which otherness and alterity become elements of the concrete 
experience of life and death. And Slaughterhouse Five is far from alone. In the 
remainder of this chapter, I shall examine several classic postmodcrn texts, 
particularly Don Delillo's Mite Noise and Pynchon's Gravity's Rainbow and V. 
Building on my treatment of Vonnegut, I shall argue that once again it is the treatment 
of death that effectively prevents the labelling of such texts as postmodern. My 
contention is what could be described as the alterity of such novels is in fact nothing 
more than an attempt to express a heightened consciousness of life in the face of 
death. In the case of Mite Noise, this consciousness means that we should, like 
Slaughterhouse Five, remove this novel from a generic association with 
postmodernism. Instead, Mite Noise should be seen as a comment upon postmodern 
society with the premise that the contemporary media environment is merely an 
evasion of humankind's fundamental condition of mortality. 
Don Delillo's Mite Noise has become for many the supreme example of 
postmodern fiction. In the world of Mite Noise, images take precedence over reality, 
language is assembled using consumer sound-bites and movie philosophy, and 
technology expands into the psychological fabric of society itself. With such an 
environment, it is natural that the novel has been seen as perfectly illustrative of 
Baudrillard's theory of the simulacrum and Foucault's understanding of language and 
power. 39 Yet some critics have started to question whether Mite Noise really does 
make a convincing candidate for the postmodernist genre. Cornell Bonca's incisive 
essay 'Don Delillo's White Noise: The Natural Language of the Species', is a 
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persuasive sceptical voice. Bonca introduces his argument by accepting that 'Mite 
Noise has begun to replace The Crying of Lot 49 as the one book professors use to 
introduce students to a postmodern sensibility' . 
40 However, Bonca does not see in the 
title of the novel the white noise of a culture without foundation, the static crackle of 
an artificial media consciousness. What Bonca senses instead is a background noise 
that alludes to humankind's deepest intuitions of mortality and the sense of the sacred 
that is bred from these intuitions: 
'White Noise' is for Delillo contemporary man's deepest expression of his death fear, a 
strange and genuinely awe-inspiring response to the fear of mortality in the postmodern world. 
(Bonca, 'Natural Language', p. 27 
In a postmodern society that is centred upon commercial lifestyle and consumer life 
enhancement, the 'death fear' is able to emerge more forcefully and, Bonca. suggests, 
reintroduce the sacred and the 'awe-inspiring' into what appears a depthless social 
organisation. What is more, if 'alterity' is substituted for 'White Noise' in the above 
quotation, then my position in relation to Delillo becomes clear. Mite Noise certainly 
depicts a reality that is dominated by the media image and commercial language. The 
product of this condition seems to be the postmodern alterity where reality becomes 
trace and the simulacrum holds sway. Yet I would argue that this alterity in fact 
represents what Defillo sees as the reality of death and the unknown behind the fagade 
of postmodern culture. The alterity of media world in Mite Noise is not the absence 
of reality, but the suppression of a mortal reality that contemporary language 
disallows. This suppression is what Bonca terms 'the natural language of the species, 
a language which Bonca locates in a useful passage from Mike Noise where the 
charismatic Murray Jay Siskind philosophises to Jack Gladney within the sterile hum 
and glare of a modem supermarket: 
'Fear is unnatural. Lightning and thunder are unnatural. Pain, death, reality, these are all 
unnatural. We can't bear these things as they are. We know too much. So we resort to 
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repression, compromise and disguise. This is how we survive in the universe. This is the 
natural language of the species. 941 
'Unnatural language' in the contemporary world is that which admits the vulnerability 
that haunts physical existence. Unable to cope with the constant imminence of its 
demise, the human race constructs a 'natural language' where the frailty of life is 
covered with psychological safety-nets that stop the fall into full mortal recognition. 
This 'natural language' does not negate the concept of reality in the manner of the 
Baudrillardian simulacrum. Siskind implies that language attests to reality in its 
implicit acknowledgement of the mortal silence which motivates "repression, 
compromise and disguise'. The sign, therefore, is a qualification of reality, but not the 
dominant in that reality. The feelings and phenomena that Siskind lists as unnatural 
are only so because contemporary language and living conditions can no longer 
incorporate them within its outlook. Thus the 'unnatural' physical existence is 
repackaged in a way that negotiates its threat. For all this, Delillo also seems to argue 
that this does not necessarily dismiss the awe that can result from glimpsing the 
haunting shadow of death. 
On this basis, Bonca argues that what appears as spiritually parodic in the 
novel, such as Steffie's sleepy incantation of the words 'Toyota Celica' and glorious 
sunsets following the 'Airborne Toxic Event', are actually moments of real spiritual 
significance. Jack Gladney frequently finds a religious sense of awe in the media 
language and images that surround him because these phenomena always point to the 
prodigious mystery of human mortality acknowledged in the very profundity that they 
try to emulate. So Bonca, interprets the novel's title as a representation of the 
mysterious religiosity and power programmed into modem language by its activity of 
denying death: 
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What the novel brings together, then, are two kinds of white noise: that which is a product 
of late capitalism and a simulacral society, and that which has always been "the natural 
language of the species"-death evasion-and which now gets expressed in the argot of 
consumer culture. The result is a vision of contemporary America that bypasses cultural 
critique in favour of recording awe at what our civilisation has wrought. Because for Dclillo, 
while white noise certainly registers the ways in which Americans evade their death fear, it can 
also be hcard-provided we learn to listen properly-as a moving and quite beautiful 
expression of that death fear. It becomes nothing less than a stirring revelation of the fear of 
death, a noise of great (and frankly, unpostmodern) pathos. (Delillo, Mite Noise, p. 33) 
There is something inherently romantic about Bonca's description of the way that 
language functions in Mite Noise, though I believe that Bonca is correct to extract 
such a romance. Even in the thoroughly postmodern reading of Kite Noise provided 
by Reeve and Kerridge, there are fleeting tendencies towards extracting epic qualities 
from episodes in the novel such as the Airborne Toxic Event, a moment when 'human 
beings discover their mortality, and gain access to a world beyond the arbitrary play of 
signifiers' (Reeve and Kerridge, 'Toxic Events', p. 313). Bonca, Reeve and Kerridge, 
though with incommensurate degrees of commitment, subscribe to an interpretation of 
Delillo as one who speaks of the metaphysical mystery of human existence through 
the language of consumerism. Delillo becomes an unwitting commentator upon last 
things, with the complex and protean forms of postmodemism constantly shielding the 
individual from the mortality which always waits at the end of interpretation and 
writing. 
By reflecting directly upon death, Delillo's language progresses from deadpan 
humour to spiritual grandeur. An important episode on which Bonca focuses in the 
novel is when Jack's son, Wilder, starts up an 'inconsolable' seven hours of crying 
which displays no medical cause. The pain behind his wailing, and the uncanniness 
sensed by those around him, becomes almost a physical manifestation of the alterity of 
existence, namely death, and the sacredness of that which is beyond language: 
They watched him with something like awe. Nearly seven straight hours of serious crying. It 
was as though he'd just returned from a period of wandering in some remote and holy place, in 
sand barrens or snowy ranges-a place where things are said, sights are seen, distances are 
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reached which we in ordinary toil can only regard with the mingled reverence and wonder we 
hold in reserve for feats of the most sublime and difficult dimensions. (Delillo, White Noise, 
p. 79) 
Jack imagines Wilder as having been to a place where the gap between subject and 
object is closed in a way which is refused by the postmodern society. The 'awe' and 
'reverence' produced by Wilder's Olympian expression of grief are derived from this 
sense of contact with the primordial and essential, even though the origin of the tears 
is a mystery known only by Wilder (though perhaps not even to him). In Lyotardian 
terms, Wilder appears to 'present the unpresentable'; the 'sublime and difficult 
dimensions' suggest an alterity which equals the mystery of the essential rather than 
the absence of the essential. 
At this juncture, we can start to espy the more overt theological content within 
Delillo's 'deathward-pointing novels'. 42 Whatever the composition or nature of 
society, Delillo implies that death will always emerge through the gaps in our coded 
securities to give us a glimpse of the mystery of life. Furthermore, the way that Jack 
finds Wilder's crying a strangely comforting experience, draws us back towards 
Detweiler's idea of 'breaking the fall'. The presence of death stops the fall into an 
infinite degeneration of language and, like the effect of Wilder's elemental wailing, 
we can start to see beyond language into more intuitive and metaphysical types of 
discourse and sensation. 43 Thus Bonca is able to comment: 
White Noise is one of the few novels capable of mastering-perhaps taming-our schizoid 
confusions about the mass media experience. It is a novel which, because of its wide-ranging 
explanatory power and uncanny compassion, somehow helps. (Bonca, 'Natural Language', 
p. 26) 
Bonca celebrates Mite Noise for an 'uncanny' quality which grounds the narrative in 
death and mystery and so restrains the runaway activity of language in a metaphysics 
of mortality. Mite Noise 'helps' because it gives priority to a humanistic and 
metaphysical encounter with a negative truth once the devices of a playing language 
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are confronted and overcome. When Jack and his wife, Babette, argue about who 
would most be affected by the other's death, the argument may not be concluded, but 
the metaphysical context of the discussion renders the lack of final decision 
inconsequential: 
She claims my death would leave a bigger hole in her life than her death would leave in mine. 
This is the level of our discourse. The relative size of holes, abysscs and gaps. We have serious 
arguments on this level. She says if her death is capable of leaving a large hole in my life, my 
death would leave an abyss in hers, a great yawning gulf. I counter with a profound depth or 
void. And so it goes into the night. These arguments never seem foolish at the time. Such is the 
dignifying power of our subject. (Delillo, White Noise, p. 101) 
Two significant themes emerge from this debate. Firstly, the 'holes, abysses and gaps' 
which Jack and Babette debate are treated as physical properties whose 'relative' 
dimensions can be argued and discussed. Yet apart from the irony of arguing about the 
size of a void, the notion of a vacuum or lack having an effective dimension is 
supported by the physical reality of the topic, death. Thus, the debate is stabilised by 
the reification of absence in death even though the debate is not concluded and goes 
on ad infinitum. Secondly, Jack offers the assurance that the inconclusive nature of the 
disputation, which could be recognised as symptomatic of Derridean fallen language, 
is overridden by 'the dignifying power of our subject'. Jack implies that the subject, 
death, is always a presence behind the swirls of linguistic confusion and one which 
gives a metaphysical dignity through the humanistic reflections it produces. In Mite 
Noise, the very fact that Jack and Babette can discuss something which ultimately lies 
outside the remit of postmodem language games seems to offer a uniquely human 
moment which is ennobling in a world of superficiality. 
Once again, we find a certain romantic strain in Delillo's writing which does 
not sit easily with the postmodern rejection of metanarratives. 44 Kite Noise forms 
itself out of humanistic speculations upon the implications of death and so retains the 
idea of physical presence even though this presence is sensed through the alterity of 
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death. Mite Noise also appears to criticise postmodem society along similar lines to 
my argument in the introductory chapter. Postmodernism fragments the world and 
language and by so doing, can practice a blindness to what is felt to be essential by 
certain societies. Delillo counters such a view by indicating death and the 
metaphysical negotiation of death as constants within this world which are frequently 
hidden in the commodity affirming dialogues of consumerism. 45 
So far in this chapter, I have looked at novelists whom I have classed as being 
outside of the sentiments of postmodernism, even though their texts have often been 
held up as being archetypal postmodem novels. Shifting my focus somewhat, I shall 
now examine several novels by Thomas Pynchon to see whether resolutely 
postmodern fiction still succumbs to the metaphysical essentials of death and the 
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unknowable presence. In Delillo and Vonnegut, the alterity within their fiction is 
actually a specific reference to the event of death or the mystery of that event. In the 
case of Pynchon, I shall stay with the theme of death, but broaden the argument 
somewhat to claim that alterity in postmodern fiction, has the ability to adopt 
symbolic roles in its need for adequate representation. When alterity becomes a 
metaphysical theme, it searches out appropriate symbolic vehicles through which it 
can be expressed. Death is perhaps the most recurrent symbolic structure into which 
otherness can be prominently incorporated, though we will see a little more variety in 
the case of Pynchon. 
Thomas Pynchon - The gravity of death 
I start with Gravity's Rainbow, focusing on Pynchon's representation of the V2 rocket 
as a sign that, whilst simulating deconstructionist play, 46 also provides a metaphysical 
focus to the novel. Throughout Gravity's Rainbow, the V2 perfonns a toternistic 
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function, uniting vast groups of disparate individuals as a focus for veneration, 
fascination, or even worship. The unity that the Rocket creates, originates from its 
symbolic reification of the alterity that results from the multiplicity of systems and 
meanings with which it is approached. The 'real' identity of the V2 may appear lost 
amidst the explosion of signification typical in a work by Pynchon, yet the resulting 
negativity elicits spiritual modes of perception in many of the characters. For the 
Rocket seems to physically embody negativity with its 'absent presence', as it 
becomes imbued with an uncanny metaphysical potential similar to that created by the 
imponderable black monoliths in Kubrick's 2001. This is illustrated when we are told 
of the ironic Jewish spiritualisation of the Rocket by various elements of the 
Schwartzkommando, the German Rocket corps: 
But the Rocket has to be many things, it must answer to a number of different shapes in the 
dreams of those who touch it - in combat, in tunnel, on paper - it must survive heresies shining, 
unconfoundable ... 
and heresies there will be: Gnostics who have been taken in a rush of wind and fire to 
chambers of the Rocket throne ... 
Kabbalists who study the Rocket as Torah, letter by letter - rivets, burner cup and brass rose, 
its text is theirs to permute and combine into new revelations, always unfolding... Manicheans 
who see two Rockets, good and evil. 47 
Despite the fact that the Rocket appears to contain no intrinsic properties other than 
what relations and 'heresies' build into it, the Schwartzkommando is quite capable of 
transforming its negativity into metaphysical content or Manichean duality. 
48 Indeed, 
the Kabbalistic perspective is a significant illustration of how the Rocket's alterity can 
be reified in a kind of a via negativa. The parallel that Pynchon draws between the 
Schwartzkommando's relation to the Rocket and the Kabbalistic relation to the Torah, 
indicates that the Rocket is an open text that does not dictate its doctrines, but which 
defines its presence because of its ineffability and negativity. The loss which the 
Rocket embodies is reified by religious narratives that have the traditions of 
translating negativity into mystical presence. Hence the Kabbalistic viewpoint accepts 
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a scripture that retains the haunting presence of the sacred, yet at the same time flows 
without ceasing. In the same way, the Rocket, continually disappearing into the 
various narratives of Slothrop, Enzian, Blicero and others, becomes a mysterious 
presence that grounds narratives in a distinctly metaphysical negative. Just as Tony 
Tanner discusses entropy as the unifying figure of the novel, 49 the altcrity of the 
Rocket acts as a spiritual ground that appears capable of producing genuine revelation. 
Enzian, the Herero, leader of the Schwartzgdrat, here berates an engineer for 
mistrusting the operational data extracted from performance tests of the Rocket: 
'Proud man, ' said the Nguaroverue. 'What are these data, if not direct revelation? Where have 
they come from, if not from the Rocket which is to be? ' (Pynchon, Gravity's Rainbow, p. 315) 
The revelatory powers that Enzian believes the Rocket contains do not come from an 
existent source but from a deferred source, 'the Rocket which is to be'. 50 The Rocket, 
though it does not yet exist, is still capable of producing revelations because its 
negativity, like the divinity of a negative theology, is capable of providing spiritual 
direction apparently without direct contact with a presence. More than anything, the 
Rocket offers a location for the alterity of Gravity's Rainbow's multiple and confusing 
narrative lines. Though there appears to be no such thing as Enzian's 'direct 
revelation' in such a complex and enigmatic novel, the Rocket grounds any ambiguity 
in a symbol of negativity itself. Thus, the otherness of the novel starts to act as a 
theme that hints towards a spiritual sublime within postmodernity. Marc W. Redfield 
has discussed Pynchon's work through the lens of the Romantic sublime and Fredric 
Jameson's later work on sublimity. Redfield describes the 'economy of the Romantic 
sublime' as that which 'typically consists in sacrificing perception in order to produce 
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a super-sensory truth structured like a perception'. In the same way, ontological and 
metaphysical order is able to occur in Pynchon's novels because alterity becomes the 
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structuration of obscured meaning rather than the proof of indeterminate, absent 
meaning. Pynchon probably does not mean to suggest the possibility of any sort of 
essential presence behind language in Gravity's Rainbow. However, the figure of the 
Rocket shows how indeterminacy is restrained within a symbolism that enables 
negativity to remain within the economy of meaning and influence. 52 
Whatever the abstract religious sentiments elicited by the Rocket it is also an 
instrument of death, and Pynchon is at home with Vonnegut and Delillo in his 
recognition of the significance of mortality. This is more apparent in Pynchon's novel 
V., in which we see the experimental Beat artists who compose 'The Whole Sick 
Crew' writing the text of their existence with finite resources. When we see them at 
'the Spoon', their meeting place, they are engaging in a futureless linguistic play 
where the limits are set by their extinction: 
Conversations at the Spoon had become little more than proper nouns, literary allusions, 
critical or philosophical terms linked in certain ways. Depending on how you arranged the 
building blocks at your disposal, you were smart or stupid. Depending on how the others 
reacted they were In or Out. The number of blocks, however, was finite ... 
This sort of 
arranging and rearranging was Decadence, but the exhaustion of all possible permutations and 
53 combinations was death. 
The presence of death seems to offer a kind of ultimate sign, a conclusion to the 
shifting patterns of word and object. In mortality, Pynchon perceives a final text which 
escapes the activity of words and definitions and thus becomes a transcendental 
signified beyond the motion of language. Death is the inescapable negative of 
ontological performance, yet it is also the visualised end which is a primary locus for 
defining self-identity. 54 So, like the Rocket, death gives a physical time, space and 
influentiality to the alterity within the narrative, as death is the moment where words 
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dissolve into an ontological reality rather than a postmodem aporia. 
At the end of Gravity's Rainbow, we see death and alterity uniting in a final, 
absolute state. Gottfried, the sexually enslaved assistant of Oberst Weissman of the 
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Schwartzgerdt, is placed into the elusive test rocket numbered 00000 and launched to 
his death. The apocalyptic symbolism of this scene is rich. The Rocket number 
consists of a compound five zeros, presenting a number with a total lack of numerical 
value. The Rocket is described as a 'womb' and also as a kind of ultimate sexual 
fulfilment, attaining the status of mother and procreational act, while also representing 
the contrary role of death and destruction. This fusion of characteristics produces a 
Rocket that cancels out both life and death, number and nothing, in a moment of 
represented void. I emphasise the word 'represented' because Pynchon seems eager to 
give the reader a vision of a pure, almost sacred, alterity. 56 This vision is pursued in 
the description of the Rocket when it reaches the end of its fall: 
And it is just here, just at this dark and silent frame, that the pointed tip of the Rocket, falling 
nearly a mile per second, absolutely and forever without sound, reaches its last immeasurable 
gap above the roof of this old theatre, the last delta-t. (Pynchon, Gravity's Rainbow, p. 760) 
Away from the violence of the impending explosion, the Rocket achieves a moment 
of static balance between earth and space. The quotation is replete with the language 
of infinity and eternity, 'absolutely and forever' and 'immeasurable' gesturing to a 
place beyond time, definition and voice. W. T. Lhamon, speaking on V., argues that 
Pynchon focuses on 'the language of the Pentecost', a language which consists of 
marginal and non-rational voices that bear 'a longing for transcendence' . 
57 Gravity's 
Rainbow bears evidence to a similar kind of language that strains to touch the point 
between all poles and all distinctions, purifying alterity so that it reaches beyond 
language into the 'immeasurable gap' of a trans-conceptual space. This is the space 
that the statistician Roger Mexico inhabits in his calculation of V-2 strike patterns: the 
'domain between one and zero' (Pynchon, Gravity's Rainbow, p. 55), where 
possibilities and probabilities become a zone of infinite division. The Rocket becomes 
representative of this zone because of its perfect arbitrariness. 
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What conclusions might we derive from the Rocket of Gravity's Rainbow in 
relation to religion, alterity and postmodemism? Firstly, for Pynchon the otherness in 
linguistic difference can be represented upon the common object of multiple 
relationships, in this case a Rocket. By giving a symbolic focus to otherness, alterity is 
able to perform as a theme which, after all, is the intention of a novel that discusses 
indeterminacy or over-determination. The upshot, however, is that 'genuine' alterity is 
lost as soon as it is pursued and what is left is an influential negativity with all the 
mystery and spirituality of the object of a negative religion. So Joseph Slade is able to 
see an equation between the Rocket and the practices of Eastern mysticism: 
One draws parallels between rocketry and Zen archery. Mondaugen borrows metaphors from 
Stefan George and Hermann Hesse; he visualizes the rocket as a resolver of paired opposites: 
male and female, life and death, creation and destruction. (Slade, Pynchon, p. 221) 
Interpreting the Rocket in terms of Buddhist spirituality is far from irrelevant. Just as 
the Buddhist attempts to see beyond binaries and to dissolve self through such 
practices as archery, so the Rocket appears as a means by which the self can be 
transcended in a trans-linguistic mode of perception. The narratives surrounding the 
Rocket are held together around a negativity of conspicuously metaphysical influence. 
Much of the language of Gravity's Rainbow seems theological in its scope, drawing 
on the transfer of the absolute presence of God into the absolute absences of 
postmodem mythologising. 
Turning our attention back to V., there is the same gravitation towards alterity 
as is displayed in Gravity's Rainbow, though this time it is not made manifest in a 
Rocket, but is personified through the multifarious appearances of V. 'herself'. 
Herbert Stencil's pursuit of the secrets which he believes V. contains, leads inexorably 
to his mysterious death at sea in a waterspout, his death appearing to be the only 
adequate fulfilment to a quest in which nothing is concluded except Stencil's yearning 
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to be united with the truth of V. Like the Rocket of Gravity's Rainbow, the signifying 
structures that surround V. are multiple, subjective and contingent. Yet in Ws case 
'she' not only centres the focus of the narrative, but also appears to transcend 
historical, geographical and even material conditions with the non-matcriality of 
otherness. V. is not frozen in the Rocket's twentieth century space; she appears in 
diverse forms and personalities such as the mysterious hinterland of Vheissu, the 
persons of Victoria Wren in Cairo and Florence of the 1890s, Vera Meroving at 
Fopple's siege-party in southwest Africa, and Veronica Manganese on Malta in 1919, 
a place to which she returns in the final form of the 'Bad Priest' during the siege of 
that island in the Second World War. Sidney Stencil pursues V. amidst a plethora of 
historical and metaphysical signs, attempting, like Oedipa Maas attempts with the 
Trystero, to find an essence which can be classed as the definitive V., the sum of all 
her parts. Yet we see in Stencil's search a belief that truth would be a mortal 
discovery, the initial warning of which Stencil discovers in his father's journal: 
'There is more behind and inside V. than any of us had suspected. Not who, but what: what is 
she. God grant that I may never be called upon to write that answer, either here or in any 
official report. ' (Pynchon, V., p. 53) 
The 'answer' to V. is perceived as a nameless threat which must never be voiced to 
protect personal and social safety. A comparable dread is apparent in Gravity's 
Rainbow, when Tyrone Slothrop discovers the complex links between his past and 
present life and the world-wide corporate network linked to the production of the 
Rocket. When he acquires the dossier of Laszlo Jarnf, his self-understanding is 
overwhelmed by the evidence that his father, William Slothrop, while in economic 
difficulties with his business, sold Tyrone to the scientist Jamf for unknown scientific 
purposes. Through this knowledge, Slothrop has to re-identify himself, reformulating 
his history in the light of Jamf as a new, mysterious centre in his personal history. He 
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experiences a dream which defines his crisis, a dream where he reads from a old 
dictionary of technical German and sees the definition 'Jamf. 1'. 
He woke begging It no - but even after waking, he was sure, he would remain sure, that It 
could visit him again, any time It wanted. Perhaps you know that dream too. Perhaps It has 
warned you never to speak Its name. If so, you'll know about how Slothrop'll be feeling now. 
(Pynchon, Gravity's Rainbow, p. 287) 
The capitalisation of the 'It' achieves produces a haunting effect. 'It' becomes as 
fundamental as the T of the dream definition, an T which destroys Slothrop's 
illusion of the independence from the impersonal constructions of capitalism. 58 
Therefore the 'I' is threatened by replacement with the 'It', an external and ghostly 
force which lurks at the edge of perception. Yet despite the chilling mood surrounding 
the 'It', there is also the feeling that contains a truth which needs to be discovered as 
much as it will remain forever out of reach. The nameless threat contains the 
possibility of desolation and destruction, and yet lures with the assurance that 'the 
truth is out there'. In V. the momentum behind the narrative is supplied by a 
fundamental yearning towards the discovery of V. 's truth, even though the result is 
potentially disastrous. Stencil's quest for V. is never completed in his lifetime, but his 
travels amongst the forms of V. enable him to relate his identity to meaning. The 
mystery that V. represents to Stencil is absolute. Because it is absolute, it defies total 
participation in its shifting forms and seems to point to some ultimate cognitive 
recognition beyond human ken. Stencil is engaged in a negative pursuit of V., 
constantly dismissing the forms of its identity in the attempt to unify himself with its 
ineffable presence. 
Stencil is an unlikely quester in the early stages of the novel, for he adopts a 
position of complete relativism with regard to truth and reality, a position which 
would seem to threaten any belief in a trans-historical V.: 
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He had decided long ago that no Situation had any objective reality: it only existed in the 
minds of those who happened to be in on it at any specific moment. (Pynchon, V., p. 189) 
For Stencil, truth is an utter contingency which is wrought within the 'specific 
moment' of a particular history. Yet it soon becomes evident that V. is an answer to 
this disconnected perception of reality, overturning Stencil's contention by producing 
meaning and what Thomas Schaub has described as a 'fourth dimension' of Stencil's 
world (Schaub, Pynchon, p. 9). This extra dimension is the abstracted world that 
provides the 'solace of an explanation' while never resolving itself in a definitive 
perception. Schaub claims, in the case of Stencil, that this solace 'does little to 
diminish the chaos he sees around him, but I would suggest that disruption is the very 
mode by which otherness performs its function of ontological location. V. is later 
described as 'the ultimate Plot Which Has No Name' (Pynchon, V., p. 226), a 
designation with a paradoxical blend of grammar and meaning: the 'Plot' is without a 
name, but the capitalisation makes this lack of identity into an object within its own 
right, a pure otherness in the same way as the 'I AM' of the Old Testament Yahweh. 
The same paradox of the personified void emerges when Old Godolphin is asked by 
Signor Mantissa about what he saw in the mysterious realms of Vheissu: ' "Nothing, " 
Godolphin whispered. "It was Nothing I saw. " ' (Pynchon, V., p. 204). 'Nothing' is 
able to become God-like in V. and thus becomes a source of metaphysical interest and 
a solution to ontological problems, fulfilling what Tony Tanner calls 'the need to see 
patterns' (Tanner, W. and V-2', p. 8). By absorbing himself in V., Stencil is able to 
embrace the Nothingness and the void of contemporary (postmodern? ) existence and 
turn it into a personified goal, enabling him to see the elusiveness of V. not as a 
futility, but as the indicator of metaphysical presence pointing outside the 
uncertainties of reality and truth. 
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It is important to contextualise my argument of the metaphysical potential of 
V. with Deborah Madsen's contention that the mystical and religious elements of V. 
are actually illustrations of the ultimate depth of bureaucratic conspiracy and political 
control in the twentieth century. Madsen interprets V. as representing the mechanistic 
nature of modem, institutionalised rationalism, instead of showing a possible 
transcendence over it. This is embodied in what Madsen calls the 'V-metaphysic' 
(Madsen, Postmodemist, pp. 29-37) whereby V., in her procession from the animate, 
though destructive, Victoria Wren to the inanimate Bad Priest, a mere collection of 
inert prosthetic limbs, symbolises the dehumanising effects of capitalism, the fatal 
'disease' which Stencil describes as infecting the world 'somewhere between 1859 
and 1919' (Pynchon, V., p. 461). Madsen argues that V. seems to provide 'a signifying 
centre which would be the 'spirit' informing modem history, giving it pattern, 
significance and direction' (Madsen, Postmodemist, p. 29), though this centre 
ultimately undermines its appearance of transcendence by ironising the 'ideology of 
the transcendental signified' (Madsen, Postmodenzist, p. 31). The 'confessions' of 
Fausto Maijstral on the island of Malta perhaps provide the most immediate support 
for this interpretation, when Maijstral describes his descent from strong spiritual 
convictions to a cynical belief in the inanimate, such as it is embodied in the Malta 
that lies passionless under the bombardment from the German forces: 
Fausto's kind alone with the task of living in a universe of things which simply are, and 
cloaking the inanimate mindlessness with comfortable and pious metaphor so that the 
'practical' half of humanity may continue in the Great Lie, confident that their machines, 
dwellings, streets and weather share the same human motives, personal traits and fits of 
contrariness as they. (Pynchon, V., p. 326) 
Fausto presents religion as a massive act of self deception, the giving of a spiritualised 
form to 'a universe of things'. In such a universe, objects are the only reality and the 
order of the inanimate, of which the mechanistic philosophy is its servant, is the 
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complete truth of modernity. I would, however, be reluctant to conclude that the 
insistent use of religious material in Pynchon's novels is merely for purposes of 
parody. 59 David Seed has remarked that Pynchon's use of religion points towards an 
ontological gravitas rather than a depthless model of existence: 
The gap left by the loss of religion, implied as an ironic absence in V., leads to a collective 
yearning for an absolute confirmation of characters' own existence and for a dimension 
exempt from the flux and uncertainty of this world. '50 
Seed notes that the 'gap' which remains after God has disappeared has a 'collective' 
potential for giving meaning to a world that displays chaos and fragmentation. The 
fact that this meaning is indefinable is not the real issue. Once a novel is constructed 
around an absent centre, then that absence becomes the centre in itself, 61 and replays 
the qualities of the original centre, e. g. God. Pynchon's characters and worlds are 
centred by the constant postulation of a meaning which is present and total, but which 
is not invested in the terms or objects with which we form understanding. As one of 
Pynchon's 'Proverbs for Paranoids' makes clear: 'You may never get to touch the 
Master, but you can tickle his creatures' (Pynchon, Gravity's Rainbow, p. 237). The 
'Master' is that which is never comprehended directly, but only through the 
illustrative nature of material reality. By negating the authority of particular morsels of 
evidence and information, Pynchon focuses our attention on the alterity of the text as 
the inconceivable truth of his textual world. Moreover, once this alterity becomes 
defined or symbolically contained in such physical vessels as death, V. or the Rocket, 
then otherness performs the security of embodying the presence of the demand for 
meaning. Therefore, alterity actually protects against what Slothrop terms 'anti- 
paranoia', 'where nothing is connected to anything, a condition not many of us can 
bear for long' (Pynchon, Gravity's Rainbow, p. 434). 
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Madsen is right to point to Pynchon's ironising of capitalism and religion. Yet 
what he ironises them with is no real threat to either. Pynchon finds his 'still point in a 
turning world' through attempting to push his novels deeper into a cosmological 
alterity. For as he ranges across many social, political and philosophical worlds, he 
unites them all with a portentous sense of otherness and mortality. This 'common gift' 
(to use Derrida's term once again) is the ultimate judgement upon social hegemonies, 
but only insofar as it dominates the philosophical horizon of how they justify 
themselves. So even in Vineland, Pynchon seems to use political injustice to illustrate 
the absolute force of the aporetic as a reality that goes beyond all forms. The novels of 
Thomas Pynchon manifest deep mystical tendencies because he uses the ineffable to 
connect, even transcend, characters and events, and by so doing gives alterity a 
position of influence, power and meaning Within the text. As such, what criticisms he 
can make are always pulled askew by the gravity of pure philosophy and religious 
sentiment. 
In this chapter I have attempted to show how the alterity which is meant to 
define the postmodem novel can be a distinctly unpostmodem attempt to negotiate 
death and represent negativity. In the cases of Vonnegut and Delillo, I have argued 
that labelling their work as postmodem is a mistake, not least for the fact that they are 
more concerned with exploring the human condition than they are with pondering the 
death of the metanarrative. Regarding Pynchon, I consider that he does sincerely try to 
depict an indeterminate and fragmented world, but his focus on that which is lost 
ultimately returns his language to the priorities of essential, even absolute, meaning. 
The recurrent focus upon death in postmodem fiction has perhaps not been treated 
with enough seriousness in recent criticism. The insistence of this theme is a 
humanistic shout often unheard by the ear of contemporary criticism. We can read 
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postmodem attempts to express alterity and otherness as a way of instructing us in the 
experience of death by its visualisation in form. Thus we have seen several 
'postmodern' novelists who have made death and alterity intersect in an attempt to 
reify otherness as the confrontation with that which we cannot see or know. The effect 
of this is that postmodem fiction recognisably fits into a model of literature where 
certain primary constituents of human experience are presumed. In much postmodern 
fiction, these constants seem to be the consciousness of death and the negotiation of 
the unknown. The metaphysical register surrounding the postmodern speculations on 
death, therefore, comes as no surprise. Postmodem fiction concerns itself with seeing 
beyond the limits of the concept and even beyond life itself - in effect it is a 
permanent speaking of the last rites. By seeking indeterminacy, postmodem fiction 
seems to desire a point of satori when the subject is able to see the whole of the world 
through the lens of negativity itself. The critical discourse that has surrounded 
postmodem writing has obscured the fact that alterity surges into meaning rather than 
deconstructing meaning. Metaphysical and mystical truth is admittedly obscure and 
indirect in such writing, yet the presumption of a total present meaning is still held in 
confidence. Postmodem fiction maintains the structural pren-dse of truth by making 
otherness an absolute in itself, and by reifying that otherness in, amongst other things, 
death. In the next chapter, we shall look at how the postmodern negative acts as the 
metanarrative of perhaps the most scriptural literary form - allegory. 
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Chapter 3 
A Tale of Absence: Postmodern Allegory 
If the key component of postmodern textuality is the unstoppable play of difference, 
then it is intriguing that many critics have seen allegory as the most visible 
embodiment of this condition. Such a claim for allegory could well seem 
inappropriate to the functions which allegorical literature has adopted throughout 
literary and social history. Allegory's scriptural origins and Classical adaptations have 
generally seemed to imbue the allegorical text with a didactic transparency, where the 
words on the page didactically revolve around a stable referent such as the divine 
logos or the national identity. Thus John Bunyan, in the apology for perhaps the most 
famous Christian allegory of all, defends the metaphoric nature of his work: 
Ifind that holy Writ in many places, 
Hath semblance with this method, where the cases 
Doth callfor one thing to setforth another. 
Use it I may then, and yet nothing smother 
Truths golden Beams. ' 
Bunyan justifies his allegorical method in the transcendent 'Truth' of Scripture which 
holds signifier and signified together in a confident structure of metaphor. In a sense, 
Bunyan is claiming that his allegory constantly discards its own signifiers as the text 
opens to reveal the Word behind the sign. With such evident logocentrism in its 
history, why have critics like Zhang Longxi claimed that allegory has become 'the 
favourite trope in postmodern criticism'? ' 
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The history of allegory is built out of presence-bascd assumptions. Philo's 
development of the 'allegorical hermeneutic' grounded the non-literal interpretation of 
scripture in the twin doctrines of inspired reading and biblical infallibility, thus 
enabling the metaphorical to retain its links with the transcendental signified. Now 
that we are meant to be living under the 'hermeneutics of suspicion', the age of 
Nietzsche, Freud and Derrida, Philo's long persuasive model appears to have undone 
itself in the very textuality of allegory and the infinite play of the metaphoric process. 
So it is that the alterity of allegory is able to emerge and the concept of the 
postmodern allegory is born. Yet we must be cautious here, for Philo's religious voice 
is not so easily overridden. Despite the positivist appearance of Philo's literary 
method, he has also been described as 'the Father of negative theology'. 4 Philo did not 
believe that positive statements about God were possible - hence the allegorical 
model relies on indirection and mediation when discussing God. The significance of 
Philo for our discussion of postmodern allegory here, is that the aporetic and 
logocentric are not necessarily exclusive from one another. The alterity found in 
postmodern allegory essentially acts as the Philonic God - nothing positive can be said 
about it, but it remains as the totalising force behind the culturally situated act of 
interpretation. 
The focus of this chapter is basically threefold. Firstly, there is the question of 
originality: is postmodern. allegory markedly different from allegory prior to the 
postmodern epoch? Or is postmodern allegory merely a continuation of a traditional 
allegorical project under the guise of indeterminacy? Secondly, I shall focus on the 
alterity of postmodem allegory not in aporetic terms, but as a referential anchor for the 
allegorical and its cultural priorities. The interpretation of alterity as cultural message 
instead of elusive trace will be expanded in the third and main part of this chapter. 
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Here I shall focus on three classic and much discussed postmodern allegories: John 
Barth's Giles Goat-Boy, Thomas Pynchon's The Crying of Lot 49 and Angela Carter's 
The Passion of New Eve. I shall demonstrate that the 'otherness' which haunts these 
texts is not a common aporia but a negative presence which attempts to retain the 
didactic ground of allegorical tradition though ostensibly embracing the indeterminate. 
Allegorical alterity and postmodern culture 
Arguably the most determinable feature of all allegory is its conscious intertextuality. 
Whether it be the Bible, a fable, or an episode in political legend, the allegory is 
always a text which presents itself in relation to a pretext, ' the prior text or social 
theme that is the object of and authority behind the allegorical setting. The relation 
between the text and the pretext is necessarily mobile, for the allegorical text is always 
incorporating the cultural specificity of the present as it attempts to make the pretext 
relevant and visible to a particular age. Deborah Madsen claims that allegory's 
application throughout oral, biblical and classical history has been an ideal form of 
textual and social crisis-management. Madsen contends that allegory intervenes in 
history to defuse new exegetic demands placed upon an authoritative, usually 
religious, text, by a changing culture: 
at any moment when the textual justification for a particular cultural order was threatened by 
historical change or by a shift in dominant beliefs, it was to allegorical interpretation that 
exegetes had recourse, in order to shore up the authority and legitimacy of their sacred book. 6 
Allegory acts as a textual defence whose virtue is the versatility to adapt a supposedly 
permanent textual foundation to the vagaries of a constantly mutating society. Implicit 
in allegory's fortress mentality is the suggestion that the language of the present is 
somehow fractured and fallen compared to the logos within a pretext such as the Bible 
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or Homer. ' The author of allegory recognises the fallen nature of language, yet seeks 
to reconstruct its fractures through the authoritative pretextual other. 
Madsen, in her examination of pre-Romantic literature, also shows how 
allegory outside postmodernity has tried to occupy both 'horizontal' and 'vertical' 
planes of exposition: 
Allegorical narratives make a demand to be read both 'vertically' and 'horizontally'. That is, 
allegorical images require definition in terms of their place within the larger symbolic structure 
and with reference to their implied relations with cultural structures which exist outside the 
text (Madsen, Allegory, p. 125) 
This positioning of allegory across axes of both temporality and spatiality shows how 
allegory offers itself as an epistemologically superior medium for uniting ideality and 
impermanence in the alignment of 'horizontal' social movement with the 'vertical' 
authority of pretextual icons. It is in this totalising unity that allegory seems most 
opposed to postmodem literature, especially as allegory seems confident in the 
letter/spirit division which has been the primary target of poststructuralism: ' 
Allegory constructs a hypothetical fictional reality which is centred upon, and determined by, 
the ideal. Within the narrative, the broad and general significances of any event are judged in 
terms of this ideal which is thus tested and proved; the imitation of life on the literal level of 
narrative coexists with an evaluative principle which gives meaning and purpose to that life. 
(Madsen, Allegoty, p. 125)9 
The ideal context of allegory transforms temporality into a form of eschatological 
quest, a stretching out towards the final revelation beyond language. There is a sense 
in which allegory has functioned as a textual mechanism through which the reader can 
accept a presence behind the visible signifier and a source of reference itself. So when 
Bede in c. 700 was able to say that allegory 'is a trope in which meaning other than the 
literal is indicated', " he implied that the text is merely a linguistic window through 
which pretextual knowledge is seen. 
Yet as we saw in Bunyan's defensiveness, it is apparent that the movement 
beyond literality can generate an awkward epistemological position. Allegory's 
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didactic moment lies in intertextual passage, with the allegorical text acting as a 
literary thoroughfare through which the reader passes to an originary authority and 
returns from that authority to validate a particular cultural interpretation. However, the 
pendulum-swing of intertextuality means that the final applicable authority of the 
allegorical text is displaced from the simple text and pretext division to an indefinable 
space between these two constituents of the allegory. In short, once text and pretext 
engage, then it would seem that neither can remain pure in the volatile interpretative 
activity of diffirance. 
A conclusion that can be drawn from allegory's intertextual priorities is that 
allegory exposes its own indeterminacy. Here the opening for postmodern. theory 
becomes conspicuous. Several prominent postmodernists have seen in allegory the 
form which most reveals the operations of language theorised by poststructuralism. 
Paul de Man and Jonathan Culler have both argued that allegory defies the logocentric 
presumptions of symbolism as its intertextual condition testifies to the lack of an 
4original' referent free from the instability of the linguistic play. " Culler argues that 
allegory differs from the expectations of Romantic symbolism because, in Madsen's 
words, allegory operates by 'stressing the difference between apparent and ultimate 
meanings, focusing on the "semantic leap" needed to produce meaning' (Madsen, 
Allegory, p. 138). 11 Allegory always exposes the text's inability to contain its own 
meaning and de Man expands this theme in 'The Rhetoric of Temporality' and 
Allegories ofReading. De Man separates the symbolic from the allegorical because: 
Whereas the symbol postulates the possibility of an identity or identification, allegory 
designates primarily a distance in relation to its o-*,, n origin, and, renouncing the nostalgia 
and the desire to coincide, it establishes language in the void of this temporal difference. 
(de Man, 'Rhetoric', p. 207) 
The reference to 'the void of temporal difference' implicitly associates de Man's 
theorisation. of allegory with Derrida's notion of diffýrance. Indeed, Derrida's 
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contention that '[njothing, either in the elements or in the system, is anywhere simply 
absent or present' is especially relevant to allegorical temporality (Derrida, Positions, 
p. 26). For allegory is caught not only within the diffdrance of its own signification, 
but its 'present' appears suspended in limbo between the contemporary and the iconic. 
Allegory reveals the quintessential postmodern form because meaning is vagrant 
between past and present, transcendence and trace. 
Madsen concludes in response to de Man: 
The language of allegory is then purely figurative; it is not based upon perception. Rather than 
attempt to write the self and world through emotion, the allegorical sign refers to previous 
signs, the text's meaning is derived from other texts, and because the narrative thus exists in a 
purely linguistic context it reveals an 'authentically temporal destiny', an authentic linguistic 
self. (Madsen, America, p. 139) 
Madsen's summation of de Man's theory of allegory is offered with the caution that 
his reasoning is more applicable to the allegories of modernism onwards than the 
allegories of pre-Romanticism. Madsen sees indeterminacy as the root of the 
allegorical form, but she recognises that such an aporetic structure has been managed 
throughout history, through boundaries of typology and analogy which keep the 
allegory within the limits of a cultural role. Postmodern allegories, such as Pynchon's 
Gravity's Rainbow and The Crying of Lot 49 and Barth's Giles Goat-Boy, contrast 
with, say, the early Puritan allegories of the New World, because they centralise the 
gulf between reference, meaning and signification. Longxi offers similar views when 
he claims that postmodem allegory differs from other styles of allegory because the 
postmodem presentation of the 'impersonal nature of linguistic necessity' differs from 
the 'controlled linguistic construct of the past' (Longxi, 'Historicizing', p. 215). 
The purpose of this chapter is to dissolve the artificial theoretical boundaries 
constructed between postmodern allegory and its forerunners. The claim of this thesis 
is that postmodern alterity is not an inconceivable negativity, but a textual device used 
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to negotiate the ontological and even epistemological problems of contemporary 
culture. Following the lines of Madsen's argument, though to different ends, I would 
suggest that postmodem allegory mediates a foundational pretext as a way of 
addressing specific social challenges. Proposing these challenges as the instability of 
values in a market-orientated, multi-cultural society, what postmodern allegory does is 
represent metanarratives through negative discourse and thus move contemporary 
ontologies of absence into a traditional metaphysical authority. By keeping alterity 
close to tropes of divine presence, the postmodern allegory is thus able to retain its 
allegorical role of judging the world and defining its psychology. In this meeting of 
metaphysics and alterity, postmodem allegory protects itself against the collapse into 
nihilism and futility by making the negative resound with the authority of the absolute, 
pretextual other. 
So how is alterity constructed in postmodern allegory? As we have seen, 
postmodem allegory forces the reader towards intertextual aporiae and textual 
difference. Yet the result need not see a literary work floundering in a sea of 
indeterminacy. We have already seen in the case of Philo how the apophatic text can 
use alterity to signify both a formal structure and a metaphysical presence within a 
theological system. It is reasonable to ask, therefore, whether postmodem allegory and 
negative theology share a desire for a trans-textual foundation in their constructions of 
ambiguity. In another consideration of Philo, Joel Fineman sees allegorical alterity as 
a way of fusing absent scriptural origins and the imminent cultural present into an 
attestation of the ineffable, yet historical, presence of the divine: 
It is as though allegory were precisely that mode that makes up for the distance, or heals the 
gap, between the present and a disappearing past, which, without interpretation, would be I otherwise irretrievable and foreclosed. ' 
155 
The significance of Fineman's argument is that allegory acts as a form that reclaims 
meaning and the 'presence' of history by its implicit demand for interpretative action 
and its connection of different time-frames of experience. All allegory contains the 
inherent impetus towards an interpretation, yet as Fineman suggests, this association is 
as much productive as it is aporetic in the way the allegory charges us to create 
meaning instead of suspending it. 
Associating postmodern allegory with negative theology is not inappropriate. 
The fact that allegory questions the bonds of meaning does not necessarily produce an 
eternally nomadic reader, but instead can offer a conscious interpretative presence, 
which like the inconceivable God, has deferral as its identity. As I have argued in my 
introductory chapter, once alterity and indeterminacy are given priority within a 
narrative schema, then such a priority achieves a certain visibility within the thematic 
structure of the text. Once alterity is offered as a visibility or awareness, then it 
becomes something to which the subject must respond. In postmodern allegory, the 
alterity which exists between text and pretext is not only a demand for the reader to 
assemble textual meaning. There is the additional demand that the reader, whose 
ontological isolation is implied by textual structures, uses alterity in the attempt to 
represent pretextual codes in a contemporary environment. The alterity of postmodem 
allegory thus becomes a groundwork for social confrontation and a benchmark for 
subjective interpretation. 
However, there is a problem when applying the above theory to actual works 
of fiction. As I am arguing that alterity is not, in fact, a pure realm of difference, but a 
visible thematic presence within postmodern textuality, the implication is that alterity 
can be handled and applied, like any other theme, to direct ideological ends. As the 
remainder of this chapter will show, the otherness of postmodcrn allegory is always 
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packaged and directed by focused narrative priorities rather than a general allusion 
towards difference. Otherness is quite capable of containing religious, philosophical, 
nihilistic and linguistic themes as part of an allegorical message. In this chapter, I shall 
focus on the religious heritage of allegory, mainly because the apophatic within 
postmodem allegory stays close to biblical and mythological pretexts. Such pretexts 
are useful because they cement the themes of absence, ontology and value into a 
metaphysical whole. 
For all the charges of logocentricity that postmodernism has raised against 
religion, the strongly aporetic trends in many branches of theology makes religion an 
ideal site of return for those who wish to provide indeterminacy with philosophical 
import. The association of negativity and spirituality in postmodern allegory is natural 
considering allegory's religious lineage, hence textual alterity often performs the role 
of the spiritual logos and transcendental signified. Madsen claims that 'allegory has 
intervened in all the most important debates concerning the spiritual destiny of 
Western civilisation' (Madsen, America, p. 4). Postmodernism is no exception. The 
interaction of alterity with spirituality questions the extent to which postmodern 
allegory is a revolution in thought or a retreat into tradition. This will be the main 
question during my analyses of Barth, Pynchon and Carter. 
John Barth 
Any treatment of postmodem allegory would be incomplete without an appraisal of 
the novels of John Barth. Barth's value for this chapter is that he produces a typical 
postmodern allegory which aims at unsettling the confidence in the stability of textual 
reference. Yet I shall claim that the otherness which results from this disruption is 
actually an ontological repackaging of life in a mix of liberal humanism and didactical 
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negativity. Mainly using Giles Goat-Boy and The Sot-Weed Factor, I argue against 
John Stark's view that Barth defies thematic priorities in his novels and that, in the 
case of Giles Goat-Boy,: 
the reader, after he peels off all the layers of the onion, finds in the last layer only the impetus 
of story-telling. 14 
I do not disagree with Stark over his contentions that the reader discovers 'the impetus 
of story-telling' in Barth. Such an engine does drive much of the volatile plot, 
characterisation and reflection in Barth's novels. However, the desire to tell stories 
depends on a whole system of ontological presumptions which is writ large within 
Barth's characters as that which both listens and speaks within a meaningful 
discursive context. Barth's postmodern credentials are questionable, not because he 
shares the common involvement in the metaphysics of presence, but because he 
espouses alterity as a first principle which keeps his narrative within the remit of 
Philo's allegorical hermeneutic. 
We start with the acknowledgement that the allegorical play between text and 
pretext in Barth's novels does appear to create a postmodern 'discourse of the Other' 
and an alterity which testifies to the absence within the sign. The alteritY of Barth's 
fiction emerges out of what Madsen would describe as the attempt to 'articulate what 
is atemporally true (the logos) in a temporal mode of representation' (Madsen, 
America, p. 145). On this interpretation, Barth clouds the logos with its own allegorical 
medium of expression and disables transcendental import through the temporality of 
metaphorical performance. In applying this argument, it is useful to juxtapose the 
alterity in texts such as Giles Goat-Boy to de Man's analysis of allegorisation in 
Romantic literature and its relation to ontological awareness. According to de Man, 
when allegory reaches 'the void of [ ... I temporal difference': 
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it prevents the self from an illusory identification with the non-self, which is now fully, though 
painfully, recognised as a non-self. It is this painful knowledge that we perceive at the 
moments when early romantic literature finds its true voice. (de Man, 'Rhetoric', p. 207) 
I would question whether the separation between self and non-self is as 
incommensurable as de Man states. The self seems not so much alien to the non-self, 
but in many ways acts in an adjectival relationship to a kind of pure and nameless 
being. For as the two 'selves' are held in confrontation, the non-self starts to appear as 
the essentialist motivation for being upon which the temporal succession of the self is 
built. The otherness of the non-self is the permanent precondition of seeing the self in 
all its relief and thus it is absorbed back into an ontology of judgement and 
independence. 
The association of self and non-self is what gives alterity an atemporal force 
that ironically emphasises the continuity of the subject in a postmodem allegorical 
text. For though critics like Craig Owens have seen allegory as dominated by 
'[alppropriation, site specificity, impermanence, accumulation, discursivity, 
hybridization', such textual features are grounded by their contribution towards the 
meaning-formation presupposed in the allegorical activity itself. 
15 In Giles Goat-Boy, 
the allegorical emphasis on absence becomes meaningful within itself and thus 
converts negativity into an allegorical centre. My main goal in this discussion of Barth 
is to explain the mechanics of this shift and the implications for a theological 
investigation of postmodern writing. 
Giles Goat-Boy begins in a confusion of textual multiplicity and fictive self- 
consciousness. The 'Publisher's Disclaimer', " consisting of five editorial voices 
questioning both the authenticity and the quality of the subsequent text, initiate a 
novel where authorial identity seems forever questioned and interpretative security 
cannot be found. The 'Cover-Letter to the Editors and Publisher' signed by URS 
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(Barth, Giles, pp. xvii-xxxi), only contributes to the instability. Far from providing a 
governing authorial intention, Barth's 'cover-letter' further dissolves the authoritative 
author within fictionality. 'J. B'., a university Professor, describes the encounter with 
the student Stoker Giles who leaves in his hands The Revised New Syllabus (RNS) of 
George Giles, 'Goat-Boy' and 'Grand Tutor' of New Tammany College, the 
allegorical equivalent of the western, capitalist world. J. B. enthusiastically accepts the 
spiritual content of RNS, yet admits that Stoker Giles and New Tammany College do 
not seem to exist and that the giant computer, WESCAC, which is supposed to have 
collated and composed the RNS manuscript, was not even a technological possibility 
at that time: 
Acknowledge with me, then, the likelihood that The Revised New Syllabus is the work not of 
'WESCAC' but of an obscure, erratic wizard whose nom de plume, at least, is Stoker, Giles; 
and, again with me, acknowledge further that this is not the only possibility - for as that 
splendid fellow observed, there are in literal truth 'other universities than ours. ' (Barth, Giles, 
P. Xxx) 
As J. B. questions the literalities of the RNS, the system of referentiality in the novel 
seems impossible to contain. For here we have an author who has fictionalised himself 
arguing over the authenticities of a fictional text, with publishers who are fictional in a 
situation where the author is both conspicuously present in his artistry yet curiously 
absent in his status. The admission that there are 'other universities than ours', wryly 
opens up the limitless possibilities of alternative interpretations and worlds and thus 
seems to prohibit confidence in our own epistemology or judgement. 
Giles Goat-Boy is thus a text which continually ironises the desire for textual 
certainty. The very first words of the novel deliberately toy with the trust usually 
constructed between reader and author in the suspension of disbelief. 
The reader must begin this book with an act of faith and end it with an act of charity. We ask 
him to believe in the sincerity and authenticity of this preface, affirming in return his 
prerogative to be skeptical of all that follows it (Barth, Giles, p. xxxi) 
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The ironic effect of this entreaty is that faith in the preface is precisely the thing which 
the preface itself disallows. The opening to the novel places the reader in an awkward 
position in which the fictional has confessed itself and merged with apparent 
pretences to the factual. In such a situation, the role of the novel as allegory appears 
insecure in a novel where the distinct relation between the allegory and the world 'out 
there' becomes multi-layered and confused. Barth seems to enact Roland Barthes' 
proclamation of the death of the author by withdrawing into elusive layers of fiction 
and difference. If traditional allegory offers the movement towards the transcendental 
signified of the Author, then Barth's postmodernist qualities seem to deny that any 
such logocentric presence could be pinned down with certainty. 
The 'Revised New Syllabus' is the story of George Giles who, though raised 
as a goat by his benefactor Max Spielman, ultimately attains the position of Grand 
Tutor, an office of supreme religious and philosophical status. The action takes place 
within the New Tammany College, the western half of a giant university which acts as 
part of the allegorical conversion of the universe into a university. " As Giles searches 
for the truth of his origins in relation to WESCAC and attempts to promote himself as 
a Grand Tutor, the allegorical references range dramatically through the politics of the 
Cold War (represented by the mutually assured destruction policies of WESCAC and 
its eastern counterpart, EASCAQ, and the ideas of Darwin, Freud, Sophocles and 
Dante. Here I am going to focus particularly on Barth's partly parodic, though 
ultimately stabilising, treatment of religion. To target religion in Giles Goat-Boy is not 
an arbitrary focus. Barth himself, in interview with Heide Ziegler, has asserted that 
Giles Goat Boy's central trope is the cycle of mystical disillusion whereby a 
spiritually-minded individual is capable of moments of epiphany, but has problems 
applying the new insight in a socially complex milieu: 
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At the end of Giles Goat-Boy the hero-narrator's experience is betrayed, qualified, 
postscripted, requalificd, etc. It's done comically because I can't do things any other way. But 
it's the comic rendition of something I take quite seriously. To sum up: society is not at the 
forefront of my literary concerns, but it's the ntilieu in which the mystic or the hero has to 
implement the ineffable and which will inevitably falsify, to some necessary degree, the thing 
he is trying to transmit. Society is the noise in the hero's signal. 18 
The secondary position which society holds in Barth's analysis will be important to 
the progression of this chapter. For the moment, however, this quotation acts as a 
caution against classing the religious content of the novel as simple parody. Though 
Giles Goat-Boy attests to the difficulty of keeping the spiritual fires burning, it also 
places the drive towards the ineffable as primary mode of perception that social 
realism can never quash. What social qualifications achieve is the negating of 
definitions of the divine. However, Giles Goat-Boy keeps negation itself within the 
boundaries of George's spiritual journey and so the alterity of the novel retains the 
figuration of the divine centre. In a sense, Barth makes alterity a metaphor of the 
ineffable God and thus keeps the allegory moving towards a religious, not a 
postmodem, pretext. As we shall see, the religious pretexts of Giles Goat-Boy are not 
ultimately mocked by the uncertainties of allegorical alterity, but act as the means by 
which alterity can be retained within the framework of mystical association. 
George Giles, in his attempt to become a recognised Grand Tutor, encounters 
three main systems of religious thought: Moishianism, Enochism and Beism, 
respectively representing Judaism, Christianity and Buddhism. The followers of 
Moishianism (Judaism) are described by adherent Max Spielman as the 'chosen class' 
(Barth, Giles, p. 29) who adhere to the tenets of the 'Old Syllabus' containing the 
revelations of the 'Founder' of the University. Barth gives them historical reference in 
the persecution of the Moishians at the hands of the 'Bonifacists' in the 'Second 
Campus Riot'. The Christian allegory surrounds the figure of Enos Enoch, a 
conspicuous Christ figure, 'the Shepherd Emeritus who died for his sheep' (Barth, 
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Giles, p. 29). As one would expect (bearing in mind the Moishian scriptures), the life 
and words of Enos Enoch are contained within the 'New Syllabus', and the novel is 
littered with didactic quotations from this textual authority and its Moishian 
predecessor. 
Throughout Giles Goat-Boy, Moishianism and Enochism are used to show the 
instability of the pretext in both allegory and society. Max, when educating George as 
to the difference between Enos Enoch's approach to knowledge and that taken by the 
Moishians, offers two versions of textuality which underpin the allegorical activity of 
the novel as a whole: 
But look here: he told his students Ask, and you'llfind the Answer, that's why the goyint call 
him their Grand Tutor, and the Founder's own son. But we Moishians say Ask, and you'll keep 
on asking ... There's the difference 
between us. (Barth, Giles, p. 29) 
The 'difference between us' which Max describes is the difference between Christian 
and Judaic textuality, with the former generally offering the secure pretext of an 
infallible scripture; while the latter, in its Rabbinical and Kabbalistic forms, offers a 
pretext which always multiplies and shifts with the performance of interpretation and 
glossing. If we were to try and distinguish which of these approaches Giles Goat-Boy 
favours, then we would probably tend towards the latter, as the biblical pretext moves 
from the hands of its own referentiality into the hands of the character applying the 
pretext to a given situation. This has important consequences for the way we read 
Giles Goat-Boy, because we are forcibly presented with the mediation of the pretext in 
other interpretative layers of textuality. And yet, like Judaism itself, the confrontation 
with the negative is part of understanding the hyperessentiality of the divine in which 
alterity alludes to a presence beyond language and concept. Thus, George's journey 
into spiritual understanding is a deepening series of epiphanies of alterity as he 
encounters the full force of the negative as centre. 
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Initially, George's passage to Grand Tutorship is beset by the problems 
existing between religious pretexts and allegorical ambiguity. For example, George 
spends much philosophical energy on various interpretations of the phrase Pass All 
Fail All, a conundrum of salvation and damnation which was written on a card hung 
about his neck when he emerged from the belly of WESCAC as a child. The 
ambiguity of this axiom makes George's project as Grand Tutor a volatile and 
frequently ludicrous experience. " He initially interprets Pass and Fail in terms of a 
radical distinctions and oppositional categories. This divisive perspective leads to a 
disastrous handling of the 'boundary dispute' -a territorial conflict between the East 
and West campuses. By forcing the two campuses into rigid separation, George 
simply escalates the ideological hostility and political aggression. His later perception 
of Passage and Failure as indivisible categories made oppositional by a false mind set 
is equally catastrophic. George's shift towards a holistic philosophy is precipitated by 
a conversion to Beism, an allegorical version of Buddhism where the binary 
distinctions of the mind are rejected as impositions onto a seamless and indivisible 
reality. At the moment George's mother mutters the words TassM are the flunked' 
(Barth, Giles, p. 552), George receives a mystical revelation that explodes his 
interpretative perceptions: 
There in a word was the Way: Embrace! What I had bid my Tutees shuck - false lines in their 
pictures of themselves, which Bray in his wisdom had Certified -I saw now to be unshuckable: 
nay, unreal, because falsely distinguished from their contraries. Failure is Passage. (Barth, 
Giles, p. 552) 
Bray, George's spiritual alter ego and competitor who performs dizzying changes of 
personae and theology, now becomes a source for George's holistic philosophy. The 
epiphany which George here receives, pushes deconstructive arbitrarity to its very 
limits by transforming negativity into a passive mysticism. Yet once again, the 
translation of such insight into social practice is fraught with impracticalities. 
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George's celebration of the collapse of binarity leads him to advise Chancellor 
Rexford, the leader of New Tammany College, to 'embrace nonsense' and merge the 
east and west campuses together, an ideal which is far from satisfied in the civil 
disorder resulting from George's new gospel. Max Spielman's observation that 
passage and failure are a 'trick of the mind' (Barth, Giles, p. 562) may be 
philosophically appealing but the Buddhist pretext, allegorically represented in the 
sublime unresponsiveness of Sakhyan, is parodied primarily because of its lack of 
application. As Barth contends, the problem of the religious pretext is in the taking of 
its message back into a world which cannot sustain transcendence within the temporal 
and unpredictable structures of existence. This is the essence of Barth's parody of the 
allegorical form, for the RNS, itself meant to be a religious text, is split by the textual 
problems of multiple pretexts, none of which seem able to stabilise the play of 
language involved in translating any religious practice into a compelling 
transcendence. 
By exposing allegorical multiplicity, Giles Goat-Boy reveals the alterity 
underlying any system of reference. Barth's parodic quoting of various scriptures 
leads to a heightened awareness of the condition of religious texts as linguistic and 
temporal objects, whose shape is continually changed by the otherness it cannot 
contain but which is its aspiration. For example, when Max is educating George on 
some differences between the 'Old Syllabus' and the 'New Syllabus', the 
recognisability of the quotations serves only to separate the reader from the pretext as 
authority: 
Now I wanted to know: was Ia Moishian? 
'Maybe so, maybe not, ' Max said. He fetched out his aged penis and declared, 'Moishe says in 
the Old Syllabus, Except ye be circumcised like me, ye shall not Pass. But in the New Syllabus 
Enos Enoch says Verily, I crave theforeskin of thy mind. ' (Barth, Giles, p. 29) 
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This passage is significant for the way that Max presents textual options as 
indistinguishable from ontological options. Frank McConnell's contention that 'Barth, 
in an extreme degree, accepts the linguistic nature of man as man's generative 
definition"' is an important summation, though, as we shall see, it is far from 
complete. By presenting the physical and spiritual interpretations of circumcision 
through parodic quotations, Barth shows how ontological choices are made through 
adherence to a particular pretextual authority. Yet however textual the problem may 
be, the absolute nature of the choice means that alterity is preserved as the otherness 
that is the ultimate goal of the choice. As a result, the pretextual authorities of Giles 
Goat-Boy always remain within the performative limits of divine alterity, as Barth 
seeks to explore what he sees the as insistent spirituality of the human condition. 
The primary emblem of the allegorical alterity in Giles Goat-Boy is the 
Founder's Scroll, the guiding religious text of the University. George's assignment 
list, received on entry to the university, asserts that George must 'Replace the 
Founder's Scroll' and his attempts at accomplishing this task reveal much of the 
novel's attention to otherness. When George, led by his mother, Virginia Hector, 
arrives at the library to accomplish his task, the Scroll is first found to be missing, and 
then appears from one of the library machines in a shredded state. George's despair 
and his goatish hunger overtake him and he proceeds to eat some of the shreds in a 
literalised comedy of the individual being fed by the word of God. The surviving parts 
of the Scroll end up in the hands of a Committee whose attempts to piece it together 
exhibit much about the novel's philosophy of signification. The Committee recognises 
that the Scroll has no original towards which the restoration process must work, as a 
Warden points out to George: 
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'After the first shock of seeing the Scrolls destroyed, we realiscd you'd actually given us a 
unique opportunity. All the texts are corrupt, you know, even these - copies of copies of 
copies, full of errata and lacunae - but we could never agree on a common reading, and of 
course the Scrolls acquired a great spurious authority for sentimental reasons, even though 
they contradict each other and themselves. ' (Barth, Giles, p. 663) 
The Warden's critique of scriptural infallibility removes the possibility of the primary 
religious text and seems to move us decisively away from Philo's allegorical 
hermeneutic. With his emphasis on errata and lacunae, the Warden points towards 
the aporetic nature of pretextual authority with the 'original' scripture disappearing 
into the conditions of textual reproduction and interpretative appropriation. Thus the 
allegorical passage between text and religious pretext is not a matter of unearthing 
presence but of co-operating with absence. 
The crucial sticking point for the exegetical committee is again on the 
interpretation of the words pass andfail. The committee is faced: 
by a practical question about the translation of a single sentence -a mere two words in the 
original language of the Scrolls. The 'etymons, ' as he called them, were the root terms for Pass 
and Fail, but inflected with prefixes, infixes, suffixes, and diacritical marks to such an extent, 
and so variously from fragment to fragment, that conflicting interpretations were possible. 
(Barth, Giles, p. 663) 
The recognition that 'conflicting interpretations were possible' over the crucial terms 
of salvation in the religious pretext, give a remarkably self-conscious moment in 
the structure of Giles Goat-Boy as an allegory. But as the words pass andfail dissolve 
into the alterity of diffirence, the allegorical hermeneutic does not disappear but rather 
shifts its object of focus. In its pursuit of illustrating alterity, otherness in Giles Goat- 
Boy becomes not only the rule of interpretation, but also the object of interpretation, 
thereby closing the text in a centre every bit as defined as Philo's negative God. Barth 
gives us an allegory which is forever moving in the alterity of its own material and 
thus the reader is not denied a stable point of textual understanding. What can appear 
as an inter-textual disruption is actually working as an extra-textual presence, as is 
shown in a revealing later episode. As George leaves the Committee room to make his 
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way to the Clocktower, he stops to ask directions from a 'longhaired pallid girl' 
(Barth, Giles, p. 666) at an information desk, a girl who is intently reading a book 
while she gives George his directions. The following eulogy and response are central 
to the allegorical nature of Giles Goat-Boy: 
Mild, undistinguished creature, never seen before or since, whose homely face I forgot in two 
seconds; whose name, if she bore one, I never knew; whose history and fate, if any she had, 
must be lacunae till the end of terms in my life's story - Passage be yours, for that in your 
moment of my time you did cnouncc, clearly as from a written text, your modest information! 
Simple answer to a simple question, but lacking which this tale were truncate as the Scroll, an 
endless fragment! 
'-less fragment, ' I thought I heard her murmur as I stooped through the little door she'd 
pointed out. I paused and frowned; but though her lips moved on, as did her finger across the 
page, her words were drowned now by the bells of Tower Clock. (Barth, Giles p. 666) 
George initially rejoices in the girl's directions because she seems to offer the escape 
from the nebulous confusion of scriptural difference into a moment where there is 
correspondence between word and thing, intention and object. Yet the repetition of 
George's words, itself in fragmented form, destroys any certitude, and returns George 
and reader once again to the domination of alterity. However, the fact is that the girl 
herself operates as a visible reification of alterity, an embodiment of the alterity that is 
dominating the novel. Described in terms of lacunae, she functions as a momentary 
centre where the aporetic is gathered into a figure whose status and significance is 
absolute within the economy of Barth's allegory. In a sense, she is an incarnation of 
Barth's god. 
Taking all the aporetic elements as a whole, it is tempting to proceed to a 
wholly postmodern conclusion about Giles Goat-Boy as a novel that undermines 
logocentricity by the alterity present in the allegorical process itself. Yet as we have 
already seen, the alterity which Barth produces in his fiction does not seem to disrupt 
the transcendent intentions traditionally associated with allegory. " Indeed, in Giles 
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Goat-Boy alterity actually stabilises and anchors the allegory. Looking closely at the 
novel we can see that alterity seems to perform three important functions: 
* Alterity becomes the content of an epiphanic moment where the textual nature of 
reality is perceived and experienced with extra-textual relevance; 
4, Alterity relies on the absence of God/Author and is deliberately presented by Barth 
as a spiritual negativity evoked in terms of ineffability; 
* Alterity's spiritual performance is heightened by Barth's concentration on the effect 
of negativity on the status of the subjectivity of both characters and readers. 
In examining each of these points in turn it should become clear that though 
Barth has pursued an allegorical form indebted to postmodernity, Giles Goat-Boy is 
quite logocentric in its philosophical grain. Giles Goat-Boy is dominated by religious 
ideas on almost every page and its parodic goal seems rather more a reinvcntion of 
spiritual expression than the pursuit of theological deconstruction. What the rest of my 
analysis will develop, is the idea that Barth's negative strategies all gravitate towards 
revealing shared alterity as the bedrock of every faith and a motif for religious 
foundations. 
Alterity and epiphany 
Throughout Giles Goat-Boy, alterity acts as the substance of a revelation about the 
nature of world and self. Put another way, Barth's otherness is not the absence of final 
meaning, but the presentation of absence as the structure of allegorical meaning. This 
presentation is pursued in the steady dissolution of George's empirical and linguistic 
certainties. As George experiences the indivisibility of passage and failure, the 
resulting tension exposes negativity as a holistic epiphany that totalises the process of 
linguistic play: 
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Passage was Failure, and Failure Passage; yet Passage was Passage, Failure Failure! Equally 
true, none was the Answer; the two were not different, neither were they the same; and true 
andfalse, the same and different - Unspeakable! Unnameable! Unimaginable! Surely my mind 
must crack! (Barth, Giles, p. 650) 
This apopýýatiý moment in George's development initially appears to be what exposes 
the indeterminacy of the allegorical form itself. The 'Answer', the single transcendent 
source of the text, is dispersed in the play of signs and thus places the Revised New 
Syllabus in a fluid, rather than dependent, relationship with the scriptures which form 
its allegorical basis. Yet the final part of the quotation shows George in the act of 
labelling the alterity in terms of that which is beyond conception and summation, not 
as that which is inherent in language itselL Consequently, George's fear that his 'mind 
must crack' acts as a revelation and as a psychological encounter which focuses 
alterity on the Same of the metaphysical subject rather than on the other of internal 
negativity. At this moment, George enters the belly of WESCAC for the last time, a 
dangerous feat meant to prove his status as Grand Tutor. As George answers the 
various enigmatic questions put to him by WESCAC, he encounters negativity within 
the language of satori and spiritual enlightenment: 
In the sweet place that contained me there was no East, no West, but an entire, single, seamless 
campus: Turnstile, Scrapegoat Grate, the Mall, the barns, the awful fires of the Powerhouse, 
the balmy heights of Founder's Hill -I saw them all; rank jungles of Frumcntius, Nikolay's 
cold fastness, teeming Vang - all one, and one with me. Here lay with there, tick clipped tock, 
all serviced nothing; I and My Ladyship, all, were one. 
'GILES, SON OF WESCAC 
Milk of studentdom; nipple inexhaustible! I was the Founder; I was WESCAC; I was not. I 
hung on those two buttons; I fed myself myself. 
'DO YOU ýVISH TO PASS' 
I the passer, she the passage, we passed together, and together cried, 'Oh, wonderful! ' Yes and 
No. In the darkness, blinding light! The end of the University! Commenccment Day! (Barth, 
Giles, pp. 672-3) 
There is undoubtedly something rather comical about George's moment of satori, but 
the purpose of this moment in terms of the structure of Giles Goat-Boy is beyond 
simple humour. Here George converts the textual alterity he has encountered 
throughout his quest into the substance of an epiphany. George's revelation consists of 
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transferring the aporetic into an holistic theme of the unity of all things. With the 'end 
of the University' comes the acceptance of alterity as a kind of via negativa, a way of 
perceiving the world that utilises the aporetic in understanding. Giles Goat-Boy strains 
itself towards allegorical presence; alterity is not a by-product, but a site in which the 
characters experiment with self-realisation. So in the 'Posttape' (Barth, Giles, pp. 697- 
708), where a disillusioned George explains the incapacities of his faith, the effect is 
not to deny George's epiphany but to make it more faithful to the novel's eagerness to 
represent the unrepresentable. 11 The fact that the Posttape finds George at the age of 
thirty-three and a third, the age of Christ at his death, means that even his disillusion 
resonates with allegorical transcendence. For by making alterity an epiphanic goal, to 
be read as the overarching part of the novel's 'message', Barth seems to retain the 
allegorical emphasis on a transcendent pretext which underpins his perspective on 
reality. Moreover, the religious pretexts retain their authority by remaining focused on 
the realisation of the ineffable. 
Deborah Madsen interprets George's revelations as the recognition of his own 
supplementarity, where '[u]nable to make present the "being" it names, the narrative 
constructs the "supplementary" status of George through the manipulation of 
textuality' (Madsen, Allegory, p. 164). Indeed, Madsen understands the 'Posttape' as 
the emphatic return to the temporality of allegory's form. The narrative of Giles Goat- 
Boy 
is only temporarily centred; the cpiphanic moment cannot be sustained just as, and because, 
transcendental tropes cannot be made present in temporal form: the analogy will always recede 
into intertextuality. (Madsen, Allegory, p. 165) 
would agree with Madsen in that the 'Posttape' does signal a return to intertextuality, 
but it is my contention that the intertextuality contributes towards allegorical stability, 
not volatility. The intertextual structure of Giles Goat-Boy acts like a fonn of literary 
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distillation that extracts a pure referent from its many pretexts. Giles Goat-Boy has a 
distinctly postmodern construction, but the text as a whole strains towards presenting 
a pure form of alterity which has little to separate it from the more traditional spiritual 
foci of religious allegory. As such the novel's intertextuality works towards deft-ning 
an allegorical centre in the negative language of faith. 
ii) Alterity and the absent god/author 
I have argued that alterity is not to be regarded as a radical emptiness but as a thematic 
presence which plays different functions according to the milieu in which it operates. 
More importantly, alterity borrows a shape from the priorities of the surrounding text. 
So the alterity of, say, Peter Ackroyd's Hawksmoor, functions as a comment within 
the novel's historical theme; and the alterity of Heller's Catch-22 is a distinctive 
disruption in social discourse and understanding. Barth's Giles Goat-Boy is equally 
dependent upon the codes of mystical theology. The novel transforms the absence of 
God and his literary equivalent, the author, into a portentously mystical ontological 
space. In many ways, Giles Goat-Boy fills the hole left by the absent God with an 
alterity shaped exactly like the God it is ieplacing. While Barth's self-conscious 
literary devices dissolve our certainty as to the status of the author, they 
simultaneously construct a view of the Author as God, able to create whatever textual 
worlds he will. 
This is conspicuous in Barth's later novel, LE7TERS. Issues relating to the 
interplay of truth and fiction go even deeper in LE7TERS than in Giles Goal-Boy. The 
author of LEYTERS, named as John Barth, is a specific character, sharing in the 
dialogue and actions of characters which are supposedly his creations yet have an 
equal ontological status in the environment of the fiction. The now familiar result is 
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the crumbling of epistemological boundaries as the real becomes fictional and the 
fictional real. Thus the author falls within inverted commas, and becomes an alterity 
composed of his evident presence and equally evident absence. Yet this position is 
one of real power, with the author able to move in and out of ontological categories 
with extraordinary licence. Whereas someone like Fowles renounces his role of deity 
over the characters, Barth makes himself conspicuous as creator. He does this by 
establishing his identity in absence, but then denoting this absence as the creative 
source of the text. 
Extending a theological analogy, we can view Barth as a God of negativity, 
offering himself as the assurance of presence that cannot be adequately revealed 
through signs. Comparing Barth to God is not an over-interpretation, for in LOTERS 
there are several moments where the capitalised 'Author' implies either God or Barth. 
For example, in LETTERS we encounter a (rather familiar) computer named 
LILYVAC developed by Jerome Bray and his associates, that is intended to 
automatically produce a revolutionary 'NOVEL' after being supplied with vast 
amounts of data and philosophy. However, instead of producing the NOVEL the 
computer expresses itself with a list of apparently random numbers. Bray and his 
colleagues attempt to plumb the significance of the numbers by experimenting with a 
Kabbalistic approach to numerical significance, substituting the numbers for letters to 
see what emerges. Through this process the divine name YHWH is deduced from an 
anagram of the vowels - IEOUA. What is important here is that the divine name 
emerges out of production and arbitrariness. " As the name of Yahweh proceeds from 
the random numbers, the presence behind that name seems fundamentally 
unknowable. Yet as unknowability is an element of the divine anyway, then the 
alterity of difference and the alterity of God become indistinguishable under the name 
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of Yahweh. God and absence enter into an absolute relationship with one another and 
become the numinous source of language and being. So Irv makes the reference to 
Matthew Amold's belief that: 
God puts a heap of letters into each man's hand, for him to make what word he Will. 24 
Under this statement, the divine becomes a negative authority as each person gives an 
individual coherence to a body of 'letters'. The Kabbalistic perspective is apt because 
within Kabbalism, the religious text is always mutable and protean yet located itself 
within the inexplicable alterity of the divine. The same could be said for the novel 
LE7TERS, as the reader is left to piece together its many fragments under the alterity 
of the absent Author, though this alterity is framed so clearly that the author keeps his 
pre-postmodern authority. Throughout LETTERS, the notions of God and author are 
highly interchangeable. So Todd Andrews submits himself to the volition of an 
ambiguous 'Author' when contemplating a car journey with Jane Mack: 
John was nagging at the wheel; our Author likewise, or he'd have fetched us straight from 
Long Wharf to Todd's Point and 12R instead of routing us through the next diversion. (Barth, 
LETTERS, p. 460) 
The tension in this comment is that as Barth here speaks of himself as Author, then 
confesses himself as a fictional creation, yet the capitalisation phrases the author's 
absence within the mystery and transcendence of the Kabbalistic YHWH. Owing to 
such authorial positioning, John and Jane perform their actions against a deep, present 
silence that retains the assurance of foundations and which reifies the other. 
It seems that the anti-foundationalism of novels such as Giles Goat-Boy and 
LEITERS should be questioned, not least because textual alterity leads back to the 
mastery of the author and the mystery of the divine. This places the economy of the 
novel firmly within a religious and philosophical content which tends to diminish 
social or political significance. Barth raises the allegorical oppositions of East and 
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West, Student-Unionism versus Informationalism, Grand Tutor versus Dean o'Flunks, 
but quells social comment by subjugating it with a silencing alterity. If we were to 
seek out a fictional representation of Barth's philosophy, then it might be Harold 
Bray's declaration, 'Our Schools and Divisions - what are they but seanis in the 
seamless? ' (Barth, Giles, p. 402). The transcendentalism of this philosophy runs 
throughout Giles Goat-Boy, as all social or political material is demonstrative of 
alterity rather than powered by alterity. All is reduced to an aporetic flatline without 
material energy or social force. On the whole, this philosophical bent rests upon the 
independence of human spirituality rather than any scýciological perspective. 
iii) Barth and the subject. 
As we shall see in the cases of The Crying of Lot 49 and The Passion of New Eve, the 
alterity of postmodern allegory does not, despite its declared intentions, do away with 
the notion of the subject as a primary impetus for the postmodern novel. Allegory's 
didactic history has always contained strong expectations of subjective response, from 
an expanded moral awareness to a greater social insight. De Man's contention that 
'[alllegorical narratives tell the story of the failure to read' (de Man, Allegories, 
p. 205), does not adequately take account of the positioning of the reading subject 
within allegorical narrative. De Man argues that works such as Rousseau's Julie are 
actually allegories of the impossibility of grounding reading in a stable structure of 
reference and foundation. Therefore, allegory performs inside a specific environment 
of undecidability. However, this perspective relies on the assumption that a) 
indecision is what the text is actually about, and b) that the indecision takes place 
within a conceptual environment, namely a cognitive subject. An allegory of 
undecidability is still an allegory with its presumptions of a hermeneutic relationship 
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between the allegorical material and the interpreting subject. Indeed, the only 
distinction in de Man's allegory is its atemporality, its tendency to place the 
subjective judgement above material conditions. 
Barth's allegories demonstrate this ontological priority. In the early chapters of 
Giles Goat-Boy, George tries to make sense of the verb 'to be' which he overhears in 
a debate of sexual and political philosophy between two amorous students. His initial 
confusion of the infinitive with coitus leads to partly comic, partly brutal effects in his 
rape of his mother, Virginia Hector, in an allegorical correspondence with the myth of 
Oedipus. The interpretation of 'to be' becomes a nagging refrain throughout George's 
life, as he tries vainly to match his physical existence with a psychic essence. While 
George seems to learn that total identity is impossible, the allegory retains a sense of 
subjective conviction. Barth's self is represented as a kind of chora or dasein that has 
a transcendent and continuous value over experience itself. This Heideggerian type of 
the self, for all its postmodem inflections, actually questions whether there is anything 
distinctly different about postmodem allegory from its predecessors. At the heart of 
traditional allegory is the recognition of a subject whose being is stable enough to 
convert narrative into a moral or religious theme. Barth himself sees the merit of 
allegory in its creation of a peculiarly independent subjective space: 
The use of historical or legendary material, especially in a farcical spirit, has a number of 
technical virtues, among which are esthetic [sic] distance and the opportunity for counter- 
realism. 25 
Here Barth assigns the historical material of his work to a simple use-value, 
productive of the 'esthetic distance' that takes front stage in the operations of his 
fiction. 26 The distance of which he speaks seems to be a conscious, reflective alterity 
whereby that which is indeterminable in the allegory does not carry the subject away 
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from a perception of self, but instead makes the subject aware that self is still the 
primary constituent in interpretative interaction with the world. 
Such a view of being is perhaps more visible in Barth's 7he Sol-Weed Factor. 
The malleable personality of Henry Burlingame is principally memorable for its 
astonishing transformations amongst the corrupt and erratic politics of the New World 
colonies. Burlingame adopts personae without a purpose other than to play the tide of 
events and live all the varied hues of human identity. At the centre of his exploratory 
personality is a belief that identity cannot be frozen in rational constructions and 
permanent categories. He outlines this belief when he mutates back from being the 
urbane Peter Sayer to the 'true' Henry Burlingame, a transformation which he 
contextualises for the amazed Ebenezer Cooke. 
'Tis but a grossness of perception, ist not, that lets us speak of Aames and Pgris, or even 
France and England, but especially me and thee, as though what went by these names or 
others in time past hath some connection with the present object? Maith, for that matter how 
isIt we speak of objects if not that our coarse vision fails to note their change? The world's 
indeed a flux, as Heraclitus declared: the very universe is naught but change and motion. " 
Burlingame here rails against monolithic - theoretical definitions of identity which 
attempt to freeze object and self into some overarching teleology. Rigorous 
conceptualisation becomes 'grossness' and 'coarse', lacldng the clarity of perception 
that sees the world in its essential 'flux. Burlingame's understanding of time is not of a 
continuity which can be locked in place by linguistic terms, but an experiential flow 
which the individual must five within. Note that this flux does not extend to 
Burlingame's perceptive integrity: he presents the world as a mutability to which the 
subject must turn as an interpretative (i. e. allegorical) standpoint. 
Fixed identity, in terms of praxis, emerges from Yhe Sol-WeedFactor as a 
textual tyranny whose constant labelling and narrativisation creates a tension between 
conceptual order and the immediacies of human experience. Henry's life and thought 
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move away from the notion of identity as a comfort and embrace instead the creative 
possibilities of sequential living as a pragmatic philosophy of self. Instead of 'writing' 
a personal narrative which will hold good in all times, Henry recommends an 
approach to life where the understanding of self is composed within a living mobility: 
One must needs make and seize his soul, and then cleave fast to't, or go babbling in the 
corner; one must choose his gods and devils on the run, quill his name upon the universe, and 
declare, ' 'Tis I, and the world stands such-a-way! ' One must assert, assert, assert, or go 
screaming mad. What other course remains? (Barth, Sot-VVeed Factor, p. 360) 
The universe which Henry delineates is a frequently hostile and unpredictable milieu. 
Yet Henry's response to such a universe is to take control of the individual's ability to 
create a selfi In this process the subject embraces the fact that, with no intrinsic 
identity to acknowledge, the individual has a freedom to 'assert' a personality 
according to his choice. The only alternative would be to allow the 'gods and devils' 
to choose you, and let an already existing narrative structure take hold of the self. 
What is interesting is that Henry's philosophy seems to return a certain dignity of 
humankind through the confrontation between a world that gives no transcendental 
order and a subject who recognises this condition and forms a conception of living on 
its basis. Negativity thus becomes an ontological drive. What we see in The Sot-lVeed 
Factor are pictures of identity in flux being allegorised around alterity, an alterity 
whose imitation of allegorical transcendentalism proceeds upon a vision of human 
self-sufficiency. So the poet Ebenezer Cooke, repeatedly disillusioned in his 
expectations of an ideal world, declares that 'that which the cosmos lacks we must 
ourselves supply' (Barth, Sot-Weed Factor, p. 660). Of this declaration, Manfred Puetz 
observes: 
In sum, the hero turns to the panacea of mythopoesis and creates fictional schemes and 
mythical worlds around himself which in turn support the very self-concepts from which all 
interpretations of self and world have sprung. 28 
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Puetz interprets The Sot-Weed Factor not as a postmodern assertion against identity 
but an actual enforcement of the distinction between self and world in an act of active 
and conscious mythmaking. " Under this interpretation, we can start to question the 
limits of play in Barth's novels. In an allegory such as Giles Goat-Boy, there is a 
deliberate focus upon pretextual instability in the allegorical form; this would appear 
to be the distinctly postmodern content of the novel. Yet Barth has the allegorical 
characters realising the aporetic conditions of their existence and transferring this 
realisation into an allegorical and pragmatic centre for the reader. 10 
Overall, alterity retains the function of the allegorical telos. This function 
explains why so much of postmodem fiction concerns itself with religious theme and 
imagery. Postmodern fiction seeks (usually unwittingly) to reinvent the logos as 
negativity, and religious language provides the models for this reinvention. The 
postmodern allegories of Barth confirm traditional allegory more than they depart 
from it by creating an alterity as a mystical rule for interpretation. There is a 
humanistic aura around Barth's novels which, when combined with a trace of 
mysticism, provides a spiritual allegory where the topic is humankind and its relation 
to that which is beyond perception. Such a position severely questions Barth as an 
exponent of radical postmodern philosophy. Instead, Barth seems much more aligned 
with a metaphysical perception of self and world which conspicuously relegates social 
engagement to aesthetic material. Giles Goat-Boy being a novel of the sixties, we 
could perhaps suggest that Barth's exploration of indeterminacy is shaped by the 
counter-cultural thrust of the late 1960s. We can also see in Barth that an 
acknowledgement of the other is more than just an epistemological realisation - it 
can be a spiritual cornerstone of a radically individualistic society. As much as Barth 
attempts to attack old certainties, we can see the project of trying to stabilise disorder 
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as a predictable return to the primacy of the self. Moving to Pynchon's The Crying of 
Lot 49, we shall see a more coherent attempt to present the postmodern experience 
through allegory, but again the pursuit of alterity shall turn the novel in a very 
unpostmodem direction. 
Thomas Pynchon - The Crying of Lot 49 
Pynchon's fictional worlds are ones where process is the dominant structural feature 
and where allegorical priorities are continually readjusted within the flow of causation 
and textuality. The ontological problems highlighted in Pynchon's novels often arrive 
with the attempt to match the external world to a secure concept of self. 
31 Oedipa 
Maas, in The Crying of Lot 49, attempts this project when she commits herself to 
unravelling the mysteries surrounding her ex-lover, the late Pierce Inverarity, to whose 
estate Oedipa has unexpectedly been appointed as executor. Her quest involves the 
search for understanding about the Tristero, an underworld organisation which 
appears to act as an illegal alternative postal service to that of the central government. 
Instead of Oedipa's deductive journey leading to conclusion and insight, she finds that 
the shifting patterns of symbols, metaphors and stories concerning the Tristero build 
into a rapidly deconstructing text and, for the reader, the allegory of the 'condition of 
postmodernity'. Oedipa is consequently faced with an expanding narrative that she is 
quite unable to control: 
Now here was Oedipa, faced with a metaphor of God knew how many parts; more than two, 
anyway. With coincidences blossoming these days wherever she looked, she had nothing but a 
sound, a word, Tristero, to hold them together. 32 
Oedipa finds herself trapped within an ongoing act of metaphor. 33 Supplementary 
information constantly qualifies her relationship to the Tristero and the responsibility 
of ordering a meaningful narrative becomes an increasingly onerous burden. As 
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Oedipa moves through the novel, gathering signs which only point but do not define, 
she discovers that the Tristero is not an independent physical entity, but an 
impermanent text which shifts and transfonns with the introduction of each new sign. 
As Oedipa slides through a decentred world, continually rearranging signifiers 
and signifieds into contingent orders, Pynchon creates an allegory of contemporary 
epistemology. The contemporaneity of this allegory is that Oedipa's joumey of 
discovery is not towards foundational insight, though, as we shall see, it is dominated 
by an epistemological rule. Towards the end of the novel, Oedipa arrives at a cross- 
roads of indecision where the Tristero could equally be a reality, a self-delusion, a 
hoax, or the appearance of a hoax: 
Those, now she was looking at them, she saw to be the alternatives. Those symmetrical four. 
She didnI like any of them, but hoped she was mentally ill; that that's all it was. That night she 
sat for hours, too numb to even drink, teaching herself to breathe in a vacuum. For this, oh 
God, was the void. (Pynchon, Lot 49, p. 17 1) 
The interpretation of signs, has produced an unwelcome balance of evidence where all 
options are equally valid and no single textual route can be closed. This balance is 
physically experienced by Oedipa in a catatonia, her rigid body the exact match of her 
frozen interpretative condition. Her speculative diagnosis of mental illness is 
significant, for the transference of an epistemological dilemma into a psychological 
threat shows how narrative closure is sought as a reassurance of a definite self in 
relation to a definite world. Oedipa hopes for mental illness because a collapse in 
sanity would indicate that her identity is whole but merely suffering, something which 
when healed would produce a regained clarity of self. Whichever analytic route 
Oedipa might take, it seems that the process of achieving meaning would start all over 
again and quickly reach the abyss of infinite possibility. 
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Thus The Crying of Lot 49 does not seem to achieve any form of cognitive 
climax. At the end of the novel, Oedipa attends the auction of lot 49, Pierce 
Inverarity's illicit stamp collection somehow connected to the Tristero. There Oedipa 
is eager to unmask the identity of a mysterious bidder who is considered as a possible 
member of the Tristero organisation. As the auction opens, the novel ends. On the one 
hand we might presume a revelation beyond the pages of the text and speculate further 
despite Pynchon's narrative decapitation. Yet, because of the narrative suspensions we 
have experienced throughout the novel, we also sense that any resolution could not be 
complete or authoritative. For a conclusion would have to be written backwards into 
the fabric of the whole text and once again, we would be faced with a bewildering 
alterity. 
34 
The Crying of Lot 49's allegorical nature is due to the way it seems to take 
Oedipa on a text-book wandering through all the main epistemological and 
ontological problems of postmodemity. Oedipa's investigation capably allegorises 
Baudrillard's simulacrum, Foucault's theories of power and language, Derrida's 
diffirance and Jameson's 'depthless' society. Yet we could also suggest that The 
Crying of Lot 49 attempts the familiar allegorical aim of imparting an ethical lesson, 
though this is attempted through the alterity resulting from the novel's indeterminate 
character. In the midst of Pynchon's preoccupation with 'informational entropy' and 
6possible worlds', alterity acts with an ethical impetus that ultimately runs away from 
the social pragmatism that Pynchon tries to propound. This ethical force, coded in 
terms of absence, relies on the specific modes of religious imagery which permeate 
the novel. Through the combination of religious motifs and textual aporiae, there 
emerges a kind of ethical via negativa, the utilisation of the absence of God to 
discover a relation with being and morality. Though Pynchon does not offer a specific 
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negative theology I shall claim that the combination of the aporetic, the religious and 
the ethical form a space which is theological in its manner and which restrains any 
indeterminacy within the novel. Pynchon, in many ways like Philo, tries to sew 
together the allegorical and the negative in one spiritual weave. 
The Crying of Lot 49 is continually haunted by the biblical pretext, especially 
in its concern with the mechanics and possibility of revelation. Oedipa's first 
intuitions of revelation have the effect of sensitising her to the possibilities of the 
Tristero: 
That's what would come to haunt her most, perhaps: the way it fittcd logically, together. As if 
[. .j there were revelation 
in progress all around her. (Pynchon, Lot 49, p. 29) 
Oedipa's intuition of revelation is conditional and hesitant, as her revelations always 
seem partial and allusive rather than complete and direct. This state of affairs, as we 
have already seen, leads her to the 'void', a void which constitutes the alterity of a 
novel where final truth is absent. 35 Hence the novel's ending, at the auction of lot 49, 
offers the reader only the gesture towards a complete revelation: 
Passerine [the auctioneer] spread his arms in a gesture that seemed to belong to the priesthood 
of some remote culture; perhaps to a descending angel. The auctioneer cleared his throat. 0 
Oedipa settled back, to await the crying of lot 49. (Pynchon, Lot 49, p. 127) 
Whar connects this inconclusive revelation with Oedipa's first presentiment is the 
spiritual imagery. The auctioneer resembles either a priest or an angel, both figures 
who traditionally mediate God's will to the individual. We could say that the 
auctioneer mediates negativity itself, representing the infinite scope of the alterity that 
Oedipa has realised throughout her investigations. For while the text ends with a 
characteristic indeterminacy, there is a persistent play on the numinous qualities of the 
negative, especially in the way that religion is used to construct a present 'void', 
replete with images of sacredness and threat. 
36 This spectral ending holds potential for 
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expanding our comprehension of what is actually allegorised within the novel. The 
Grevelations' of The Crying of Lot 49, the individual nuggets of evidence which 
Oedipa discovers, do not reveal nothing. Instead, they open a recognition of the 
absolute other of intuitive, negative morality and they reveal the alterity that has 
absolute jurisdiction over reality. 
At several points Oedipa explicitly likens her relationship with the Tristero to 
spiritual experience: 
Each clue that comes is supposed to have its own clarity, its fine chance for permanence. But 
then she wondered if the gemlike 'clues' were only some kind of compensation. To make up 
for her having lost the direct, epileptic Word, the cry that might abolish the night. (Pynchon, 
Lot49, p. 81) 
Oedipa's lamentation appears to place the direct Word into the characteristic alterity 
of its own absence. Yet as Pynchon presents alterity in terms of religious absence, 
then that absence becomes figured in the presence which is lost, as the 'clues' which 
Oedipa encounters rely on the metaphysical register of the logos. The consequence is 
that the alterity of God is still played out as a relation of self to that which is beyond 
being. As the logos is treated in terms of the unobtainable, then the divine referent 
seems pushed out of being into that which language cannot contain. Once this occurs, 
the absence left by God seems to attain a singularity as it is purified from its linguistic 
container by the straining to evoke a purity of absence. 
The 'presence' of alterity as synonymous with the religious logos has several 
important functions throughout the length of The Crying of Lot 49, all of which seem 
to take the role traditionally assigned to the inconceivable divinity. The most 
significant function is that otherness brings an awakening of ethical and social 
responsibility. For Oedipa, the Tristero leads to a very Christian experience of 
marginal societies which ostensibly challenge the reductionism of centralised political 
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discourse. So, when Oedipa is considering the interpretative possibilities of the 
Tristero, she thinks that she might: 
have stumbled indeed, without the aid of LSD or other indole alkaloids, on to a secret richness 
and concealed density of dream; on to a network by which X number of Americans are truly 
communicating whilst reserving their lies, recitations of routine, and betrayals of spiritual 
poverty, for the official government delivery system; maybe even on to a real alternative to the 
exitlessness, to the absence of surprise to life, that harrows the head of everybody American 
you know, and you too, sweetie. (Pynchon, Lot 49, pp. 117-18) 
At this point, when Oedipa is faced with a world that seems uncontainable within 
discourse, she also sees a certain hope of liberation from the standardising 
formulations of officialdom. She gives the impression that she is teetering on the edge 
of discovering the secret America, one which offers a 'real alternative' to a 
homogenising existence imposed by centralised language and institutions. 
The most poignant moment of this increased awareness of the social other 
comes when Oedipa goes to the assistance of a destitute old man on the streets of San 
Francisco. Taking pity, Oedipa guides him to a boarding house and puts him to bed. 
As he lies there, she prophesies that his life content, 'like the memory bank from a 
computer of the lost' (Pynchon, Lot 49, p. 87), would be extinguished when he bums 
to death falling asleep with a lit cigarette. With the recognition that the old man's life 
is comprised of his absence in marginality and his rush towards death, Oedipa: 
was overcome all at once by a need to touch him, as if she could hardly believe in him, or 
would not remember him, without it. Exhausted, hardly knowing what she was doing, she came 
the last three steps and sat, took the man in her arms, actually held, gazing out of her smudged 
eyes down the stairs, back into the morning. (Pynchon, Lot 49, p. 87) 
In this passage, Oedipa seems to be straining to overcome the man's absence, to 
somehow treat the other not as a social outcast, but as a distinct being who is barred 
from the currency of official language. Her physical need to touch him acts as an 
attempt to have an unmediated ethical contact with the needs of the man's body, to 
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actually approach him without intrusion. John Schad sees this moment as attesting to 
the opening up of the ethical dimension of the novel: 
in pausing, touching and even holding the old man she encounters for once not just anothcr 
clue, or sign, but the person of the sign - or, if you like, the 'face of the word'. In doing so, 
indeed, she not only looks into a face that is, for once, not her own but also thcrcby opcns up a 
profoundly ethical space in the conspicuously post-ethical continuum of California; for whcn 
she whispers, 'I can't help ... I can't help, ' even while holding and rocking the old, we cannot 
avoid reading, 'I can't help but help. *37 
would agree with Schad in that Oedipa's confrontation with the sailor constitutes an 
ethical acknowledgement of the 'face of the other'. Like Derrida's ethical descriptions 
in The Gift of Death, Oedipa senses her ethical isolation and absolute responsibility in 
the face of someone other than herself. Oedipa encounters mortality in her quest for 
the Tristero in a way that had been previously masked to her. Yet the ultimate absence 
that death asserts, drives Oedipa into a deeper understanding of how the dominant 
culture excludes the other and denies its own mortality. 
38 The final revelation which 
Oedipa seeks would ostensibly signal the death of the novel's activity, a sudden 
cessation of the 'keep it bouncing' philosophy propounded by Pierce Inverarity. As it 
is, death in The Crying of Lot 49 is the revelation of absence itself, the absence that 
exists in social marginality. 
Pynchon's use of death alongside the quest for an impossible revelation gives 
the novel not so much a postmodern ambiguity but an alterity which equals an 
absolute unknown not to be contained in social formulations. For as much as the novel 
allegorises the conditions of postmodemity, it also offers alterity as the space in which 
the impact of mortality can be felt and experienced through the revelation of alterity 
itself Thus the mass of religious references that fill the pages of The Crying of Lot 49 
do not seem to be parodic dismissals of ontotheology, but actually channel alterity into 
an age old fear of mortality and the metaphysical potency of such a fear. 
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What is the implication of this presentation of alterity in terms of postmodern 
politics? As we have seen, the alterity of The Crying of Lot 49 is a peculiarly moral 
void that exposes social marginality. Indeed, the novel seems to use absence to 
allegorise the exclusions suffered by a silent number who arc severed from the 
mainstream of capitalist lifestyle. By using the alterity contained in deferred revelation 
and the absent Word, Pynchon forces a confrontation between self and other which 
attempts an ethical awareness which combines anti-foundational positioning with the 
ethical force of the Word. Yet we can start to question the effectiveness of this form of 
ethics as an assault upon capitalist hegemonies and social deprivation. Most 
importantly, we must ask whether the particular metaphysical edge to Pynchon's 
ethical Other, ultimately negates the challenge which he is able to offer. 
John Schad has offered the possibility that The Crying of Lot 49 is built upon a 
shift away from Greek metaphysics to Jewish spirituality: 
[s]ince Oedipa, we read, 'left the Greek Way', is it possible that she enters what Derrida has 
called 'the [Jewish] other of the Greek'? (Schad, 'Why waitT, p. 262) 
This question has an intriguing potential. Oedipa's relation with the Tristero seems to 
hold a deep affinity with Judaic techniques of textual interpretation, as she holds the 
name of Tristero as a kind of logos in her quest while recognising that this logos 
forever generates an infinity of meaning. However, the parallels with Judaism stop 
over the issue of the force of law. Many postmodem texts, The Crying of Lot 49 
included, appear to invoke a Jewish sense of textual otherness yet back away from 
containing that other within legal, pragmatic codes. This is an unwillingness to 
transform the Other into the Same. Yet the conceptual grid of legality is not an iron 
fist that constrains the operation of meaning, but rather the necessity of transferring 
understandings of otherness into a content of physical experience. What protects many 
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religions from the criticisms I direct against postmodernism, is that most orthodox 
faiths do not stop at a sense of the other, but realise that the other must contain de 
facto social and philosophical codes because of its involvement within human praxis. 
Thus religious allegory often leads to a behavioural lesson, whereas postmodemism, I 
would suggest, offers a lesson of pure philosophy that wants to remain unviolated by 
worldly demands for action. Ultimately, postmodernism holds more purist ideality 
than Enlightenment philosophy ever contained. 
Tuming back to The Crying of Lot 49, we can see that though Oedipa is 
confronted with social marginality, this exposure is allegorical material for alterity 
itself. William Gleason has argued that the metafictional nature of the novel guides 
the reader to read 'both diachronically and synchronically'. 39 Postmodern fiction 
regularly makes this demand, but what must be understood is that the two 
perspectives form a unity in the thematic and structural dominant of the text: alterity. 
All roads in the The Crying of Lot 49 lead to a pure absence that has no legal force 
and which runs from understanding the social links that place the excluded subject. 
Beneath this absence Oedipa stands as the creator of local meaning, albeit a rather 
paranoid subject. Oedipa holds an allegorical centre together by focusing on alterity as 
that under which the experiential is recognised as existing under lack. Tony Tanner 
has argued that Oedipa lives in the impossible world of the 'excluded middle' which 
contains: 
the possibility of unforeseen 'diversity' and irresolvable dubiety. Yet it is into just such an area 
of possible diversity and dubiety that Oedipa has stumbled - and we, as readers, along with 
her. 40 
Tanner's theorisation of the excluded middle naturally betrays itself in the distinction 
between Oedipa, the reader, and the 'area' of alterity and possibility. The image 
Tanner gives us is not of the dissolution of self into infinite meaning, but the 
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distinction of self in relation to otherness. Oedipa is never able to displace alterity, 
since that alterity needs to be experienced as a relation to personality before it 
becomes channelled into ethical responsibility. Thus otherness is not about others, but 
about the development of an absolute motif. 
In many ways, The Crying of Lot 49 relies on a religious voice because the 
trope of God is essential to the way it voices the ethics of alterity. What prohibits the 
efficacy of those ethics is that Pynchon seems to stop with the negativity of God 
without following through to the positivity of the Word. The religious dimension 
makes the novel truly allegorical, for Pynchon steers us away from nihilistic 
interpretation by focusing on the resonant profundity of the absent God. Oedipa can be 
seen as the itinerant prophet in the wilderness who never sees the face of God, the 
'direct, epileptic Word', but tries to convey a distinctly ethical message. Yet the 
ultimate problem in Pynchon seems to be that people are pointers towards otherness 
rather than designating themselves as social subjects. So instead of encountering those 
who are marginal, we are instead given a metaphysics of marginality which sets others 
apart from the discourse of capitalism. In a sense, others become imprisoned in a 
totalised alterity, stranded in their otherness rather than offering a physical challenge 
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to the structures under which they are marginalised . 
Such a problem not only characterises much postmodern fiction, but also 
dominates postmodernity itselL It has always seemed rather trite to accuse 
postmodernism of establishing its own totality, as postmodernism has always 
acknowledged that it cannot escape metaphysical terms. Yet, in these days when 
confidence in postmodem theory seems to find itself on the wane, we no longer seem 
afraid of offering voices which are not anti-foundational, perhaps because the 
exigencies of the world around us demand such voices. 
189 
Angela Carter - The Passion of New Eve 
The Passion of New Eve, like The Crying of Lot 49, is a novel which allegorises the 
social conditions of contemporary America, though Carter's vehicle is the rather more 
fantastical setting of an apocalyptic future. Carter's allegory centres on the nature of 
postmodem gender identity in a world where the Baudrillardian image drains reality 
of its conceptual life-blood, thus leaving a wan environment of surfaces. Carter 
demonstrates the alterity within the represented real, to question essentialism and 
stereotyping in gender identities, with the central character, Eve, disrupting 
categorisations of male and female. Yet Carter's use of alterity to question 
essentialism is only part of the way in which she applies otherness. In many ways, 
The Passion of New Eve is a mythology of alterity, for Carter shows how that which 
defies boundaries of identity can in turn be reconstructed into a new mythology which 
enforces its own rigidities and tyrannies. Carter is very aware, perhaps more so than 
the other two authors in this chapter, that conceptions of otherness act like vacuums 
which are inevitably filled with other cultural models. I shall argue is that Carter's 
allegorisation senses the awkwardness of valorising the Other. Carter is caught 
between a spiritual empathy with alterity that challenges gender discourse and a 
realisation that 'the other' must take its responsibility for actually creating schisms, 
categories and divisions. 
The Passion of New Eve revolves around Evelyn, a man living in a futuristic, 
apocalyptic New York ridden with casual violence and aggressive factions. After a 
disastrous association with a prostitute, Leilah, Evelyn heads off into the mid-Western 
desert in order to escape the dark existence of the city. While in the desert, he is 
captured by a cultish group of women who worship an archetypal leader named 
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Mother, at a place called Beulah. It is in this place that Evelyn is forced through a 
comprehensive sex-change operation and is thus transformed into the New Eve. 
Attempting to escape from Beulah, Eve is captured by a sadistic poet called Zero, who 
runs his own female desert gang with physical brutality and macho egotism. Zero is 
obsessed with the same figure who has haunted Evelyn/Eve's imagination throughout 
his/her life, the Hollywood actress Tristessa de St. Ange, whom Zero believes made 
him impotent through telepathic means during the screening of one of her films. 
Tristessa is captured and brutalised by Zero in an attack on her dilapidated desert 
home and it is here that Tristessa is actually revealed to be a man. Zero forces Eve to 
marry Tristessa and for a time after the eventual destruction of Zero and his coterie, 
they find themselves in an Edenic relationship in the desolate landscape of the 
American desert. Their happiness, however, is short lived, as Tristessa is shot dead by 
the adolescent leader of a child militia. After a journey through a disintegrating 
America, Eve finally experiences a mystical rebirth in a cave by the sea where, in an 
intense and convoluted symbolic scene, she undergoes an encounter with evolution, 
the icons of herjourney, and the Mother of Beulah, now old and decaying. 
The pretexts of The Passion of New Eve are multiple, yet the novel is 
allegorically dominated by the land of America itself. America is allegorised as a dark 
and unstable land crippled by violence and despair, but also containing a definite 
sense of possibility and expansiveness. 'In the beginning all the world was America' is 
John Locke's epigraph to the novel, an epigraph which is double-edged in both its 
New World optimism and its hints of the international domination of American 
capitalism. Carter tries to do justice to the difficulty of representing America by 
offering it as other in itself, a place where contradiction, absence and presence live 
side by side. The 'last days' aura of the novel heightens this sense of internal 
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otherness, as America finds itself poised on the brink of either desolation or 
rejuvenation. Richard Brown perceives Carter's America as an 'ambiguous', culturally 
divided land: 
America may be an 'other' to our senses of cultural identity and yet also an 'other self' that 
may either be represented as a younger and more callow partner or else as that future on whose 
threshold with increasing eagerness and terror we suspend ourselves. 42 
Speaking for a British audience, Brown presents Carter's America as a temporal and 
cultural cleft in identity. Offering both difference and uniformity, inexperience and 
future power, America appears to have no real place or time from which it can define 
itself Like Oedipa's quest for the Tristero, Carter gives us an America that is 
continually promising to reveal and clarify itself, yet Carter makes clear that the 
mechanisms of America's extrovert capitalism mean that its identity is always 
6suspended' in a confusing mass of commercial representation. Brown's reference to 
America as the 'other self' is useful in that Carter does seem to offer America as a 
land where the self can experience its own alterity in a place where borders between 
the real and the image, the self and the other, are profoundly bluffed. 
Such an experience of alterity is nowhere more apparent than in the marriage 
of Tristessa and Eve and their 'honeymoon' in the desert. In this curious scene of 
holism and idealism, Eve explains a new world of genderless being: 
Speech evades language. How can I find words the equivalent of this mute speech of flesh as 
we folded ourselves within a single self in the desert, under our dappled canopy, on our bed of 
filthy cushions? Alone, quite alone, in the heart of that gigantic metaphor for sterility, where 
our child was conceived on the star-spangled banner, yet we peopled this immemorial 
loneliness with all we had been, or had dreamed of being, or had thought we were - every 
modulation of the selves - aspects of being, ideas - that seemed, during our embraces, to be the 
very essence of our selves; the concentrated essence of being, as if, out of these fathomless 
kisses and our interpenetrating, undifferentiated sex, we had made the great hermaphrodite 
together, the whole and perfect being to which he, with an absurd and touching heroism, had, 
in his own single self, aspired; we brought into being the being who stops time in the self- 
created eternity of lovers. 43 
The common ground of theology and negativity in postmodern literature is peculiarly 
apparent in this passage. As Carter searches for descriptions of a genderless state 
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beyond logocentric categories, her language tips over into terms of theological 
absolutes: 'concentrated essence of being', 'whole and perfect being', 'immemorial', 
'fathomless', 'the being who stops time', 'the self-created eternity of lovers'. The 
theological priority implicit in these terms is not accidental. Like many of the authors 
we have seen so far, Carter seems to want to purify the negative as an extra-linguistic 
ideal that holds the revelatory power of the divine. Alterity here acts as the catalyst of 
genderless self-discovery that, like God, dominates the horizon of being itself. This 
euphoric and intense passage is offered as a moment of unity with alterity, when 
binary models of gender are dissolved into 'mute speech' beyond the 'language' of 
representation. The desert, an enduring symbol of the absence at the heart of America, 
becomes a realm of fulfilment that defies the more usual models of its aridity and 
4sterility'. It is in this place that Tristessa and Eve dissolve the categorisations of 
gender into a perfect moment of 'undifferentiated' being. If Baudrillard saw America 
as the country where 'it is not sex one is looking for but one's "gendee,,, "Carter 
gives a moment of sight beyond gender where being appears to defy time and 
representation in a sexual identity which is always deferred. 
Yet despite the utopian angle which Carter here gives to difference, she also 
recognises that the negation of presence need not always be aligned with political or 
psychological liberation. What makes The Passion of New Eve a distinctive, rather 
undecided allegory, is that Carter hesitates over the status of the Other that centres the 
allegorical action. On the one hand, Carter yearns for a world where the categorical 
and essential are no more, while on the other hand she accepts that such a world may 
actually be present in some of the cruel side-effects of American capitalism. So even 
the blissful desert union of Tristessa and Eve is adulterated by the manufactured 
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reality of Hollywood and its immense power over signification. Eve now sees more in 
Tristessa than just his beautification: 
The sun had slipped past its meridian and now illuminated him from behind; for a moment, he 
seemed to me surrounded in the oblong glory of light which emanates from divine figures - an 
aureole or vessica, celestial limelight. 'More stars than there are in heaven, ' had been MGM's 
motto. This transforming light covered his nakedness like a garment; no, it was his flesh itself 
that seemed made of light, flesh so insubstantial only the phenomenon of persistence of vision 
could account for his presence here. The habit of being a visual fallacy was too strong for him 
to break; appearance, only, had refined itself to become the principle of life. He flickered upon 
the air. (Carter, Eve, p. 147) 
If Tristessa is an allegorical representation of the American nation itself, as is often 
suggested in the novel, then this vision of his transfiguration evokes the ambiguities 
that exist between national idealism and representational superficiality. The 'celestial 
limelight' which Tristessa displays, disrupts notions of where the heavenly ends and 
the image commodity begins. Indeed, the light which bathes Tristessa has a double- 
edged potential in that it makes him appear airy and transformed yet also seems to 
threaten his erasure as he 'flickered upon the air'. Carter shows us that the otherness 
of Tristessa may actually issue from a machinery of representation, a Hollywood 
composition of identity. On an allegorical level, Carter seems to be saying that 
America's alterity is a troubled space for liberation because in many ways it is 
grounded in media activity and corporate hegemonies. When such reflections emerge, 
The Passion of New Eve is an allegory working within social criticism, a position 
broadly in sympathy with the argument of this thesis. Yet Carter still retains the Other 
as a spiritual fulcrum where the drive to find identity is not straight-jacketed by 
convention and role but by an embrace of absence. Alterity is Carter's uncertain hope. 
Thus she seems to float in and out of the postmodern sublime, an interaction that 
becomes especially confused when realism takes precedence over messianic hope. 
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A central battleground of the social and the ideal in The Passion of New Eve 
concerns the meeting of mythology and modem society. Carter's allegory participates 
in mythological language and pretexts, yet at the same time it extends a critique of 
myth for the way in which it appropriates otherness and obviates its alterity in patterns 
of totalising narrative. This critique of myth is not to say that Carter aspires to a 
mythless society. Myth, as we shall see, still has a vital role. Carter depicts a world 
where myths are unavoidable in a factional society where groups must forge 
compelling narratives with which to propagate their theories. So it is that though 
Carter's work speaks a distinctly feminist project, she is equally aware that myths of 
the essential female can be just as oppressive as the myths generated by men about 
women. 
The Passion of New Eve's ambiguous attitude towards the nature of the Other, 
is nowhere more apparent than in her focus upon myth and female otherness. In 
Leilah, the prostitute whom Evelyn regularly meets and eventually makes pregnant, 
her Other is not a singular feminine space but the conformity to male sexual 
stereotypes: 
Her beauty was an accession. She arrived at it by a conscious effort. She became absorbed in 
the contemplation of the figure in the mirror, but she did not seem to me to apprehend the 
person in the mirror as, in any degree, herself. The reflected Leilah had a concrete form and, 
although this form was perfectly tangible, we all knew, all three of us in the room, it was 
another Leilah. Leilah invoked this formal other with a gravity and ritual that recalled 
witchcraft; she brought into being a Leilah who lived in the not-world of the mirror and then 
became her own reflection. (Carter, Eve, p. 28) 
Leilah's othemess is her mirrored image, a formal image which she moulds to the 
visual representation of women presupposed by her clients. With the production of 
this representation, a third person literally enters the room as the construct of Evelyn's 
expectations and Leilah's provision for those expectations. Carter's evocation of the 
&not-world of the mirror' is significant in terms of the allegorical impact of The 
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Passion of New Eve. The alterity of the novel is not the irreducible gap between the 
text and the pretext but is a social condition in the pretext itself, America. The novel 
shows us how otherness is socially produced and emerges out of the strategies of 
image production in late twentieth century Western culture. Her allegorical style is a 
conscious collection of models and types which even as they ycarn towards a freedom 
in difference, are continually pulled back by the dictates of certain mythologies. 
Evelyn himself realises this problem shortly after he is physically reconstructed into 
the New Eve: 
I KNOW NOTHING. I am a tabula erasa, a blank sheet of paper, an unhatched egg. I have not 
yet become a woman, although I possess a woman's shape. Not a woman, no; both more and 
less than a real woman. Now I am a being as mythic and as monstrous as Mother herself-, but I 
cannot bring myself to think of that. Eve remains wilfully in the state of innocence that 
precedes the fall. (Carter, Eve, p. 83) 
Just as this moment in Eve's nascent consciousness represents a step beyond the 
essentialism of gender, Carter also makes clear that Eve has become a 'being' who is 
both a physical ideal, and a person who will soon 'fafl' into the constructions which 
follow upon her physicality. The image of the fall perhaps gives us the strongest clue 
as to how to interpret Carter's relationship to alterity. Carter seems to distinguish two 
categories of otherness: 1) the pre-lapsarian alterity of genderless being, and 2) the 
post-lapsarian otherness resulting from the domination of representational alterity. 
Keeping this distinction in mind, the word 'Passion' from the title accrues its full 
significance. For Eve almost becomes an American Christ figure, bearing the sins of a 
media world in a sinless body. It is this sense of the fall that finally takes The Passion 
of New Eve away from postmodernism. Carter accepts the implications of a 
Baudrillardian world but places this against an evocation of a primal alterity that is 
both spiritual hope and ontological defiance. Once again, we can read the religious 
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allegory over the postmodem allegory as the postmodem understandings become 
allegorically illustrative of the absolute Other as a primary, obscured, centre. 
Eve's alterity, between totalities of gender, is 6as monstrous and mythic as 
Mother herself because she realises that her original otherness will become 
imprisoned in an constrictive archetype of femininity. David Punter describes Eve's 
condition when she first looks in the mirror as: 
a disbelief that this self-on-view can be taken as a full representation of the person alongside 
the bitter knowledge that it will be, that at every point the woman is locked into the 
metaphysical insult of the masculine gaze. 45 
Punter describes the female as imprisoned in the mythologies produced by the 
Gmasculine gaze' and goes on to observe that the hermaphroditic state of both 
Tristessa and Eve can represent both 'liberation and despair'. Punter's analysis 
emphasises how Carter uses otherness to demonstrate the practical impossibility of 
embracing the genuine other outside social constructs. Carter's allegorical America is 
a place of difference but this difference testifies more to localised. structures of myth 
than an absence which can dissolve gender boundaries. 
Such a position would seem to place Carter's sympathies much more in line 
with Anglo-American feminist theory than the French feminist utilisation of 
poststructuralism and Kristeva's postulation of the khora. Carter does acknowledge 
alterity in identity in that the self is never present to itself in any essentialist way, as 
Eve observes after her encounter with Tristessa: 
Masculine and feminine are correlatives which involve one another. I am sure of that - the 
quality and its negation are locked in necessity. But what the nature of masculine and the 
nature of the feminine might be, whether they involve male and female, if they have anything 
to do with Tristessa's so long neglected apparatus, or my own factory-fresh incision and 
engine-tuned breasts, that I do not know. Though I have been both man and woman, still I do 
not know the answer to these questions. (Carter, Eve, pp. 149-50) 
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The mystery of gender identity is its confrontation with otherness, with that which 
cannot be known, yet the quotation is under tension from the expressions 'factory- 
fresh' and 'engine-tuned'. However 'other' Eve's identity may be, she remains 
beneath the shadow of capitalist production and the question of who controls such a 
mechanism. In Kristevan terms, Eve is acutely bound between the symbolic and the 
serniotic, though Carter makes the latter a negative dream and the former a vigorous 
presence. 46 Carter seems aware that alterity may simply mean that each individual is 
an inessential site of representations over which they have no control. Thus, escape 
into difference can merely mean switching the myths under which one operates. 
The constructed nature of myths is nowhere more apparent than at Beulah, the 
desert hideout populated entirely by women and commanded by the archetypal 
Mother. Beulah is described as a place where 'contrarieties existed together' (Carter, 
Eve, p. 48), yet the Mother is a questionable representative of female otherness. The 
change enforced upon Eve is not a steady process of education, but a literal 
psychological and physical manipulation which unites metaphysics and science in an 
imperious mythology. The Mother is described as 'a complicated mix of mythology 
and technology' (Carter, Eve, p. 48) and in Beulah, 'myth is a made thing not a found 
thing' (Carter, Eve, p. 56). Carter depicts myth as the transference of a conditional 
narrative into the appearance of that which is natural and eternal. Such a naturalisation 
is treated as the root of metanarrative hegemonies, as in Beulah the promotion of 
female identity soon becomes an act of suffocating totalisation: 
One glance assured me that she was sacred. She had been human, once; and now she had made 
herself into this. This! 
Mother has made symbolism and concrete fact. 
She is the hand-carved figurehead of her own, self-constructed theology. (Carter, Eve, p. 58) 
Technology has a potent presence throughout The Passion of New Eve, most 
significantly for the way in which it provides the necessary physical accompaniments 
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that enable myth to be actualised. Eve is impressed by the Mother not for her intrinsic 
status, but for the power of representation that she commands. In the underworld of 
Beulah, ostensibly acting as the other of male dominated society, there are equal 
tyrannies of self in the Mother's massively contrived theology of essential 
womanhood. 
The Mother is rediscovered at the end of the novel as a shrivelled old woman, 
secreted in a cave on the coast in an attempt to escape America's gathering 
disintegration. Eve enters this cave in an attempt to see her but, in a richly symbolic 
scene, she has an intense encounter where she experiences the evolutionary history of 
the earth. This entire passage has a vivid revelatory dynamism, yet the novel cannot 
seem to resolve itself: 
I have come home. 
The destination of all journeys is their beginning. 
I have not come home. 
I emitted, at last, a single, frail, inconsolable cry like that of a new-born child. But there was 
no answering sound at all in that vast, sonorous place where I found myself but the resonance 
of the sea and the small echo of my voice. I called for my mother but she did not answer. 
(Carter, Eve, p. 186) 
The archetypal mother remains absent and Eve is faced with an otherness which 
consists of silence and longing. It is here that Carter evokes the tout autre in all its 
independent force and gravitas. Situated at the end of history, Eve contacts the 'vast, 
sonorous place' where space, time and identity are utterly, irrevocably silent. In one 
sense, after the ontological storm she has weathered, Eve does find value and 
liberation in the subterranean Other. For here Eve experiences the full consciousness 
of being when placed against a tangible void of silence and alterity. The other is 
present, Carter seems to say, but it is like a dream that haunts the self despite its 
frequent obliteration by sensory, social and linguistic intrusions. Carter establishes the 
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'reality' of the other through yeaming, but she also accepts the other's absolute 
absence and the impossibility of directly contacting its elusive, ineffable presence. 
The Passion of New Eve is a novel that gives a double layer of allegory. On the 
one hand, the novel allegorises the conditions of postmodernity: the collapse of the 
self, the primacy of the signifier, and the paucity of the metanarrative. This constitutes 
Carter's materialist perspective. Yet there is another side to Carter's allegory that sets 
it apart from a complete advocacy of the postmodern perspective. Though wary of 
theories of difference and otherness, Carter nevertheless defers to an absolute alterity 
in which she sees the promise of a liberty beyond gendered words and signs. That this 
alterity is unobtainable is unimportant, for like Augustine's regio dissitnilitudinis, the 
fact of being in the land of unlikeness forms a negative reference to the fact that the 
ineffable is present. There is an underlying yearning in the novel to encounter some 
kind of metaphysical absence that transcends the surrounding politics of identity. The 
desert at the centre of America, where Eve and Tristessa come closest to actually 
overcoming the barriers of gender, is itself described as an 'arena of metaphysics' 
(Carter, Eve, p. 164). The meaning of the phrase is uncertain, but it seems to involve a 
combination of the idealistic and the negative familiar to religious discourse. 
Metaphysical negativity is a constant in The Passion of New Eve, as it offers a utopian 
hope of escaping from totalising social constructions; yet the Other as it lives socially 
can provide the very material to enable such constructions. Carter hints that a pure 
Other, free from all representation, is within the possibilities of experience. Thus 
Carter in The Sadeian Women states: 
There is no way out of time. We must learn to live in this world, to take it with sufficient 
seriousness, because it is the only world we will ever knOW! 7 
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Carter seems to caution us against treating the other in a way that regards the 
exigencies of time and representation as somehow unreal. Her allegory of America in 
The Passion of New Eve tries to move beyond its own symbolic narrative to show that 
a world of difference need not imply a world of plurality. At its heart, however, The 
Passion of New Eve moves through its social allegory to provide an allegorical centre 
other than the United States. The pivot of the novel is alterity itself, reffied and 
understood as an impossibility not because of its absence, but because its presence is 
unachievable. The distinction is important and it holds true for much postmodern 
writing. Carter's capitalist criticisms and negative religiosity can be judged as 
compatible when comparing the novel to my earlier arguments that postmodemism 
gives the ideal spirituality for the postmodem age. In The Passion of New Eve, Carter 
balances the fragmentations of postmodem capitalism with a psychology that takes the 
negativity of the contemporary and projects it towards spiritual conceptions. By so 
doing, Carter is able to retain the utopian at the heart of postmodernism, and 
consequently The Passion of New Eve allegorises ideal hoPe as much as postmodern 
despair. 
In this chapter I have dealt with three allegorical texts whose postmodem style 
belies deep metaphysical preoccupations. The common thread running through my 
treatment is that many postmodem allegories, while supposedly unveiling the 
indeterminacy in the allegorical form itself, turn that indeterminacy into the allegorical 
centre. Once the negative becomes the centre, then theology enters the picture once 
again and alterity possesses the narrative metaphysics of the allegorical divine. What 
we have seen so far in my general argument is the meeting of alterity and the divine in 
the trope of negativity, something which postmodernism finds useful in keeping a 
tenor of profundity and meaning in its thought. In the last chapter we saw how alterity 
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can act as a visualisation of mortality and life beyond physical being. in this chapter, 
we have seen otherness move into the role of spiritual centre in allegorical narratives. 
What is being 'revealed' is the way that alterity is performing the descriptive functions 
of the divine metanarrative, especially the divine metanarrative as conceived in the via 
negativa. In the next chapter, we shall look at a further appropriation of religious 
iconography, that of eschatology and the transcendence over history. 
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Chapter 4 
The Retrospective 
Transcendence 
Other - Postmodern History and Fictional 
[Hlistory stops here, and we see in what way: not for want of people, nor of violence ... nor of events 
. but by 
deceleration, indifference and stupefaction. History can no longer outrun itself, it can no 
longer envisage its own finality, dream of its own end; it is buried in its own immediate effect, it 
implodes in the here and now. Finally, we cannot even speak of the end of history, because there is no 
time for it to reach its own end. Its effects accelerate, but its progress ineluctably slows down. It will 
come to a standstill, and fade out like light and time on the edge of an infinitely dense mass. I 
Francis Fukuyama may have somewhat overstated the case when he described our 
arrival at the 'end of history', but the apocalyptic sentiments in his world view are far 
from uncommon in postmodernism. 2 In the opening quotation, for instance, Jean 
Baudrillard pronounces history as having finally run itself aground in 'deceleration, 
indifference and stupefaction', where history becomes nostalgia and the present is 
trapped in signs. So is the grand historical narrative now obviated within a society that 
radically compresses history into the Now of representation and the apathy of the 
commercial signifier? For Baudrillard, as the past becomes processed through 'the 
power of media diffusion' (Baudrillard, '2000', p. 19), the sense of future progress on 
which history has traditionally relied disperses into a signifying process which 
constantly reiterates immediacy over teleological vision. 
3 Baudrillard's postmodernity 
is an empty eschatology where history runs out of its ability to construct meaning, and 
is unable to project a theology of ends beyond late-capitalist representation. 
The apocalyptic voice of Baudrillard is not a solitary one in postmodernism. 
Nicholas Zurbrugg in The Parameters of Postmodernism introduces what he terms the 
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T-effect' as postmodernism's common declaration of the death of history and the 
collapse of temporal progression: 
According to this mythology, all postmodern discourses, be they borrowed from past, present, 
or future, appear 'doomed, doomed to fail, ' while every postmodern penseur, be that person a 
professor, poet, or punk, seems fated to perceive his or her present as a condition affording 'no 
future'(to employ punk rhetoric) or 'the loss in Post-modcrnism of the sense of future' and 'a 
sense that nothing will change and there is no hope' (to cite Jameson's formulation). 4 
Zurbrugg places Jameson and Eagleton at the forefront of this social pessimism with 
such theorists as Belsey, Brecht, BUrger, Baudrillard. and Barthes (hence the 'B-effect' 
title), following closely with further prophecies of the loss of a significant future or 
5 
meaningful retrospection. Throughout this chapter, I intend to qualify the idea that 
postmodernism is a period which has neither a sense of history nor a relation to 
futurity. I shall do this not by signalling the advent of a postmodern optimism, 6 but by 
showing how postmodernism uses the alterity of 'absent' history to make a possessive 
transcendence of history itself. Most importantly, I shall claim that postmodern 
historical fiction often pursues a thoroughly metaphysical eschatology in which it 
evokes the absolute otherness that comes with the end of time itself. Postmodern 
strategies of language are positioned both outside the temporal process and at the end 
of the temporal process and thus create a form of negative messianism. My fictional 
evidence will mainly be provided by novels from Umberto Eco, Peter Ackroyd and 
Toni Morrison. As we shall see, the strategic relations these writers have to history are 
quite distinct. Yet they all engage with the notion of historical alterity to emphasise 
how much we are implicated in the content and construction of the past through the 
necessary actions of narrating our existence. In so doing they all summon different 
kinds of religiosity which display wholly un-postmodern tendencies towards total 
historical realisation. 
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From the perspective of postmodernity, the pre-modem world can seem one of 
great temporal simplicity. The pre-postmodern world contained all the teleological 
metaphysics required to develop a history from a definable past and a predictable 
futurity. 7 Cause and effect, the correspondence between reality and sign, the integrity 
of the Cartesian subject, and the striving towards a univocal social direction in 
Marxist and Christian philosophy, all enabled the construction of totalising historical 
8 
perspectives. Life for the historical narrative since 1960 has been somewhat more 
difficult. With the advent of French poststructural ism's attack on presence, 
Fukuyarna's historical finality, and Baudrillard's radical theorisation of the sign, 
history has in many ways lost the directional promise where the unknown future is 
focused by the educational provision of the past. In postmodernism, history stops in 
the very medium of its expression: the written text. To quote David Bennett: 
History, to borrow Fredric Jameson's term, has become 'depthless; ' the past as a referent has 
been effaced, time has been textualised, leaving only representations, texts, pseudo-events, 
images without originals: a spatial, rather than temporal, order of simulacra. 9 
The history that Bennett describes is not a realm of temporal artefacts waiting to be 
unearthed, but a site of 'images without originals'. Turning to Jameson again, this 
compacting of all history into a radically superficial present results in a 'pastiche' 
whose sole capability is 'to imitate dead styles' without the confidence or expectation 
of historical veracity. 10 This postmodern history is negativity, a region of alterity 
where the signs of the present are our only contact with a history which is always 
other. 
The overall effect of postmodernism upon historical dialogue may well appear 
to be fundamentally destructive, for postmodernism's preoccupation with textuality 
can erode the surety required for reaching any sort of extra-textual historical presence. 
postmodernity frames the past as an alterity or an otherness which is forever absent, 
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an absence deriving from events which are lost and never to be retrieved in 
themselves. However, we can question whether a history underpinned with alterity 
really presents us with such a contrast from more traditional historical 
methodologies. " History has to a certain extent always been based on absence, if only 
the absence of acknowledged ignorance. Historians as far back as Thucydides have 
recognised that history is irrevocably bound up with epistemological loss and 
fundamentally concerned with the need for a reconstructing narrative on the basis of 
fragments. 12 Indeed, going back to the Stoics, we find a distinctly postmodern sense of 
time in the concept of aion. Aion, in distinction to the sequential time of chronos, is 
what Andrew Gibson calls 'the unlimited past and the future of incorporeals'. 13 
Gibson relates these two views of time to Deleuze and Guattari's double-sense of 
contemporary time: on the one hand a formal, measured temporality and on the other, 
a time 'independent of matter' (Gibson, Towards, p. 180), a time of expanse and 
alterity. 14 The Stoic roots of these ideas of time indicate that the wariness of linear 
history was not unfamiliar to pre-modem cultures, cultures who nonetheless saw 
history as more than just a flat montage of surfaces. The only real difference in 
postmodemism is that narrative is held more consciously as a permanent qualification 
of general epistemological securities. But once again, I find the qualification provided 
by alterity to be quite limited in its effect. As postmodern epistemology draws our 
attention ever more to the present by confirming the past as alterity, then alterity 
seems reified as the essence of history itself and becomes the essential fabric of all 
history past and present. In addition, historical alterity emboldens the interpreter in his 
possession of history. By locating history as an open space, defined by the 
contemporary rather than by preceding factual obligations, the historian suddenly 
gains a peculiar power to define history without an initial ethical or social obligation. 
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To hang negativity over an historical narrative is to refer that narrative to a continual 
trace of a past which haunts us in our historicising, but never achieves full presence. 
So as alterity dominates the historical narrative, we see that postmodern history places 
alterity as a teleological origin: all history confirms the transhistorical absence. To 
summarise: 
i) Postmodern history makes us conscious of the past as alterity; 
fi) Alterity becomes the dominant figure over history itself; 
W) Consequently, postmodem history becomes in practice the recovery of 
transhistorical alterity. 
What we see in postmodern history is a rhetorical rejection of totalised history while 
actually giving alterity a prodigious non-temporal force. As such, alterity is accepted 
as the primary constituent of history rather than a social ideology within itself. 
Postmodemism centralises the absence of past events as the foundation of historical 
narratives. Moreover, under this atemporal positioning, individual creativity seems to 
become the hazardous benchmark of the historian. If history is alterity, then the 
narrator of that history is under no methodological obligation except to the unearthing 
of aporia or relating historical events to that aporia. 15 In this case, the actual content of 
history becomes obsolete as interpretative favour switches to the aporetic centre, a 
problem that Huyssen was conscious of in his perception of American 
postmodemism: 
The problem with postmodernism is that it relegates history to the dustbin of an obsolete 
epist6m6, arguing gleefully that history does not exist except as text, i. e., as historiography. 16 
Huyssen is sensitive to the fact that once history becomes textuality then 
postmodernism effectively achieves a free-floating temporality that compresses 
everything into a signifying present. Once that occurs, then the historical narrative is 
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always a philosophical telescope trained exclusively on the otherness inherent in the 
past. 
An important qualification must be made here. My criticisms of postmodern 
history do not ignore some of the valuable questions that contemporary theory has 
directed towards the complacencies of some historical narratives. A history based on 
narrative alterity can force us into recognising the genealogies of our discourses and 
being aware of how narration and physical conditions are inseparable. (One need only 
think of the narratives of the colonising nations and how these were able to impose the 
qualities of 'foreignness' on to the colonised peoples and reinforce the idea of the right 
to rule. ) 17 The absence underlying postmodem history can act as a caution that history 
is always under construction. Yet the practical value of this critical consciousness 
seems rather burdened by its insistence that textuality and absence are the end of 
history. For what postmodern history generally achieves, and achieves well, is a 
discussion of the nature of history, yet its aporetic conclusion prohibits it from 
proceeding to an experiential judgement. As such, postmodern history remains within 
the jurisdiction of a timeless metaphysics. 
The parado)dcal coe)dstence of atemporal and temporal histories appears to be 
a typical problem within postmodernism. In Derridean terms, history is the oscillation 
between repetition (of the socially established texts of history) and alterity (in the 
recognition that history is subject to textual difference). Postmodem historians, by 
saying that the past and the narrative are both based in the negative, actually seem to 
offer alterity as access to the condition of history in its purest realisation. As we see 
how this confident proposition translates into fiction, it shall be evident that though 
many postmodern techniques of style or theme confuse linear historical presumptions, 
the alterity which emerges actually emphasises a seamless interaction with the past. 
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The basis of much of my argument in this chapter is that postmodernism tends 
towards a transcendent view of history rather than the radical temporal siting which it 
is commonly perceived to be. Once again the magnetism between ontotheology and 
postmodernism makes itself felt. Jameson may have charted the switch from history to 
historicism, but he needs to consider the metaphysical structures that support this 
shift. 18 Postmodernism presents a negative eschatology wherein the primordial 
absence is brought to its impossible full consciousness in the contemporary age. 
Attending postmodem conceptions of alterity is the premise of conting to 
consciousness, of moving beyond history to a locus of play where the subject 
conceives of the alterity that has always been. Once positioned in such a place, alterity 
is read across all history as the primary authority behind being, knowledge, power and 
time itself. Such a transcendental status gives negativity the function (and often 
appearance) of the full presence that it is meant to question. But most importantly, 
transcendental alterity must perform linguistically and conceptually within a pre- 
existing frame of reference, the most ideal being the concept of the divine. The use of 
religious imagery to package postmodern history is not simply a matter of 
convenience. By lending alterity the force of the ultimate metaphysical presence, then 
alterity is able to achieve the ontological and ethical force that many of its 
practitioners believe that it contains. Thus at ground level, postmodern history is an 
attempt to realise an eschatology of the end of time and give itself the authority to read 
all history as othemess. 
Negative history will always struggle to attain an ethically responsible 
framework. It could be observed that postmodem culture's predilection for nostalgic 
forms of history is all part of capitalism's control of negative expectations on the part 
of the consumer society. By this I mean that a nostalgic repackaging of history creates 
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idealisms which are implicitly recognised as absences, contemporary manifestations 
of a recreated time. The fact that these golden moments did not exist in such 
simplicity is actually essential to the avoidance of those social and historical 
complexities which are always inimical to a nostalgic product. Under such an 
interpretation (and leaving aside any questions of nostalgia as psychological 
necessity), treating history as absence rather than presence means that narratives of the 
past operate a bolder licence to meet consumer demand. Self-conscious nostalgia is a 
logical expression of postmodern history. A past dominated by both absence and 
transcendentalism can easily produce a history that is empty of any implicit authority 
outside of the contemporary user of that history. So it is that alterity must be judged by 
what it creates rather than what it represents. In the following analysis of several 
works of fiction, I intend to show how historical or retrospective narratives utilise 
negativity as a reified presence as a way of taking off beyond temporal bounds into a 
realm of static spirituality. 
Umberto Eco - The Naine of the Rose 
Brian McHale, leaning on Dick Higgins' reclassification of modernism and 
postmodernism, describes The Name of the Rose as a novel which straddles the 
'cognitive' and 'postcognitive' modes of fiction. 19 Such a siting of Eco's most famous 
work would seem to be faithful to a novel which insists on creating multiple 
suspensions between the epistemological and ontological dilemmas of a free-playing 
text. However we try to reconcile these dilemmas, there is no denying that the 
historical slippages of The Name of the Rose challenge the issue of how narrative play 
alters historical being and historical knowledge. Straddling as it does the medieval and 
the contemporary and playing to all sections of popular and academic readership, The 
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Name of the Rose not only makes a demanding read but indicates a postmodem time 
in which alterity comes to full consciousness in our readings. What I intend to show in 
this section is how Eco combines historical writing and factuality with an acute 
comprehension of the epistemological insecurities of the postmodern world. The 
result, however, is that Eco, actually repeats a teleology of alterity in which absence 
comes to an Altizerian fullness in the novel's schema. In fact, eschatology would be a 
more accurate term to apply than teleology, for Eco relies on the theme of emergent 
religious apocalypse to unveil the absolute presence of alterity. As such, Eco's 
pretension to postmodern parody is only part of the story of his works. 
Describing postmodern history as ironically framed by a silent past, Eco 
contends that history does not exist beyond the practice of reconstruction: 
The postmodern reply to the modern consists of recognising that the past, since it cannot really 
be destroyed, because its destruction leads to silence, must be revisited: but with irony, not 
innocently. 20 
Eco makes the observation that postmodemism is always ironic because pursuing its 
own theoretical positions would result in an inability to speak .21 Thus speaking in 
parody preserves 'irony, metalinguistic play, enunciation squared' (Eco, Reflections, 
p. 67) in the background of all discourse. Eco's use of irony tends towards Charles 
Jenks' positive concept of the ironic as something that facilitates the growth of 
meaning rather than its suppression or negation. 
22 Yet Eco would do to be mindful of 
the fact that 'silence' is discussed as the terminal centre, the final place, of any 
metalinguistic awareness. In a sense, Eco uses irony as an admission of the alterity at 
the heart of language. This alterity actually forms the ground for the eschatological 
drive in The Name of the Rose. As we shall see, The Name of the Rose gives itself to 
drawing all time to a point of realised alterity in which the historical detail of the 
novel is overcome by the postmodernist eschatology of the absolute other. 
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The epistemological construction of The Na? ne of the Rose at first appears to 
transpose the logos of history into all the lack of the Derridean trace. The motif of the 
labyrinth, a common figuration of postmodern identity, hangs heavily over the text. 
The Aedificium, the monastic library/maze at the architectural centre of the novel, 
mirrors Deleuze and Guattari's notion of the 'rhizome' with all its sense of 
deconstructive irregularities and multiple dynamisms. 23 Eco's 'rhizome labyrinth' is a 
place of texts with 'no centre, no periphery, no exit, because it is potentially infinite' 
(Eco, Reflections, p. 57). Such a labyrinth alludes to the idea that the book is always 
without thematic conclusion or structural transparency because of the intrinsic 
condition of textuality itself. The irony is that the library, where wisdom and truth 
might be deemed to be held, is the very place that undoes the epistemological security 
of William of Baskerville's attempts to unravel the various deaths that are plaguing 
the abbey in north Italy. William interprets all the deaths as corresponding to the 
prophecy of the seven angels contained in the Book of Revelation (8: 6-10: 10). The 
rhizomatic world that he enters, however, means that William ultimately finds his 
methodology undone by the randomness and arbitrariness of a world without inherent 
meaning. Indeed, William eventually realises that the failure of his deductive method 
in defining Jorge as murderer implies that the life of the sign is not something to be 
resolved in definitive causalities: 
24 
I arrived at Jorge pursuing the plan of a perverse and rational mind, and there was no plan, or, 
rather, Jorge himself was overcome by his own initial design and there began a sequence of 
causes, and concauses, and of causes contradicting one another, which proceeded on their own, 
creating relations that did not stem from any plan. Where is all my wisdom, then? I behaved 
stubbornly, pursuing a semblance of order, when I should have known well that there is no 
order in the universe. 25 
William realises that causality is expansive and omni-directional rather than linear. 
His verdict that the universe is without order fires him into a world represented by the 
rhizome labyrinth which has just burned to the ground. The annihilation of the library 
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gestures towards the absence that was the very principle its textuality was based upon. 
With its destruction, William is left in a universe where reality shifts with the existence 
and non-existence of the texts by which it is defined. Eco makes a metalinguistic 
extension of this position by then having William anachronistically quote from 
Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus: 
', The order that our mind imagines is like a net, or like a ladder, built to attain something. 
But afterward you must throw the ladder away, because you discover that, even if it was 
useful, it was meaningless. Er muoz gcHchesame die leitcr abewerfcn, s6cr an ir ufgcstigcn ... 
Is that how you say iff 
'That is how it is said in my language. Who told you thaff 
'A mystic from your land. He wrote it somewhere, I forget where. And it is not necessary 
for somebody one day to fmd that manuscript again. The only truths that am useful are 
instruments to be thrown away. ' (Eco, Rose, p. 492) 
As William speaks Wittgenstein to his assistant Adso, the historical framework of the 
novel dissolves into Eco's metalinguistic preoccupation. Eco takes his medieval fistory 
and compresses it into the textuality not only of the present, but of all time. Taking the 
full potential of the prefix in the word 'metalinguistic', I would argue that what Eco 
achieves is a reduction of all history to the principle of textual alterity. Alterity thereby 
achieves a transcendental import by being an historical constant which once realised 
cannot be undone. 26The eschatological. location of 77ze Name of the Rose is at the end 
of historical presence, as the novel negates history in the totalisation of textual alterity. 
This argument can be made somewhat clearer by reconsidering William's 
logical problems. Joan DelFattore argues that the failure of Williams deductive 
powers comes from his confusion between 'universals and particulars'. 
27 William's 
confounded logic comes, DelFattore contends, from William's incompatible 
combination of the rational methodologies of Roger Bacon and William of Occam. 
Mriffiam's of Baskerville's most persistent error is his attempt to make the murders at 
the abbey fit into the apocalyptic pattern of the seven woes described by John of 
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Patmos. William tries to use Jorge as the causal explanation of the murders, yet comes 
to realise that Jorge only follows the apocalyptic sequence because William's model 
inspired him to do so (Eco, Rose, pp. 469-70). When this is understood, William's 
quest for individual causal links to the murders is thwarted, for he sees that 
determinable activity need not be reduced to a single action or unique provenance. 
Thus William's attempts to enter the finis Africae are initially hindered because he 
tries to interpret the inscription above the mirror in the Aedificium according to 
principles of symbolic extension rather than treating the words as things in 
themselves. His initial approach to deciphering what 'the first and the seventh of the 
four' (Eco, Rose, p. 319) actually means, is based upon making a metaphorical 
connection between the words and an external world. The realisation that the phrase is 
to be treated de dictu and not de re (Eco, Rose, pp. 457-8), may lead to access into the 
_fInis 
Africae, but there is the accompanying awareness that the life of words may be of 
such a nature as to destabilise all confidence in external reference. 28 Thus it is that Eco 
draws attention to the way that The Name of the Rose is a work proceeding not from a 
singular act of creation but from a process of textual borrowing and montage. 
The result of William's epistemological plight is that the reader is made aware 
of the textuality of any empirical approach to causality. Consequently, The Name of 
the Rose constantly refers its history to the inescapable play of language, as the novel 
is composed as a world of texts which is inseparable from the world of events and 
reference. The monk's theological contentions are always conducted in terms of 
conflicting textual authorities and the words of the novel itself, so the preface 
illustrates (Eco, Rose, pp. 1-5), are not the direct contact with the mind of an author 
but a process of deferral and translation. 29 As Adso comes to realise, the cultural 
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'world' of the library is not a collection of individual commentaries on reality but a 
vast intertextual labyrinth which is in constant motion and mutation: 
Until then I had thought each book spoke of the things, human or divine, that lie outside of 
books. Now I realised that not infrequently books speak of books: it is as if they spoke 
amongst themselves. In the light of this mflection, the library seemed all the more disturbing 
to me. It was then the place of a long, centuries old murmuring, an imperceptible dialogue 
between one parchment and another, a living thing, a receptacle of powers not to be ruled by 
a human mind, a treas= of secrets emanated by many minds, surviving the death of those 
who had produced them or had been their conveyors. (Eco, Rose, p. 286) 
Adso's perception of the library hints at Barthes' theories of intertextuality and the 
death of the author. Adso recognises himself to be in a world of scripts and language 
rather than in a world of absolute self-presence, a place where the author is secondary 
to the interpretative afterlife of the text. As this becomes a common theme throughout 
the novel, the historical data we encounter are more about a topography of narrative 
and representation than about the possibility of contacting the actual events of a past 
age. 30 William and Adso are essentially led from their own period into a postmodernity 
of textual slippages and thus they do not belong to the time of medieval Europe, but to 
the end-times of postmodem temporality. In effect, the medieval illustrates the 
postmodem and the postmodern becomes all history in an eschatology that takes the 
reader to the very limits of interpretation. Turning our attention to the apocalyptic 
emphasis of Ihe Name of the Rose, we also see how the coming of postmodern alterity 
is an historical moment of peculiar theological resonance. 
Me Nwne of the Rose is haunted by the imminent end of history. The perceived 
order of the monastery is constantly threatened by the apocalypticism within its own 
theology and the social chaos feared outside that theology. Adso's visions and lustful 
inclinations, the seismic presence of John of Patmos and the murders of the 
emotionally tortured monks, are elements which race the novel towards the final 
disintegration of the cultural compass that is the library. 31 As the library has defined 
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the conceptual perimeters of the monks, the conflagration at the end of The Name of 
the Rose signifies the literal end of the world and the metaphorical revelation of the 
textuality of all worlds. McHale sees the destruction of the library as the dual collapse 
of the medieval world and our own text-conscious, postmodern world: 
Thus the destruction of the library is in this sense doubly apocalyptic, involving the 
(metonymic) destruction of the ancient world at the same time as the (metaphorical) 
destruction of our world, the postmodern world. (McHale, Constructing, p. 162) 
would question McHale's contention that the burning of the library destroys the 
postmodem world. Rather, I would suggest that the end of The Name of the Rose is 
actually a moment signifying the birth of the postmodem as the books of the library 
are reduced to textual fragments. However, McHale's observation about the 
doubleness of Eco's apocalypse is useful because it hints at the dual function of 
apocalypse as something that destroys but also something that reveals. Apocalypse 
usually comes as the end of revelation, the end times in which death and disintegration 
expose the essential forces of justice, divinity and spirit. If we use the destruction of 
the labyrinth as a symbol that our own age is perched over the void, then we must pay 
due attention to this double function of apocalypse and ask ourselves what is disclosed 
about postmodemism through the buming of the library? 
Lois Zamora's analysis of the treatment of apocalypse in The Nante of the Rose 
is distinctive because within the destructive eschatology of the novel she also sees the 
various apocalyptic religious factions as the historical forerunners of our own age: 
In Adso's final, skeptical analysis on the pessimistic side of apocalypse, and in the political 
uses of the apocalyptic visions by the religious groups that populate the novel, Eco dramatises 
the subversive uses of apocalyptic ideas which by 1327 had begun to propel the medieval 
world toward the modern age. (Zamora, 'Apocalyptic Visions', p. 34) 0 
Zamora gestures towards the disclosive sense of apocalypse as the way that 
apocalyptic traditions generated new narratives and new histories that re-evaluated the 
individual's place within social order. The prophets of apocalypse always stand in a 
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marginal relation to society and consequently seem more able to expose and reveal the 
social structures to which they do not belong. But what also occurs through Eco's 
apocalyptic history is the full revelation of difference within history. The destruction 
of the library and its build-up in themes of religious apocalypse combine to give a 
fictional eschatology in which the logos of History is ostensibly destroyed and the full 
presence of linguistic alterity is revealed. Thus I would argue that the alterity revealed 
through The Name of the Rose is actually given the absolute status of the divinity of 
the last times. For the apocalyptic otherness of realised alterity gains eternal authority 
by revealing itself as the essentiality behind all historical events. Through this reading, 
the apocalyptic theologies of the novel appear not merely as an illustrative 
environment for Eco's linguistic ideas, but a necessary container for conveying the 
historical transcendence that comes with a postmodern eschatology. 
Nowhere is this more allegorically apparent than when Adso, collects the 
'lesser library' from the blackened shell of the monastery in the aften-nath of the fire. 
As Adso collects the fragments of various ancient texts, he comprehends that though 
they are a product of chance without any overarching purpose, they still provide a 
locus for the act of narration and the consciousness of narrative limits: 
The more I re-read this list the more I am convinced that it is the result of chance and contains 
no message. But these incomplete pages have accompanied me through all the life that has 
been left me to live since then; I have often consulted them like a oracle, and I have almost had 
the impression that what I have written on these pages, which you will now read, unknown 
reader, is only a cento, a figured hymn, an immense acrostic that says and repeats nothing but 
what those fragments have suggested to me. (Eco, Rose, p. 493) 
Common to many postmodern deliberations on fragmented narrative, the importance 
of what Adso says is not the messages derived from the fragments but the highlighting 
of the fragmentation as the totality of meaning. The Name of the Rose emerges as a 
negative apocalypse in which threatened historical destruction reveals real historical 
alterity. Graham Swift demonstrates a similar thematic in Waterland where the 
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expectations of nuclear Armageddon, the end of history, focuses attention on the way 
Tom Crick constructs his personal history and his world view. Tom's view of 
historical presence is the blend of a temporal alterity with a belief in the reconstructive 
content of narrative: 
What do you do when reality is an empty space? You can make things happen - and conjure 
up, with all the risks, a little Here and Now [ ... ] Or, like the Cricks who out of their watery 
toils could always dredge up a tale or two, you can tell stories. 32 
The 'empty space' of reality may well produce the impetus towards new narratives, 
but the telling of stories must always be subjected to the absolute presence of absence 
in history. Thus it is that the 'Here and Now' of postmodernism also acts as a past, 
present and future in terms of its jurisdiction over interpretation and epistemology. 
The apocalyptic imagery in The Name of the Rose makes the reader aware of living at 
the end of a linguistic eschatology that channels us into a deep relationship with the 
alterity behind narrative. In a novel where the secular and the religious are unified in 
eschatological expectations, Eco uses history to take us into the Other that has reached 
its fullness in our own age. 
The propensity towards giving alterity a theological privilege over temporality 
is equally apparent in Eco's famous novel, Foucault's Pendultan. Foucault's 
Pendulum thrives on the interface between a Kabbalistic spirituality and a 
contemporary apophaticism. In the novel's opening meditations upon the pendulum 
itself, Casaubon lays the groundwork of a Toranic eschatology that transfers the 
aporetic fulcrum of the pendulum into a dominating mystical principle: 
In the beginning He created a point, which became Thought, where all the figures were drawn. 
He was and was not, He was encompassed in the name yet not encompassed in the name, 
having as yet no name other than the desire to be called by a name.... He traced signs in the 
air; a dark light leapt from His most secret depth, like a colorless mist that gives form to 
formlessness, and as the mist spread, a burst of flames took shape in its center, and the flames 
streamed down to illuminate the lower Serifot, and down, down to the Kingdom. 
But perhaps in that simsum, that diminishment, that lonely separation - Diotavelli said 
there was already the promise of return. 33 
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From contemplating a pendulum that remains beyond time and motion, Casaubon 
steps into a theological perspective reminiscent of Altizer's reflections on the divine 
absence. The deus absconditus is here characterised not only by its emanations based 
in the Kabbalistic doctrine of sefiroth, but also by the 'promise of return' that 
proceeds from the attempt to finally absorb divine negativity. The proximity of 
postmodern alterity and negative theology is such that Foucault's Penduhan takes 
alterity as eschatological promise with the simsuin of God providing the vacuum that 
necessitates the drive for spiritual return. It is Diotavelli who later reveals the nature 
of this drive when he considers the infinite process of searching the Torah for 
meaning: 
By rearranging the letters of the book over the centuries, we may someday arrive at the 
original Torah. But the important thing is not the finding, it is the seeking, it is the devotion 
with which one spins the wheel of prayer and scripture, discovering the truth little by little. 
(Eco, Foucault's Pendulum, p. 33) 
At the heart of Diotavelli's perspective upon the Torah is an energy that leads alterity 
towards expectations of conclusion and union. Arguably alterity in postmodern fiction 
achieves a source of 'devotion' that grounds linguistic activity in the promise of 
negativity itself as ontological authority. In both The Name of the Rose and Foucault's 
Pendulum, time seems to act as that which obscures atemporal alterity. Thus both 
these novels effect their own Kabbalism, where words and meaning are continually 
rearranged to produce an active and emergent otherness that is sensed through 
historical activity, yet always projected beyond history itselL 
Here is postmodern fiction at its most theological. Apart from giving 
contemporaneity extraordinary power over the historical past, postmodernism treats 
history like an archaeological dig in ontological ground - alterity is unearthed piece by 
piece until its whole structure is visible. This mysterious negativity then becomes an 
historical godhead, the fundamental presence in all historical periods to which we now 
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have privileged access. So as alterity presents the absence of a 'real' past, it then 
comes to stand for the disclosure of the 'genuine' history of narratives in alterity. 34 On 
this basis, postmodern relations with history are a matter of transcendental expansion 
across textual time rather than the constriction within contemporary limits. Thus 
alterity is reffied as the condition which underpins narrative, and therefore history, 
itself-, for negativity comes to represent the consciousness that history is always being 
written in narration. Alterity is the very condition of the construction of the past. 
The problem that we are starting to see emerge is that postmodcrnism has 
indeed retreated from conventional landscapes of history, but the new territory it 
occupies is not one of fragmentation and historical pluralism. Instead, postmodernism 
has turned alterity into an historical master-trope that makes the past a servant of 
negativity. It does this by giving alterity the theological quality of transcendence and 
thus makes the other a metanarrative authority of extremely potent scope. As we move 
on to Peter Ackroyd's novel Hawksmoor, we will find that the spiritual resonance of 
this powerful other of history achieves an even greater force of influence. 
Peter Ackroyd - Hawksmoor 
Peter Ackroyd's novel Hawksmoor differs centrally from Eco's The Naine of the Rose 
because the interaction between past and present is an explicit theme rather than an 
implicit dialogue. Hawksmoor is constructed upon a metaphysical conversation 
between two historical moments: a dark eighteenth century London, and the London 
of the twentieth century. The two ages are sewn together through a wealth of sinister 
coincidences, parallel plots and the repetition of words and phrases across the chapter 
divisions and the representative centuries. 35 The protagonists are Nicholas Dyer and 
Inspector Hawksmoor, characters belonging to the seventeenth and twentieth centuries 
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respectively. Nicholas Dyer, a Druid and prominent architect, is based upon Nicholas 
Hawksmoor (1661-1736), an architectural assistant to Christopher Wren and John 
Vanbrugh. Dyer is commissioned to build seven churches in London (the historical 
Hawksmoor was actually commissioned for only six), churches which in the 
twentieth-century attract a mysterious series of child murders connected ironically to a 
ghostly figure called 'the Architect' whose 'name is Legion'. 36 Inspector 
Hawksmoor's job is the investigation of these enigmatic and sinister killings. The 
satanic mood surrounding the Architect is ably supported in the novel by a whole 
series of underworld philosophies and theological aberrations. Not the least of these is 
Dyer's druidic persuasion, consisting of an irrepressibly dark view of human nature 
which leads him to the murder of a tramp and one of his colleagues. 
Dyer's celebration of violence and putrefaction chisels out a clear anti- 
Enlightenment philosophy opposed to the rationalism of Wren, Vanbrugghe and their 
respective academy: 
This mundus tenebrosus, this shaddowy world of Mankind, is sunk into Night; there is not a 
Field without its Spirits, nor a City without its Daemons, and the Lunatics seek Prophesies, 
while the Wise men fall into the Pitte. We are all in the Dark, one with another. (Ackroyd, 
Hawksmoor, p. 101) 
Dyer's judgements on social order play constantly within metaphorical shadows and 
psychological darkness. He perceives a society where the genuine human condition is 
always that beneath the surfaces of reason and science, a netherworld where spirits, 
corruption and vice constantly haunt the peripheries of progressive theories. Thus his 
building project is not so much concerned with the creation of a conspicuous 
architecture but with constructing subterranean labyrinths 'where the Dead can once 
more give voice' (Ackroyd, Hawksmoor, p. 16). 37 
The sinister qualities which pervade Dyer are transferred into the investigation 
by Inspector Hawksmoor of several child-murders around, or underneath, Dyer's 
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churches three centuries later. Hawksmoor, whose presence is prophesied to Dyer by a 
Bedlam lunatic (Ackroyd, Hawksmoor, p. 205), is soon embroiled in cases where 
causality and intellect become subservient to dark intuitions and superstitions. The 
metaphysical links between Dyer and Hawksmoor are rigorously pursued by Ackroyd: 
Dyer and Hawksmoor both work in Scotland Yard and their assistants are Walter Pyne 
and Walter Payne respectively; Mrs Best is Dyer's landlady and Mrs West is 
Hawksmoor's neighbour, and phrases, themes and incidents are shared across the 
centuries. 
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Steven Connor has argued that Hawksmoor offers a challenge to the processes 
of narrative and history themselves, by evoking the fictionality implicit in the 
historical activity: 
The novel does indeed construct an elaborate series of coincidences and uncanny recurrences 
between the seventeenth and twentieth centuries, which accumulate in a disturbing way to 
unsettle expectations of linear cause and effect and the coherent relations of past and present. 
Rather than being a given, external fact, time becomes subject to artifice and fictional 
patterning, and thus able to fold over itself, and to flow backwards as well as forwardS. 39 
Connor treats Hawksmoor as a novel which disrupts standard constructions of history 
and narrative by its tendency to work against the grain of linearity. As time loses a 
unidirectional purpose, then there remains a model of time which depends on spatial 
time rather than a succession of causal moments: 40 
The novel sets recurrence against irreversibility, proposing against a developmental view of cp 
history a spatialised view which sees history as occurring all at once. (Connor, English Novel, 
p. 144) 
The 'spatialised view' of history which Connor describes is a fundamentally 
postmodern space where the reader becomes aware that narration is the act of 
expanding time in the absence of any extrinsic causal direction. Yet Connor does not 
accredit Hawksmoor with postmodern status. Connor concedes that Haivkvnoor is 
postmodern in sympathy in that it challenges assumptions of linear time (Connor, 
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English Novel, p. 145). However, he places the novel more in the traditions of 
modernism because, in the words of Avron Fleishman, it lifts 'the contemplation of 
the past above both the present and the past, to see it in its universal character, freed of 
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the urgency of historical engagement'. Connor seems right to translate the extreme 
consciousness of time into a critical distance fron? time. Ackroyd's text certainly 
confuses linear time, but its history is such that it allows the readers to propel 
themselves beyond the activities of narrative to a numinous, effectively eternal place 
where they can transcend the constraints that narrative history places upon them. For 
instance, Hawksmoor has two passages where the standard format of the novel 
changes into dramatic dialogue, complete with a list of dramatis personae (Ackroyd, 
Hawksmoor, pp. 174-81, pp. 194-5). Both passages enforce the presence of textuality, 
the open admission that what we read is the technique of narration rather than the 
history itselL Yet as one passage belongs to Dyer's world and the other to 
Hawksmoor's, the effect is to reduce both periods to a condition in which aporetic 
textuality delimits historical periods in favour of an homogenising negative 
interpretation. Standing outside time, the reader thus totalises the consciousness of 
textual worlds in the making, a process that actually searches for the freedom to 
transcend time and realise alterity as the essence of time and history. 
For a novel supposedly imbued with a postmodern style, Hawksinoor relies 
heavily on a metaphysical influence and manner. The mysticism of Hawksynoor could 
simply be a supernatural deepening of the detective genre, an interpretation supported 
by the fact that the novel ends without conclusion or rational direction. 42 However, 
Hawksmoor's theological content, like that of The Name of the Rose, serves a vital 
function in constructing a negative metaphysics of time. As we have seen, Ackroyd's 
attempts at enforcing a postmodern history fail because the mechanics of difference 
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dissolve time frames into a seamless play and reify alterity as the absolute within 
history. The apocalyptic and chthonic subject matter of the novel affect its negating 
linguistic strategies by making alterity commensurate with the metaphysical 'cloud of 
unknowing'. Postmodern fiction has the unusual trait of turning to religious frames of 
reference to present alterity and indeterminacy. As I have argued, this is because the 
effect of the encounter with an abstracted negativity is essentially dependent upon 
spiritual tradition. In Hawksmoor, the purpose of the theological framework that 
Ackroyd uses seems to be the bonding together of disparate time frames in an 
interactive metaphysical mystery. Yet as the novel also bonds the two periods together 
in postmodern fictional observations, the alterity of difference and the alterity of the 
divine cease to be separable, as both become trans-historical forces. 
Thomas, the ill-fated schoolboy, provides us with further illustrations of this 
blending of the religious and the postmodem when he redefines his school history 
classes: 
In History class (which was known to the children as the 'Mystery' lesson), for example, he 
liked to write down names or dates and watch the ink flow across the spacious white paper of 
his exercise book. (Ackroyd, Hawksmoor, p. 29) 
Mystery and history reach equivalence here, as mystery is that which is always other 
than the facts and the data of past moments. Ackroyd develops this association 
through Thomas' text-book writings. Thomas jots down the 'facts' that comprise the 
core of conventional history-making, yet his attention is not on the events and people 
but on the action of writing itself and the white space beneath and between those 
words. Thus, the connection of history with mystery comes from a literal 
representation of history as trace: the words on the page act as the presence of 
historical writing upon the fundamental absence of the blank page. Like Eco, Ackroyd 
brings the negative into a literal feature of history, a page to be viewed which keeps 
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alive the consciousness of absence. What is more, the privileging of absence in the 
novel actually becomes the solution to the fictional mysteries. The mixture of 
detective novel and metaphysical reflection combine once again to assert an 
eschatology that reaches fulfilment: alterity becomes the alpha and omega of the 
fictional action. This is illustrated as Inspector Hawksmoor tries to piece together a 
causal model of the last few hours of one of the murdered children: 
The chain of causality might extend as far back as the boy's birth, in a particular place and on 
a particular date, or even further into the darkness beyond that. And what of the murderer, for 
what sequence of events had drawn him to wander by this old church? All these events were 
random and yet connected, part of a pattern so large that it remained inexplicable. He might, 
then, have to invent a past from the evidence available - and, in that case, would not the 
future also be an invention? It was as if he were staring at one of those puzzle drawings in 
which foreground and background create entirely different imagcs: you could not look at such 
a thing for long. (Ackroyd, Hawksmoor, p. 157) 
Hawksmoor apprehends that the causal resolution of the murders is impossible 
because of all that is absent in any history. The way he partially resolves this problem 
is crucial to the way we see alterity as functioning within postmodern historical 
narratives. Hawksmoor realises that he might 'have to invent a past from the evidence 
available'. All too often in postmodern criticism, the emphasis is placed on the 
narrative mobility of the indeterminate rather than the fact that the indeterminate has 
absolute rule as a governing principle of interpretative activity. Hawksmoor suggests 
that narrating history is a construction self-consciously pursued under the hegemony 
of alterity. The effect of this may be to force our narratives into the open to reveal 
their content and choice, but this is always performed under the judgement of the 
atemporal other. Postmodern fictional history does not signal textual free-play, as such 
history is anchored upon an otherness that qualifies and emasculates past and present 
in its domination of the limits of narrative. 43 When Hawksmoor says of his 
predicament 'you could not look at such a thing for long', he is speaking the same 
sentiments which are behind William's resigned comment to Adso at the end of The 
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Name of the Rose: 'There is too much confusion here' (Eco, Rose, p. 493). Both 
William and Hawksmoor understand that a conventional model of causality is no 
longer acceptable. The encounter with the negativity is overwhelmingly numinous: it 
threatens to crush sanity, words and time into an immense silence. Hawksmoor's need 
to look away, like a dark, secular version of Moses' glimpse of divine glory, is 
effectively an encounter with an absolute that is indefinable but all-powerful over the 
nature of historical direction and understanding. 
In Hawksmoor, we see an equivalence between the numinous and the aporetic 
that is enormously important in understanding postmodcmism's ambiguous politics of 
history. Useful to understanding this equivalence is Thomas Docherty's consideration 
of the poststructuralist sense of time and value as an opposition to the Enlightenment 
teleology of Leibnizian 'Optimism': 
According to Optimistic philosophy, the meaning of an event is not immediately apparent, as if 
it were never present-to-itscif. its final sense - to be revealed as the necessity of goodness - is 
always deferred (to be revealed under the sign of eternity) and thus always different (or not 
what is may appear to the local eye caught up in the event itself). The major difference 
between deconstruction and Optimism is that Optimism believes that the final sense lics 
immanently within an event, whereas deconstruction consistently warns against such 
metaphysical notions. 44 
I would argue that postmodernism and Optimism are perfectly commensurable, 
especially when seen through postmodern historical fiction. Deconstructive history 
retains both the 'immanence' and the 'sign of eternity' contained within the 
optimistic philosophy by giving alterity a full presence over, above and within 
contingency. For in novels such as The Name o the Rose and Hawksmoor, alterity is f 
immanent and central within every inflection of historical content - it is in effect a 
temporal constant. Hence, the negative performs as the 'sign of eternity' and makes 
the shift from a secular/philosophical frame of reference to a theological principle. 
Hawksmoor straddles theology and poststructuralism because they occupy the same 
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historical territory. Dyer's instinctive supernaturalism is based on the rejection of 
Enlightenment reason in preference for a sense of the vacuity beneath experience and 
time. He propounds a mysticism fundamentally inscribed upon the aporctic, as his 
metaphysical debate with Sir Christopher Wren makes clear: 
You speak of Experience, I replied [Dyer], and hold it to be consistent with Reason? At this he 
nods sagely. But may it not be that Experience is inconsistent with Reason: the Gulphe in 
which Truth lies is bottomless and it will wash over whatever is thrown into it. 
He shakes his head as the Candle falters and then flares up: This is but a windy Conceit of 
Knowledge, Nick, a Maze of Words in which you will lose your self. (Ackroyd, Ilawksmoor, 
p. 146) 
Whatever the persuasions of Wren's counter-argument, Hawksynoor remains allied to 
Dyerts negative intuition of experience and history. It is interesting that Wren sees 
Dyer's theology as a 'Maze of Words', as if a dark mysticism is the result of language 
detaching itself from external reference and solid meaning. My sympathy for many of 
Wren's contentions is limited, but his accusation that Dyer is exercising a 'windy 
Conceit of Knowledge' could well be applied to postmodernism itself. Postmodernism 
verbally detaches itself from the metaphysics of history, but this detachment is a 
linguistic sleight-of-hand as transcendence slips in through the back door of 
theological reference. Hawksmoor is postmodern in its historical technique, yet the 
alterity it unveils is dependent upon theological themes to give it the aporctic 
eschatology that dominates postmodern language. For postmodernism is messianic to 
its core. What has returned is the fullness of the Other that has been previously hidden 
in historical teleology. Postmodernism privileges itself as being able to gain access to 
the alterity not only of our own times, but of all those that precede ours. 
Toni Morrison - Beloved 
In switching our attention to Toni Morrison's Beloved, we target a specific ethical 
possibility that historical alterity produces within narrative. For rather than giving 
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negativity as a general engagement with historicising processes, Morrison moves 
towards an alterity that potentially reconstructs the absent narratives of those 
suppressed under colonialism and slavery. Like the fiction of Rushdie, Beloved slips 
indivisibly between metaphysical and realist worlds, yet unlike Rushdie, Morrison has 
a more specific location than that of the siteless 'international writer. 45 Instead, 
Morrison uses the play between the 'spiritual' and the 'real' to make a 
representational, and ethical, space in which suppressed black history can emerge. In 
my analysis of Beloved, we shall again see what appears to be the elements and style 
of a postmodern history. Yet Morrison avoids the excessive apophaticism of much 
postmodern fictional history by using the negative as a reference to cultural content 
rather than cultural indetermination, thus achieving what Andrew Levy has called 
&communal solutions to the issue of unspeakability'. 46 
Beloved poses several challenges to conventional history which are familiar 
within the context of postcolonial writing. The presentation of the histories of Sethe, 
Paul D., Denver and Beloved are fragmented tales moving through many non-linear 
retrospectives which dissociate her narrative from the monologic histories of an 
imperial Western project. Beloved opens up histories not known and racial questions 
not answered. Much of this dynamic revolves around the return of Beloved herself, 
the child whom Sethe, a slave in the American South, killed in order to prevent her 
from spending a life under the brutal slave-ownership of the Schoolteacher. The 
confusions which abound about whether Beloved is a ghost, a reincarnation, an 
impostor or simply a deluded woman, do not lead to a simple confrontation with 
ontology, but actually show how ontological concerns are inseparable from acts of 
historical existence. Morrison does not evoke an abstracted alterity that dominates 
historical content through the figure of Beloved, but a testimony to a presence that has 
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been obscured and suppressed by particular historical events. Beloved is a 
conspicuously metaphysical novel in its construction and characterisation. Yet rather 
than making its supernaturalism a buttress for absolute alterity, its metaphysics instead 
allude to psychological and social realities which have been produced by concrete 
historical events. Postcolonial writing, as we shall see in my final chapter on Salman 
Rushdie, tends to avoid the negative excesses of postmodern writing by making 
absence something through which one passes to arrive at a cultural and material 
message. By keeping a material root, Morrison is able to use alterity as a tool for 
gaining access to historical understanding. In such a way, Morrison shows that the 
spiritual negative can have an immense physical significance for those on whom 
negativity has been forced. 
In Beloved, the absences underlying the narrative emerge from the question of 
what voices have been negated by the cultural actions of colonisation. An instance of 
this revisionist consciousness comes when Sethe remembers her childhood days at 
Sweet Home. The following recollection comes after the party organised by Grandma 
Suggs resulted in the social ostracism of Sethe and her family by the local community: 
Sweet Home was a marked improvement. No question. And no matter, for the sadness was at 
her centre, the desolated centre where the self that was no self made its home. Such as it was 
that she did not know where her children were buried or what they looked like if alive, fact 
was she knew more about them than she knew about herself, having never had the map to 
discover what she was like. 47 
Sethe's experience of self-consciousness is negative, yet it is not built upon any 
necessary difference that classifies all individuals. The absence of self that Sethe 
experiences is rather the concrete absence of a cultural 'map' that would enable an 
ontological orientation within a social history and place. 48 When even her children are 
removed from her by slavery, the result is a 'desolate centre' where the ability to 
narrate one's existence is left in ruins by the suppression of cultural and linguistic 
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vehicles on which that narration depends. The association between ontological 
absence and cultural acts is essential to distinguishing Morrison's use of the 
indeterminate from that of postmodem authors. Morrison's alterity is a literal absence 
in historical time - it is something that has been negated or removed from cultural 
experience. Thus alterity points not to a primacy in itself, but to a history behind a 
speciJilc moment of negation. Rafael Pdrez-Torres has noted that 'multi-cultural' texts 
such as Beloved focus more upon the particularities of social power than the 
generalities of philosophical alterity: 
In large part, the reason classically postmodern texts move away from connection with socio- 
historical reality is their commitment to the hermetic isolation of the aesthetic object. By 
comparison, multicultural texts place in the foreground the relation between language an 
power. In order to understand alterity and decentralization as historically grounded 
phenomenon rather than reified fetish, a critical postmodernism needs to take into account the 
profound relationship between language and power that multicultural texts addreSS. 49 
The accusation that postmodern texts perform 'the hermetic isolation of the aesthetic 
object' is broadly in line with the general premise of this thesis. Perez-Torres looks to 
contemporary multicultural literature as a form which does not make alterity a 
privileged centre, but which seeks the negative in the context of social power. By so 
doing, alterity can fade in and out of the critical process without being the anchor for 
the debate and without taking away the confidence in presence and the metanarrative. 
Morrison shows us how the absences that underpin the enslaved black identity 
are achieved through the white's reconstruction of the blacks as pure referents and not 
as a self-signifying community. The punishment beating of Sixo by Schoolteacher 
strikingly illustrates the narrative relation between the oppressor and the oppressed. 
Sixo is beaten not so much for his theft of a shoat, but for the rational defence of his 
actions. The schoolteacher sees this defence as a usurpation of his role as a centre for 
linguistic control: 
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Clever, but schoolteacher beat him anyway to show him that definitions belonged to the 
dcriners - not the defined. (Morrison, Beloved, p. 190) 
The schoolteacher's response to Sixo's reasoning achieves a localised act of historical 
negation. As Sixo's epistemological being is denied, so his language is cut off from 
possessing any historical authority over a cultural context. During the more even- 
handed treatment at the hands of Mr Garner, Sixo partly presumes that his language is 
a universal medium of reference. Yet the Schoolteacher's beating consigns him to the 
condition of the 'defined' because language is not to be separated from the physical 
power conditions that enable the whites to acts as 'definers', the possessors of 
referential, and therefore narrative, control. 
Beloved's basic premise is that the oppression of a particular culture is 
performed in the negation of that culture's power to narrate; once a culture's 
narratives are dominated, then that culture can quickly lose its social and individual 
being. In place of the eroded culture comes self-perpetuating modes of ideology which 
attempt to naturalise the new social relations which have been created. This is realised 
by Stamp Paid when he considers the potency of the jungle motif in a culture of 
slavery: 
But it wasn't the jungle blacks brought with them from that other (livable) place. It was the 
jungle the whitefolks planted in them. And it grew. It spread. In, through and after life, it 
spread, until it invaded the whites who had made it. (Morrison, Beloved, pp. 198-9) 
The power of definition that the slave-owners possess is capable of turning their 
representation of the jungle into a socially persuasive motif. In this quotation, 
Morrison's metaphor surrounding jungle ecology and ideological growth shows how 
representation and reality become indivisible when the signifying process is 
hegemonised by a particular group. Beloved demonstrates, if anything, that historical 
knowledge is a Foulcauldian site of power in a world where narration and 
signification are the central arena for cultural control . 
50 As history, therefore, is never 
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free from ideology, the fragmentary construction of Beloved becomes much more 
understandable as showing the difficulties of memory when absences have been 
forced upon a culture's ability to narrate its own history. 
Yet as much as the gaps and voids of Beloved represent the effect of 
oppression, Morrison also seems to be offering a signature of resistance in the way 
negativity is used. For as the novel highlights the aporiae of narrative in the stories of 
Sethe, Denver, Beloved and the Sweet Home men, the novel becomes an act of 
reclaiming and reconstructing a cultural and historical identity. The novel itself 
constantly dismantles the architecture of white cultural narration by showing that the 
spaces it creates are not places of signifying truth, but signs of historical omission. 
With this exposure of the basis of western colonial history, Beloved starts to advance 
the possibility that a new cultural history can be recovered and created. 51 
Sethe herself is often seen to be tom between the unspeakability of the past 
and the need to form a history of events. This situation becomes particularly acute 
with the reappearance of Beloved as an adult. With this metaphysical confrontation, 
Sethe is bound by the demand to frame her reasons for killing Beloved into some sort 
of contextual and historical evaluation. Attempting to do this is shown as a process 
fraught with danger, as Sethe becomes enervated by the sheer scale of the 
psychological demands generated by the act of renegotiating a tormented historical 
repression. Yet the presence of Beloved gives a dramatic gravity to the novel as she 
stimulates the narration of a history that has previously been left unspoken. Her 
ethereal yet forceful presence drags a whole collection of historical ghosts into the 
present, ghosts which arc given being through acts of memory. This narration focuses 
Sethe's sense of being with the need to find a cultural voice, as is apparent when she 
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talks to Beloved about the earrings given to her by Mrs Garner, the wife of the slave- 
owner: 
But, as she began telling about the earrings, she found herself wanting to, liking it. Perhaps it 
was Beloved's distance from the event itself, or her thirst for hearing it - in any case it was an 
unexpected pleasure. (Morrison, Beloved, p. 58) 
The moods of plenitude and discovery in this quotation hint at the self/cultural- 
consciousness that accompanies the systematic recovery of absent histories. As the 
dialogue between Sethe and Beloved exPands and becomes more confessional, there 
emerges a potential reconciliation of historically dispossessed individuals with their 
social memories. One of the most poignant moments of such temporal rediscovery in 
Beloved, comes when Sethe elicits Beloved's admission that she is the daughter that 
Sethe felt herself forced to kill: 
Tell me the truth. Didn't you come from the other side? 
Yes. I was on the other side. 
You came back because of me? 
Yes. 
You rememory me? 
Yes. I remember you. 
You never forgot me? 
Your face is mine. (Morrison, Beloved, p. 215) 
The word 'rememory' used here by Sethe is a crucial element in understanding the 
reclamation of absent historical narratives. Rememory is not equivalent with 
'remember', but suggests a re-presentation of the original incident of memory, in this 
case recalling the mother-daughter relationship that was denied Sethe and Beloved 
because of inhumane social prohibitions. The seamless presentation of the voices in 
this quotation, without speech-marks or authorial intervention, contributes to the 
interpersonal unity in Beloved's reassurance that 'Your face is mine'. For the 
repossession of memory seems to bring a shared identity and communal shape with 
regard to the past which they inhabited and Sethe and Beloved merge in a narrative 
which is both individual and general. Linden Peach defines the operation of 
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6rememory I in the physical embodiment of memory across lines of time and 
individuality: 
Sethe's healing and rebirth can only begin when she has knowledge and understanding of the 
absent narratives. The novel hinges upon what is called rememory, the basic concept of which 
is that memories have a physical existence beyond the minds of the individuals in whom they 
originate: it is possible to bump into and inhabit another person's memory. (Peach, Morrison, 
P. 101) 
Peach's notion of rememory is appealing because it gives Sethe's tragic memories the 
capacity to be both individual and representative: individual in that Sethe's memories 
originate in particular moments of her experience and representative as her memories 
seem capable of becoming the content of a broader history of social identity. Morrison 
makes clear that the absences of Sethe's life, absences of family, tradition and self, 
can be filled by recreating narrative memories which are simultaneously communal 
and specific (Peach, Morrison, pp. 10 1- 102). 
However much the character of Beloved represents the potential for 'healing' 
in Sethe's life, there is also an ontologically disruptive quality about her presence 
(Sage, House of Fiction, pp. 183-85). The reappearance of Beloved as a possible 
reincarnation of the child Sethe killed, is not incongruous in a novel which opens 
under the presence of the poltergeist spirit that haunts house 124. Beloved herself is 
cast in ambiguity. Peach lists three plausible explanations for Beloved, all of which 
are textually supportable: 
1) She is the ghost of Beloved returned in physical form; 
2) She is a mistreated black-girl who, having escaped from her captors, places 
her own self and experiences into those of Sethe's; 
3) She is a representative figure of all blacks who suffered under slavery. 
(Peach, Morrison, p. 102) 
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Peach concludes that neither definition is wholly accurate or self-sufficient, as the 
signifier 'Beloved' constantly slips and flows between the definitions (see Cornwell, 
Fantastic, p. 207). Consequently, Beloved always remains an enigmatic figure on the 
borders of metaphysics and social comment. What does such ambiguity achieve? Why 
is Beloved's 'song [ ... I just outside music' (Morrison, Beloved, p. 60)? 
So far in thiý thesis, we have seen alterity working as an absolute principle, 
mainly through acquiring the metaphysical functions of the trope of God. Morrison's 
Beloved is centrally preoccupied with metaphysical themes, but in her case the guiding 
motif is the ghost. How does this infinitely lesser form of supernatural being 
contribute towards the politics of absence in the novel? With much postmodern 
metaphysics, like the activity of the negative theology, deconstruction and difference 
are used as teleological energies that push towards an encounter with the supremacy of 
alterity itself, its priority over all other significations. Thus the linguistic other acts as 
an ineffable god. Yet in Beloved, the alterity of the absent past is literally figured in a 
ghost, a supernatural being from the past itself. Morrison's alterity is not a total 
absence of past reality but the revisitation of a time that has already been. This 
distinction is crucial because it demonstrates how Morrison is more concerned with a 
tangible encounter with the past rather than a philosophical speculation upon the 
Other. Beloved is a metaphysical novel. Yet the metaphysics of the novel have a 
materialist ground in the historical activity of the black cultural memory, and thus 
Morrison's characters live with the ghosts of real events and people and not the 
infinite deferral of presence. Accordingly, Beloved can not be read in terms of a 
negative theology but of an affirmative theology. The novel affirms that there are 
many metaphysical ghosts in history, especially the history of oppressed peoples, but 
these ghosts are referents to a past that has been and not the 'eternal contemporaneity' 
237 
of the postmodem world. William R. Handley's analysis of the ghost in Beloved, 
though tending towards a very postmodern privileging of aitcrity, argues that the 
metaphysical absences of the novel are significantly bound up with cultural and 
historical actuality: 
The figure of Beloved is Morrison's attempt to bring to presence a lost child, to fill the 
incalculable metaphysical space inaugurated by the historical facts of loss during the Middle 
52 Passage and slavery. 
Morrison's Beloved escapes the transcendentalist bias by using absence as an absence 
of cultural events or self-recognition and not a final absence that governs all mcntal 
and social phenomena. As we shall see in my final chapter on Rushdie, the mixing of 
the metaphysical and the material is a way out of the impasse of postmodern 
transcendentalism, especially when this mix recognises both the human centrality of 
metanarratives and the grounded nature of these metanarratives in social reality. 
Beloved revolves around metaphysical absence, but at its heart it is an absence built 
into a time, experience and historical actuality that are not subservient to the idealisms 
of postmodemism. 
This is a fundamental difference between the postcolonial writer and the 
postmodern. writer, with regard to metaphysical and cognitive principles in history. 
The difference has been lucidly surnmarised by Diana Brydon: 
Perhaps the clearest difference between a post-modernist practice and a post-colonial practice 
emerges through their different uses of history. As Hutcheon points out, '[hlistoriographic 
metafiction acknowledges the paradox of the reality of the past but its textuali, -ed accessibility, 
to us today' (1988a: 14). Without denying that things happened, postmodernism focuses on the 
problems raised by history's textualised accessibility: on the problems of representation, and 
on the impossibility of receiving truth. Post-colonialism, in contrast, without denying history's 
textualised accessibility, focuses on the reality of a past that has influenced the present. 53 
What the postcolonial achieves that the postmodem cannot is a rootedness in material 
history without the insistent embarrassment over presence, be that presence social or 
spiritual. In this environment, alterity becomes part of an historical act rather than an 
238 
historical totality. The uncanny quality Beloved evokes comes from her summoning of 
past events into present existence. Beloved represents both a figure of actual black 
I 
experience under slavery (therefore acting as a sign of the past), yet her ambiguous 
status in the contemporaneity of the novel places that past in the constant need for 
present negotiation. The effect of Beloved's temporal status is an alterity which is a 
direct presentation of the lost (past) narratives of black identity and the need to 
reclaim those narratives in new (present) voices and historical awareness. 
54 Seen in 
this light, Beloved moves through alterity to history as it exposes the operations of 
cultural oppression. 
Beloved exhibits the 'writtenness' of history. The void of black history under 
slavery is not a fundamental alterity, but an absence of the ability to narrate under 
certain power structures. Thus the alterity within Beloved acts as a political movement 
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against the way history has been scripted. So. when Morrison actually gives the 
white slave-owners a voice, in the scene where the schoolteacher and colleagues find 
the escapee Sethe with the child she has just killed, the focus is not on what is being 
said but on the voices that are being prohibited: 
Never again could you trust them in the woods or anywhere else. You'd be feeding them 
maybe, holding out a piece of rabbit in your hand, and the animal would revert - bite your hand 
clean off. (Morrison, Beloved, pp. 149-50) 
The animal metaphor employed here develops itself out of the 'silence' imposed upon 
the enslaved person's voice. The silence attests to the act of silencing perpetuated by 
the slave owner on those whom he controls. Thus Morrison's inclusion of this 
oppressive voice makes absence a signal that a history of experience is there, but not 
the opportunity to frame that history in a culturally specific narrative. 
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We have seen in Moffison's novela way of taking absence as a metaphysical 
given without moving into the atemporality of postmodern history. With Foucault's 
radical relativisation of history and the subject, postmodemism has ostensibly 
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embraced anti-metaphysical attitudes towards time. Yet I have argued that these 
attitudes veil a profound reliance upon figurations of eternity for describing the rise 
and apotheosis of alterity throughout history. In his essay 'The Postmodem Paradigm 
and Contemporary Capitalism', Joe Holland describes the postmodern sense of time 
as 'dialectical' in which 'the new future emerges to challenge the present, but it 
remains a future rooted in the past'. 57 The result of this dialectic is what Holland calls 
a 'holistic spiral' that 'recalls the prophetic biblical view of history' (Holland, 
'Paradigm', p. 19). That Holland has arrived at a theological model from postmodern 
time is not surprising. Postmodernism's biblical qualities lie in its sense of time as a 
totality speaking in the present, with the various critics and interpreters who are in 
touch with alterity acting as prophets and sages of negativity. We have already seen in 
Morrison's Beloved that the metaphysics of absence need not always lead to the 
transcendentalism of postmodernism. In my final chapter, I shall give exclusive 
attention to Salman Rushdie as someone who blends metaphysics, absence and 
metanarratives in a way that does not give way to a rather futureless theorising of 
alterity. Holland describes the dialect as a defining principle of postmodemism. I shall 
now argue that dialectical activity can actually take us away from postmodem theory 
to a philosophy with a greater potential than that offered by much contemporary 
theory. 
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Chapter 5 
Salman Rushdie: Dialogue and the Transcendent Aesthetic 
Any attempt to map the terrain of postmodem. /religious interaction in fiction will find 
it fruitful to address Salman Rushdie as one who inhabits a difficult borderzone 
between the sacred instinct and the secular drive, 'There's a hole inside me where God 
used to be', said Rushdie in an interview with Gerald Mazorti, 1 and it is this spiritual 
void that informs or illustrates much of the political content and stylistic quality of 
Rushdie's novels. However, in Rushdie's case I shall not proceed to file his work 
along with those authors whom I have suggested as closet negative theologians. In 
contrast to such metaphysical incongruities, I shall claim Rushdie as someone who 
applies religious themes to offer a more politically and philosophically satisfying route 
out of the indecisive battle of postmodern multiplicity and Enlightenment 
mctanarrativcs. Making parallels with Bakhtinian theories of dialogism and 
heteroglossia, I will interpret Rushdie's fictional encounter with the divine as an 
ethical form of conversation that vigorously engages with social realities rather than 
transcending them in a discourse with the other. Neither straying towards radical 
individualism nor inscribing monolithic political theories, Rushdie paints a world in 
which multiple metanarratives and pluralities are not set in unceasing play, but are 
bound together in social necessity. Moreover, the spirituality inextricably woven into 
Rushdie's style and content is not dominated by a tendency towards religious parody, 
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but by the desire to show that the realities of individuals' lives must always rely upon 
metaphysical and metanarrative ideas. 
The dialogic nature of Rushdie's fiction is apparent from the first page of a 
novel such as Midnight's Children. Saleern Sinai's attempts to contain and phrase his 
narrative are unsettled by a multitude of voices, personalities and histories 'jostling 
and shoving inside me', 2 an entire world seemingly speaking and arguing within one 
individual. Saleem's epic bonding of national and personal history is never the solitary 
expression of one detached from the world, but of a character whose flight from 
'absurdity' revolves around his never-ending interaction with faces, countries, 
languages and cultures. 
That many critics should have understood Rushdie's work in terms of 
Bakhtinian dialogue and heteroglossia should come as little surprise. The colours, 
zones and worlds of Rushdie's fiction seem to echo Bakhtin's preoccupation with the 
'polyphonic' voice as an opposition to the 'monologic' dogmas that freeze discussion 
into inflexible creeds and canons. 3 Mark Edmundson sees the 'many different 
realities' in Rushdie's novels as espousing a Bakhtinian camivality that distinguishes 
Rushdie from the more philosophically anxious tones of much postmodem writing. 4 
Similar critical voices include Philip Engblom's analysis of Midnight's Children as a 
dialogic novel, M. Keith Booker's reading of Rushdie's 'fall' into Bakhtinian. 
hctcroglossia, and D. J. Enright's conclusion that The Satanic Verses is 'copious in 
thesis and antithesis, but [. . .] synthesis hovers beyond it'. 
5 In such critical opinions, 
there is often a conscious link between Bakhtin and theories of the postmodem, 
especially finding common ground in the repositioning of meaning as an eternally 
deferred quality. Yet I shall argue in this chapter that though the connection between 
Rushdie and Bakhtin is a legitimate one to construct, the implication that this makes 
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Rushdie into an archetypal postmodemist is far from secure. Though there are many 
aspects of postmodern theory, such as Derrida's deconstruction and Lyotard's belief in 
positive language games, that can be associated with Baktinian concepts, Bakhtin 
ultimately seems to promote notions of epistemological presence and sociological 
reality at odds with the postmodem incredulity towards the metanarrative. The first 
part of this chapter will be devoted to a Bakhtinian analysis of Midnight's Children in 
order to dissociate Rushdie from the negative obsessions of much postmodern writing 
and show him as proposing a much more satisfying and rounded perspective of the 
conflict of the monolithic and the plural. Of paramount significance to my arguments 
will be Rushdie's increasing preoccupation with the importance of religion as a 
phenomenon that, though sometimes dictatorial and cruel, actually affirms ethical and 
spiritual values that must be accounted for in any humane social policy. Particularly in 
The Satanic Verses, I shall demonstrate how Rushdie's dialogic structures seek out a 
middle ground between the iconoclastic potential of the secular and the ethical 
individuality of the sacred. 
Bakhtin, Rushdie, and Midnight's Children 
Most of Bakhtin's work issues from the belief that we only come to a consciousness 
of ourselves through the confrontation with another outside of ourselves. 6 In 'Author 
and Hero in Aesthetic Activity', Bakhtin claims with a partly Levinasian resonance 
that as we face the other, the fact that we can see them and their world in a fullness 
unobtainable to them means that we comprehend them as unique and singular beings 
in the world. This comprehension, in a rather Hegelian inflection, in turn comes back 
to us as a deducted vision or 'gift' of ourselves as situated individuals: 
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Tlis other human being whom I am contemplating, I shall always see and know something that 
he, from his place outside and over against me, cannot see himself. parts of his body that are 
inaccessible to his own gaze (his head, his face and its expression), the world behind his back . 
.. are accessible to me but not to him. As we gaze at each other, two different worlds are 
reflected in the pupils of our eyes. [ ... I to annihilate this difference completely, it would be 
necessary to merge into one, to become one and the same person. 
This ever-present excess of my seeing, knowing and possessing in relation to any other 
human being, is founded in the uniqueness and irreplaceability of my place in the world. 7 
The term that Bakhtin applies to this encounter between self (author) and other (hero) 
is 'aesthetic event': the moment when the meeting of two consciousnesses produces 
not only a recognition of 'uniqueness and irreplaceability', but also a sense that I can 
never be in complete understanding of myself, as I cannot see myself as I am seen by 
the other. Thus in Bakhtin's later Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics, he would praise 
Dostoevsky's 'new authorial relationship to characters which respects the open- 
endedness of subjective consciousness' (Morris, Reader, p. 7). The step from 
ontological philosophy to Dostoevsky's literature is made because Bakhtin saw in the 
novel form an aesthetic environment in which the continual confrontation between 
self and other can be maintained and vocalised without dialogic cessation. By 
vocalising the multitude of internal and external narratives, and their interaction, the 
characters of fiction become defined more through the 'aesthetic event' of 
interdependence than through an isolated selL Thus on every level, Bakhtin denies 
solipsistic and self-reliant theories with the determination that artistic, linguistic, 
ethical and social consciousness only gains being through the encounter between two 
or more subjectivities. 
Rushdie's Midnight's Children is a novel consistent with this facet of 
Bakhtin's philosophy. The narrator of the novel, Saleem Sinai, is not a character who 
supports a subjectivity independent of his act of narration, but who is continually 
negotiating his own identity through interaction with the demands of others or the 
metaphors of nation. Saleern is visible to himself only amongst others. The 
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Scheherezade-like motivation to his reflections indicates that the existence of his 
narrative is continually fuelled by and supported by the listening ear. The most visible 
listening ear is Saleem's wife, Padma. Saleem initially presents Padma as the 'useful 
critic', 8 the face that looks over his shoulder and urges on the pace and direction of the 
narrative. Throughout the novel, Rushdie makes us aware that Padma is not simply an 
irritation or distraction for Saleem, but the other who contributes to the manner in 
which Saleem constructs his existence in narrative form. Padma's desire for linearity 
over the erraticisms of Saleem's writing style, affects the way he historicises himself 
and subsequently the way he expresses his own self-awareness: 
But here is Padma at my elbow, bullying me back into the world of linear narrative, the 
universe of what-happened-next: 'At this rate, ' Padma complains, 'you'll be two hundred years 
old before you manage to tell me about your birth. ' [ ... I Fighting down the proper pride of the 
successful story-teller, I attempt to educate her. 'Things - even people - have a way of leaking 
into each other, ' I explain, 'like flavours when you cook. Ilse Lubin's suicide, for example, 
leaked into old Aadam and sat there in a puddle until he saw God. Likewise, ' I intoned 
earnestly, 'the past has dripped into me ... so we can't ignore it. . .'[... ] 
... And certainly Padma is leaking into me. As history pours out of my fissured body, my lotus is quietly dripping in, with her down-to-earthery, and her paradoxical superstition, her 
contradictory love of the fabulous[. ] (Rushdie, Midnight, p. 38) 
Saleem sees Padma as part of a world of the more popular linear and sequential 
narrative; she is culturally visible to him in a way that she is not to herself Yet the 
collision between the two fictional strategies, I would suggest, does not produce a 
conflict of chronological techniques. Rather, what occurs is a meditation upon how 
individuals 'leak' into one another, how consciousness and identity shift when in the 
company of an alternative presence to one's own. Saleem, in comprehending Padma 
against the backdrop of 'what-happened-nextism' (Rushdie, Midnight, p. 39), expands 
his own narrative horizons through acceptance of social demand. The product of his 
interlocution with Padma is not the rigid separation of the narrative of fragments from 
the narrative of linearity. Rather, Saleem accepts the gift of heightened self- 
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understanding that Padma, gives and so returns his narrative to a pragmatic social 
foundation. Ultimately, Saleem realises that his narrative has to perform for others. 
The interaction between Saleem and Padma is redolent of Bakhtinian 
philosophy because of the way that Saleem, as in the influence of Ilse Lubin and 
Naseern Adiz on his grandfather Aadam, has a self composed through contact with 
another's world. Once that world is withdrawn, being starts to enter an unnatural and 
entropic condition. So when Padma temporarily leaves Saleern because of the clash 
between his obsessive writing and their conjugal sex life, he finds his physical and 
narrative existence threatened: 
It has been two whole days since Padma stormed out of my life. [. . .1A balance has been 
upset; I feel cracks widening down the length of my body; because suddenly I am alone, 
without my necessary car, and it isn't enough. 
[ ... I How to dispense with Padma? How give up her ignorance and superstition, necessary 
counterweights to my miracle-laden omniscience? How do without her paradoxical earthiness 
of spirit, which keeps - kept? - my feet on the ground? I have become, it seems to me, the 
apex of an isosceles triangle, supported equally by twin deities, the wild god of memory and 
the lotus-goddess of the present ... but must I now become reconciled to the narrow one- dimensionality of a straight line. (Rushdie, Midnight, p. 149-50) 
The ontological rift experienced by Saleem upon Padma's absence runs through both 
his physical body and his narrative confidence. Padma is 'necessary' because without 
an audience and interlocutor, Saleem loses the communicative rationale of any 
narrative act. 9 Not only that, but the nature of Padma's expectations and demands 
maintains Saleem's style and content within the broad social framework of Indian 
diversity, instead of descending into the 'one-dimensionality' of a non-dialogic 
presentation. Later in the novel, when Padma returns to Saleem, Saleem finds himself 
more and more dependent upon her approval as 'what actually happened is less 
important than what the author can manage to persuade his audience to believe' 
(Rushdie, Midnight, pp. 270-71). 
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Interpretations of Padma's role in Midnight's Children vary considerably, 
especially according to her perceived political comment. Timothy Brennan has argued 
that Padma is a figure of Indian authenticity, presenting 'popular aesthetics' as a 
counterbalance to Rushdie's excessive cosmopolitanism. ' 0 Alternatively, Nancy E. 
Batty's Padma has a potentially tyrannical function in her attempt to draw Saleem 
away from his constant deferrals and digressions, as Batty makes clear that Saleem's 
fragmented method is a way of showing up how power is wielded by the authors of 
social fictions. " Brennan's interpretation seems a little unwieldy for Midnight's 
Children, as he appears to see Rushdie on some kind of universal cataloguing project 
similar to Lifafa Das's claims for pan-Indian representations in his street side-show. 12 
Padma does expand the range of social reference in Saleem's narrative consciousness, 
yet her dialogic voice presents her as more than a mere token of cultural popularism. 
In particular, Padma urges the recognition that linearity and closure are essential when 
a narrative moves from solitary reflection to social communication. I would also argue 
against Batty's implicit suggestion that Padma's demands for linearity are opposed to 
Rushdie/Saleem's politically worthy deferrals. As I have argued throughout this 
thesis, the act of deferral is not necessarily the refusal to turn the Other into the Same. 
Dcfcrral can cqually bc the non-acccptancc of the social situatedness of a particular 
individual and the reality that they inhabit. Rushdie, however much he assaults 
metanarrative complacencies, insistently reinforces the fact that pluralism is a reality 
for some which others do not inhabit. Padma's role in Midnight's Children, I would 
suggest, is not to demonstrate the deficiency of linear narrative, but to show Saleern. in 
the specific fragmented social condition within which he lives. Returning to 
Bakhtinian language, Saleem faces Padma as one confronting a socially different 
other. This other then expands Saleem's consciousness of his strategies for 
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representing self-hood from the context of his own historical, economic and political 
location. 
Of course, Saleem's metaphoric identification with the experience of post- 
Independence India makes Midnight's Children more than an autobiographical fiction. 
Saleem's unique telepathic gift and, later, his emotionally sensitive sense of smell, 
bind him within the birth pangs and history of the Indian nation from the 
Independence Day celebrations, through conflicts such as the Sino-Indian. and Indo- 
Pakistani wars, into Indira Gandhi's state of emergency and subsequent sterilisation 
programme. The identification that Saleem makes between personal and national 
history is complete: 
Who what am I? My answer: I am the sum total of everything that went before me, of all I 
have been seen done, of everything done-to-me. I am everyone everything whose being-in-the- 
world affected was affected by mine. I am anything that happens after I've gone which would 
not have happened if I had not come. Nor am I particularly exceptional in this matter; each T, 
every one of the now-six-hundred-million-plus of us, contains a similar multitude. I repeat for 
the last time: to understand me, you'll have to swallow a world. (Rushdie, Midnight, p. 383) 
Speaking here after his forced sterilisation, Saleem seems to make claims of an almost 
messianic grandeur. Yet a closer look at this quotation subdues interpretations of any 
potential omniscience. Saleem. claims that he contains a 'world' because an identity is 
necessarily comprised of the people and events one absorbs in forming one's 
consciousness. Thus Saleem emphasises his lack of exceptionality, for each person of 
India has no identity apart from the 'multitude' he or she has encountered. 
In this light, Saleem's frequent claims that he has literally caused the traumatic 
events of Indian history are more understandable. His insistence on being linked to 
history 'both literally and metaphorically' (Rushdie, Midnight, p. 238), suggests 
history consists of not only what happens to us (the literal), but also of what narratives 
are devised to describe events and movements (the metaphorical). Saleem's 
'unreliable narration' clearly evokes the sense of our fictions, and the fictions of 
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others, closing the gap between the literal and the metaphorical by generating history 
in both its textual expression and its physical actuality (as a causal principle of future 
events). However, like Bakhtin's theory of the provenance of consciousness, Rushdie 
does not understand such history emerging from the product of a single mind, but 
from a radical encounter with others that changes the nature of our perceptions about 
self and world. Saleem's telepathic gift is an 'aesthetic event' through which he comes 
to a greatly enhanced awareness of the social and narrative differences of many other 
worlds: 
At one time I was a landlord in Uttar Pradesh, my belly rolling over my pajama-cord as I 
ordered serfs to set my surplus grain on fire ... at another moment I was starving to death in Orissa, where there was a food shortage as usual: I was two months old and my mother had run 
out of breast milk. I occupied, briefly, the mind of a Congress Party worker, bribing a village 
schoolteacher to throw his weight behind the party of Gandhi and Nehru in the coming election 
campaign; also the thoughts of a Keralan peasant who had decided to vote Communist. My 
daring grew: one afternoon I deliberately invaded the head of our own State Chief Minister, 
which was how I discovered, over twenty years before it became a national joke, that Morarji 
Desai 'took his own water' daily ... I was inside him, tasting the warmth as he gurgled down a frothing glass of urine. And finally I hit my highest point: I became Jawaharlal Nehru, Prime 
Minister and author of framed letters: I sat with the great man amongst a bunch of gaptoothcd, 
stragglebeard astrologers and adjusted the Five Year Plan to bring it into harmonic alignment 
with the music of the spheres ... (Rushdie, Midnight, p. 174) 
Saleem's inhabitation of various members of the Indian population seems to aim at a 
totally representative range of social incorporation, stretching as it does from the 
starving peasant to the Prime Minister. What is significant about this passage for my 
argument here, especially my relation of Rushdie's fiction to Bakhtinian theory, is that 
Rushdie's telepathic movement within the Indian people is a sociological journey that 
is as much about grounding individuals within real social and physical spaces, as it is 
about the narratives that they project about their reality. Just as BakhtinNoloshinov au 
rejected formalism, structuralism and psychoanalysis on the basis of their perceived 
distance from sociological engagement, 13 Rushdie veers away from reducing his 
telepathic hosts to narrative speculations by dwelling on their physical practices and 
concrete situations, such as the mother's lack of breast milk and the stomach-churning 
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description of Desai's drink of urine. Rushdie has the admirable ability to make the 
individual representative of social positions without losing his individuality or 
allowing his physical reality to be dispersed by his reflections upon narrativity. The 
multiple characters that Saleem encounters are always individuated by their particular 
social setting, and with each meeting between Saleern and the Other, there is an 
expansion of social comprehension as much as narratological questioning. Saleem 
proves Voloshinov/Bakhtin's contention that 'the individual consciousness is a socio- 
ideological fact' (Voloshinov/Bakhtin, Marxism, p. 12), purely by the distinction of his 
consciousness within an arena of many socio-ideological dialogues. In this sense, as 
we shall see, Rushdie begins to go against the grain of postmodemism by grounding 
dialogicity in social reality and not a primary alterity. 
Exploring the full possibilities of the term 'dialogue' in Bakhtinian theory, can 
further clarify Rushdie's relationship with social realism, and also start to expose the 
broader issue of Rushdie's ethical foundations and the significance of religion in the 
functioning of these foundations. For just as Bakhtin saw in the dialogic process an 
ethical content set against the tyranny of 'monologic' forms of discourse, so Rushdie 
hints at dialogue as a moral process grounded by a distinctive balance of social and 
spiritual awareness. 
Bakhtin and Voloshinov defined the dialogic as discourse taking place within 
the melting-pot of continual, never-ending sociological interaction. As we have 
already noted, Bakhtin considered Dostoevsky's literary characters as exemplary 
illustrations of this type of subjectiv'Ity and interactive consciousness: 
Dostoevsky portrayed not the life of an idea in an isolated consciousness, and not the 
interrelationship of ideas, but the interaction of consciousnesses. [. ] In Dostoevsky, 
consciousness never gravitates towards itself but is always found in intense relationship with 
another consciousness. Every experience, every thought of a character is internally dialogic, 
adorned with polemic, filled with struggle. [. ] It could be said that Dostoevsky offers, in 
artistic form, something like a sociology of consciousness. [ ... ] 
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Every thought of Dostoevsky's heroes (the Underground Man, Raskolnikov, Ivan, and 
others) senses itself to be from the very beginning a rejoinder in an unfinished dialogue. Such 
thought is not impelled towards a well-rounded, finalized systematically monologic whole. It 
lives a tense life on the borders of someone else's thought, someone else's consciousness. 
(Bakhtin, Problems, p. 32) 
The 'sociology of consciousness' which Bakhtin observes in Dostoevsky's fiction 
originates in the perception that meaning is an infinitely interactive dialogue between 
individuals, that prohibits the conceptual freeze of a 'systematically monologic 
whole'. Existing in 'a tense life on the borders of someone else's thought, dialogic 
discourse is the meeting ground for multifarious strands of social meaning which 
merge into new directions and modify individual consciousnesses. The never-ending 
futurity of this process is not a problem for Bakhtin. Rather, he understands 
dialogicity as a security against 'unitary perceptions of truth' (Morris, Reader, p. 15). 
So in his essay 'Discourse in the Novel', Bakhtin coins the now much used term 
'heteroglossia' to label language as multiple, shifting ideological currents that disperse 
the attempt to imprison meaning within single codes and which ensure 'the possibility 
of a free consciousness' (Morris, Reader, p. 16). 14 It should be noted that Bakhtin is 
arguing for dialogicity not as a practical alternative to monologic discourse, but as the 
condition of language itself; monologic discourse is simply the erroneous and 
imperious quest to stop dialogic movement. 
Midnight's Children is a novel whose fabric is woven into fundamentally 
dialogic patterns of narrative content and form. Indeed, all Rushdie's novels play 
amongst a plenitude of 'possible worlds', mixing genres, languages, religions, 
geographies and political creeds into a mishmash of interactive elements in which no 
one voice reaches a privileged authority. Saleem Sinai's very identity is dialogic. 15 
Even as a child, especially because of the propitious moment of his birth, Saleem is 
enveloped by a vigorous debate concerning the significance of his presence: 
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Even a baby is faced with the problem of defining itself, and I'm bound to say that my early 
popularity had its problematic aspects, because I was bombarded with a confusing multiplicity 
of views on the subject, being a Blessed One to a guru under a tap, a voyeur to Lila Sabarmati, 
in the eyes of Nussie-the-duck I was a rival, and a more successful rival to her own Sonny 
(although, to her credit, she never showed her resentment, and asked to borrow me just like 
everyone else); to my two-headed mother I was all kinds of babyish things - they called me joono-moono, and putch-putch, and little-piece-of-thc-moon. (Rushdie, Midnight, p. 130) 
Saleem. is not a still point at the centre of this confusing array of attempts at derinition. 
Rather, Saleern is a dialogic site, a container for a 'confusing multiplicity of views' 
that are in a mutable relationship with one another. Adulthood provides no diminution 
of Saleem's ontological debate, as the number of personalities within him expands 
with each newly introduced dialogic element. Even his name ceases to be a monologic 
source of reference detached from dialogic activity: 
Our names contain our fates; living as we do in a place where names have not acquired the 
meaninglessness of the West, and are still more than mere sounds, we are also victims of our 
titles. Sinai contains Ibn Sina, master magician, Sufi adept; and also Sin the moon, the ancient 
god of Hadramaut, with his own mode of connection, his powers of action-at-a-distance upon 
the tides of the world. But Sin is also the letter S, as sinuous as a snake; serpents lie coiled 
within the name. And there is also the accident of transliteration - Sinai, when in Roman 
script, though not in Nastaliq, is also the name of the place-of-rcvclation, of put-off-thy-shoes, 
of commandments and golden calves; but when all that is said and done; when Ibn Sinai is 
forgotten and the moon has set; when snakes lie hidden and revelations end, it is the name of 
the desert - of barrenness, infertility, dust; the name of the end. (Rushdie, Midnight, p. 305) 
Postmodernists and deconstructionists may see in this passage a formal confirmation 
of the inclusion of Midnight's Children into the category of the postmodem, an 
inclusion supported elsewhere by Rushdie's statement of theoretical empathy with the 
likes of Lyotard, Rorty and Foucault. 16 Saleem's exposition of the various potential 
meanings in his name suggests an allegiance with deconstruction's insistence on the 
loss of a permanent, metaphysical signified. Saleem's name, and identity, shifts 
amongst a plethora of cultural and linguistic material that would find its only cessation 
in death, the desert. By implication, it is in the monological conclusion of 
epistemological mutability that life is negated, life both real and metaphorical. Thus 
when Saleern is concussed by the silver spittoon during the bombing of Pakistan, the 
subsequent loss of all previous history and influences and his restoration 'to innocence 
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and purity' (Rushdie, Midnight's Children, p. 343) results in his becoming the 
unthinking Buddha and the human tracker for the persecution units of West Pakistan. 
It would seem that Rushdie fears conclusion and the absence of mutability bccause of 
the physical and ontological violence implicit in metanarrative philosophy. 
And yet, despite Rushdie's evident promotion of pluralism, I do not concede 
that this makes him classifiable as a postmodernist writer. I return to my argument that 
Rushdie's compatibility with Bakhtin's theory of the self and the dialogic has little to 
do with postmodernism. As should have become apparent by my insistence on 
Rushdie and Bakhtin as sociological writers, the key difference between Bakhtin's 
dialogic and postmodern deconstruction is that Bakhtin does not relinquish the 
acceptance of determinable presence and social reality, even though those meanings 
and realities are mutable. The sociological grounding of Bakhtin's theories results in 
an understanding of meaning as a communal product which lays a genuine claim to 
reality within the 'normative' elements of a community group: 
Each individual creative act, each utterance, is idiosyncratic and unique, but each utterance 
contains elements identical with elements in other utterances of the given speech group. And it 
is precisely these factors - the phonetic, grammatical, and lexical factors that are identical and 
therefore normative for all utterances - that insure the unity of a given language and its 
comprehension by all the members of a given community (Voloshinov/Bakhtin, Marxism, 
from Morris, Reader, pp. 26-7) 
Though Voloshinov/Bakhtin may be rather overstating the case when insisting on an 
'identical' and 'normative' core to speech, their argument is valuable on two counts. 
Firstly, linguistic meaning is rooted in the social experience of a particular 
community; it is not free-floating or absent. Secondly, the dialogic is compatible with 
'the unity of a given language and its comprehension by all the members' because 
meaning mutates in accordance with contextual/linguistic shifts in the actual life of 
that community. Thus meaning remains in connection with a reality comprised of both 
individual perception and sociological condition. Katerina Clark and Michael Holquist 
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argue that it is Bakhtin's firm grip on the social that contrasts him with the 
deconstructionist: 
A close bond exists between the sense that I have of myself as a unique being and the being of 
my language. This view, with its heavy investment in the personhood of individuals, is deeply 
implicated in the Western humanist tradition. It is at the opposite pole from another current 
view of language, called 'Deconstructionist, ' which holds that no one owns meaning. The very 
conception of meaning, to say nothing of persons, invoked in traditional epistemologies begins 
by illicitly assuming a presence, whose end Nietzsche announced when he let it be known that 
God had died in history. Bakhtin holds the contrary view that 'we own meaning, ' or if we do 
not own it, we may at least rent meaning. Pcrsonalists maintain that the source of meaning is in 
the unique individual. Dcconstructionists locate meaning in the structure of the general 
possibility of difference underlying all particular differences. Bakhtin roots meaning in the 
social[j 17 
Clark and Holquist distinguish Bakhtin from deconstruction through the issue of the 
ownership of meaning. Bakhtin suggests that we possess, or 'rent', meaning, because 
the fact that we forge linguistic cohesion in a socio-ideological community means that 
our sense of meaning has a purchase in the reality of our social context. This meaning 
is in a constant dialogic flux, but the debate will always move in relation to the social 
foundation or the physical consequences of altering that foundation. " The virtue of 
Bakhtin's theory is that it manages to admit pluralism and flux without consigning 
meaning to infinite play, absence or trace. Meaning and reality are very much 
presences in Bakhtin's work alongside an implicit urging of the reader to embrace this 
fact and look upon the dialogic as a perspective through which to recreate the world. 19 
From being a process, dialogism becomes an attitude that responds to all utterances as 
moments of social importance, even as it cautions against the 'monologic' word. 
Rushdie fits into this scheme in several distinct ways. Whereas postmodernism 
in a sense pre-judges multiple perspectives on reality as indicating the absence of sure 
meaning, Rushdie seems more intent on showing the concreteness of different realities 
in their social and narrative context. 20 As we saw with Saleem's telepathic 
inhabitations, each individual reality was linked to definite relations of power, social 
positioning and cultural inheritance. While Rushdie does expose the way that 
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ideologies and mythologies shift and change, he equally demonstrates that these shifts 
are located in some externality and cultural locale. This is acutely evident in Salccm's 
frustrated attempts to organise the Midnight Children's Conference into a unified 
body. The more Saleern seeks a common purpose out of the MCC, the more he is 
confronted by incompatible voices that speak from different communal realities: 
[Almong the philosophies and aims suggested were collectivism - 'We should all get 
together and live somewhere, no? What would we need from anyone else? ' - and 
individualism - 'You say we; but we together are unimportant; what matters is that each of us 
has a gift to use for his or her own good' - filial duty - 'However we can help our father- 
mother, that is what it is for us to do' - and infant revolution - 'Now at last we must show 
all kids that it is possible to get rid of parents! ' - capitalism - 'Just think what business we 
could do! How rich, Allah, we could be! ' (Rushdie, Midnight, p. 228) 
The list of alternatives for the Midnight's Children goes on until they become, in 
Saleem's words, 'the essence of multiplicity' (Rushdie, Midnight, p. 229). From this 
blurring into a representation of pluralism I would not argue, however, that Rushdie 
consigns the MCC to the postmodern condition. By making the connection between 
individual voices and their representative schools of thought, Rushdie extends beyond 
the individual to the communal context. It is precisely because of the ideological 
context, because the voices already have social/philosophical locations, that the MCC 
struggles for unity; its dialogic activity must negotiate distinct socio-economic roots. 
Rushdie seems to be saying that reality does not go away just because some of us 
recognise many versions of it. Hence Saleem can never escape participation in 
political violence or national conflict, because his perceptions are always in dialogue 
with those of others who perpetrate such terror and dissension. More than anything, 
Rushdie indicates that no man is an island. 
What is the message that emerges from Saleem's fragmented, comprehensive 
and disorganised narrative? Taking a negative perspective, one could read Midnight's 
Children as the inevitable failure of a secular, pluralistic project in the Indian 
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subcontinent because of incommensurable political, religious and social realities. The 
character of Shiva would be the most memorable figurehead of this reading, denying 
as he does the existence of any 'third principle' above 'money-and-poverty, and have- 
and-lack, and right and left' (Rushdie, Midnight, p. 255). In this dualistic world, all 
that exists is a conflictual and Darwinistic state of affairs that swamps the weaker 
voices of moderation and tolerance with the voices of the powerful. Bakhtin himself, 
for all his optimistic attitude towards dialogism, understood that power and hierarchy 
drew forth very present dangers in the transfer of communication and meaning. 21 Yet 
there is another way of reading the novel. Bakhtin's reasons for celebrating dialogism 
centred upon two factors: 1) human beings can take a certain responsibility for 
constructing society because meaning is produced somewhere between social 
conditions and individual creativity; and 2) the acceptance of heteroglossia as opposed 
to monologic systems of meaning produces 'the conditions for the possibility of a free 
consciousness' (Morris, Reader, p. 16). Both of these benefits result from the dialogic 
liberation from ideological slavery. Several critics have, with some justification, 
pointed to such arguments as recklessly optimistic, even naive. 22 However, moving 
my argument on somewhat, such social sanguinity has a peculiar relevance to what 
can be seen as the ethical politics motivating Rushdie's work, a politics that makes 
some surprising engagements with the language of faith. 
Rushdie's transcendent aesthetic 
In his essay 'Is Nothing Sacred', Rushdie embarks on a quest to achieve what he terms 
ga secular definition of transcendence', a quest motivated by speculation on whether 
art can act as 'the third principle between the material and spiritual worlds' (Rushdie, 
Homelands, P. 420). His answer to this speculation is an emphatic 'yes', and he 
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proceeds to give a quite mystical clarification of what he understands as constituting 
the transcendent: 
What I mean by transcendence is that flight of the human spirit outside the confines of its 
material, physical existence which all of us, secular or religious, experience on at least a few 
occasions. Birth is a moment of transcendence which we spend our lives trying to understand. 
The exaltation of the act of love, the experience of joy and very possibly the moment of death 
are other such moments. The soaring quality of transcendence, the sense of being more than 
oneself, of being in some way joined to the whole of life, is by its nature short-lived. Not even 
the visionary or mystical experience lasts very long. It is for art to capture that experience, to 
offer it to, in the case of literature, its readers; to be, for a sccular, materialist culture, some 
sort of replacement for what the love of god offers in the world of faith. (Rushdie, Homelands, 
p. 421) 
This little quoted passage contains ideas that could question either wholly or in part 
much of the content of Rushdie criticism, and also forge an important link with the 
Bakhtinian optimism which we have just noted. Rushdie describes the capacity for 
the 'human spirit' to momentarily lift out of the immediate experiential context in a 
holistic epiphany of the nature of life and being. Rushdie does not argue, like Bakhtin, 
that a person can attain a tot ally free consciousness; he has too firm a grip on the 
manifestations of cultural coercion to go that far. Yet Rushdie's vision of the role of 
art as the preserver of the transcendent experience has interesting connections with 
that liberating goal of Bakhtinian dialogism. 
Bakhtin sees the dialogic, of which art (particularly the novel) is the most 
prominent medium, as leading to liberation from monologism. This liberation consists 
in being able to possess the process of meaning and somehow raise oneself above the 
snares of ideological imprisonment. Like Rushdie in the quotation above, Bakhtin 
presumes that human beings can partly or temporarily detach themselves from their 
environment and somehow see the whole of a landscape instead of the part which they 
immediately inhabit. I would suggest that Midnight's Children and the majority of 
Rushdie's work contains an excessive dialogical element as a way of reproducing this 
transcendent experience while remaining attached to social realities. The dialogic 
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interaction taking place within Saleem Sinai enables him, and us as readers, to 
experience the 'freedom' of seeing the social constructs that comprise the Indian 
subcontinent. Rushdie and Bakhtin share the attempt to provide a vantage point over 
monological narratives and, by implication, draw the reader into a detached ethical 
consciousness of ideology and power. Both Bakhtin and Rushdie cling closely to 
social realities, but they also attempt to show that being aware of dialogicity produces 
a liberty to discover the fullness of oneself as a human being and the capacity to 
generate more humane systems of meaning. Of course, this is a position fraught with 
dangers, and Rushdie makes clear how easy it is to construct one's own monologisms 
or be 'trampled' into 'specks of voiceless dust' (Rushdie, Wdght, p. 463). But 
always at the heart of Rushdie's fiction is the sense that the permission to speak and 
the acceptance of dialogic identity and politics is a definite hope for valuing 
individuality and generating acceptance. This blend of social realism and human 
creativity, of multiple voices and overarching metanarratives, is a much more 
convincing fictional strategy than the abstract encounter with otherness, not least for 
the fact that Rushdie maintains our responsibility to concrete situations. Other 
postmodern writers, as we have seen, can lead us away from the confidence in 
meaning and presence and place us in a thematic wilderness of mystical non-action. 
Rushdie, though engaging centraUy with the theme of religious belief, does not draw 
us into a vague negative mysticism. It is to the whole debate of Rushdie's exposition of 
religion in Yhe Satanic Verses that I shall turn now. For I would argue that 
Rushdie does not set up reh ion to be simply knocked down by a secular aggression 91 
towards metaphysical narratives - my argument is almost the opposite of that. In 
Rushdie's fictional worlds, religion not only exercises massive psychological 
magnetism, but it is also essential in evoking his transcendent aesthetics, revaluing 
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ideas of human spirituality, and developing non-secular resistances to authoritarian 
and oppressive architectures of language. 
The Satanic Verses and the politics of faith 
The Satanic Verses is now Rushdie's most famous novel, though unfortunately not 
primarily because of its literary merit. The violent reception of the book by large 
sections of the international Muslim community, fuelled a turbulent debate on the 
relationship between literary representation and social interpretation, especially on the 
possibilities of discourse between apparently incommensurable value systems. 23 
Amongst the many things swept to one side in the furore was what I shall go on to 
describe as the spiritual politics of Rushdie's work. For it is my argument that far 
from simply parodying religion's social and theological expressions, The Satanic 
Verses is a novel that also advocates spirituality as an essential factor in a humane 
ethics and an important corrective to the don-ýination of secular materialism. Granted, 
Rushdie is no writer of religious orthodoxy. But, as his public conversion to Islam 
24 
indicates , the world of 
faith holds a powerful draw on Rushdie that emerges through 
a peculiar and invigorating blend of the sacred and the secular. 
Prior to his 1990 conversion to a certain level of Muslim orthodoxy, Rushdie 
balanced his non-religious position with a firm scepticism towards any theory that 
sought to sound the death knell of the divine. Returning to his essay 'Is Nothing 
Sacred', we see Rushdie countering William H. Gass's unrepresentative and smug 
exposition on the finality of God's demise with a broadening of cultural perspective: 
I have some difficulty with the uncompromising bluntness of this obituary notice. It has always 
been clear to me that god is unlike human beings in that it can die, so to speak, in parts. In 
other parts, for example India, God continues to flourish, in literally thousands of forms. So 
that if I speak of living after his death, I am speaking in a limited, personal sense[j (Rushdie, 
Homelands, p. 417) 
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We have already witnessed the way that Rushdie insists on situating ideology within 
cultural realities, and here we see him firmly relativise his own lack of religious faith 
with the reality of the divine for large sections of the world's population. To say that 
God is dead, Rushdie seems to argue, can repeat the intellectually patronising attitude 
of imperialism by judging the reality of others as of a somehow rationally substandard 
quality. However, Rushdie goes much further than just saying that the author of 
fiction must be capable offaithfully representing the world of the believer. Later in the 
essay, Rushdie develops a series of aesthetic ideas which not only misalign him with 
postmodem ideas, but also distinguish him from those writers whose metaphysical 
imagery, as we have seen, results in a distancing from adequate social representation 
and an unwitting advocacy of capitalist materialism. 
Much of 'Is Nothing Sacred' develops an impassioned statement of the 
democratic function of the novel, after which Rushdie briefly engages with the literary 
theory of Carlos Fuentes. It is here that Rushdie touches upon the deepest sentiments 
of his own literary practice. For Fuentes, says Rushdie: 
poses the question I have been asking myself throughout my life as a writer: Can the religious 
mentality survive outside of religious dogma and hierarchy? Which is to say: Can art be the 
third principle that mediates between the spiritual and the material worlds; might it, by 
'swallowing' both worlds, offer us something new-something that might even be called a 
secular definition of transcendence? 
I believe it can. I believe it must. And I believe that, at its best, it does. (Rushdie, 
Homelands, p. 420) 
The two poles of Rushdie's theory are 'the spiritual and material worlds', poles which 
become hegemonic and oppressive if they become absolutes within themselves. 
instead, Rushdie desires a 'third principle' to provide what is in effect a synthetic 
middle, able to regulate the dialogic interaction between the oppositions of the 
physical and metaphysical. This middle, this zone of dialogic moderation, Rushdie 
labels the 'religious mentality', which is, as we have seen, a mentality that seeks 
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through such things as art and literature an encounter with transcendence. Yet this 
transcendence is not simply a momentary step outside of experiential consciousness. 
Rushdie's reference to the transcendent as 'some sort of replacement for what the love 
of god offers in the world of faith' (Rushdie, Hoinelands, p. 421), suggests it is more 
than psychological illumination. The love of god tends to represent, for the believer, a 
redemptive possibility (or promise) and a non-material context for the interpretation of 
the traumas and joys of existence. Rushdie's wholly un-postmodern 'transcendence' 
is a move 'beyond dogma' into a place where the full content of human personality 
has the room to move and question itself partially outside of its context and thus, like 
Bakhtin's 'free consciousness', is able to attain a manner of redemption from 
monologic slavery. It is vital to a sound interpretation of Rushdie's work to bring this 
spiritual aspiration into the critical equation and to realise that for Rushdie, religion 
gestures towards essential principles of human contentment and self-comprehension. 
Just how essential can be seen in Rushdie's following valuation of historical religion: 
It is important that we understand how profoundly we all feel the needs that religion, down the 
ages, has satisfied. I would suggest that these needs are of three types: firstly, the need to be 
given an articulation of our half-glimpsed knowledge of exaltation, of awe, of wonder; life is 
an awesome experience, and religion helps us understand why life so often makes us feel 
small, by telling us what we are smaller than; and contrariwise, because we also have a sense 
of being special, of being chosen, religion helps us by telling us what we have been chosen by, 
and what for. Secondly, we need answers to the unanswerable: How did we get here? How did 
'here' get here in the first place? Is this, this brief life, all there is? How can it be? What would 
be the point of that? And thirdly, we need codes to live by, 'rules for every damn thing. The 
idea of god is at once a repository for our awestruck wonderment at life and an answer to the 
great questions of existence, and rule book, too. The soul needs all these explanations - not 
simply rational explanations, but explanations of the heart. (Rushdie, Homelands, p. 421) 
The sermonic overtones of this passage help us to contextpalise Rushdie's later 
spiritual conversion. Yet apart from filling out a chronology of Rushdie's religious 
life, this passage presents several themes vital to the exposition of his work. For 
Rushdie, the 'religious mentality', the 'third principle' and the 'transcendent', all 
seem to denote a desire to preserve human experience as an irreducible quality by 
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accepting the partial ability to question life from outside its material surroundings. 
Religious sentiment, Rushdie explains, already has the philosophical vehicle for 
making this step. Furthermore, Rushdie argues that 'rational explanations', the 
explanations that Rushdie appears to group with 'secular materialism', are inadequate 
by themselves. On the foundation of these contentions, Rushdie's literary project 
appears to be not the rejection of materialism or metaphysics, but the attempt to 
capture the humanistic elements of religion in a principle that ethically and 
aesthetically mediates between the physical and the spiritual. Thus when Rushdie 
refers to 'people's spiritual needs' (Rushdie, Homelands, p. 422), he turns attention 
towards abstract human requirements that only a certain kind of religiosity can satisfy. 
Postmodemism itself has attempted to provide this religiosity in its language of 
sublimity and negation. In so doing, postmodernism builds its project upon 
metaphysics, though its insistence on indeterminacy and deferral has made a 
metaphysics of limited options when it comes to matters of social interpretation. 
With Rushdie the social possibilities are somewhat broader. I am not claiming 
that Rushdie advocates the primacy of the metaphysical over the physical. I am 
suggesting though, that metaphysics and materialism are equal bedfellows in 
Rushdie's ethical and political strategies and he seems to feel that each must be 
present to assure an ethical mode of dialogue that blends the social with the 
individual. Rushdie's search for a religious mentality 'beyond dogma' in his fiction, is 
an attempt to find a politics of human spirituality in which the transcendent becomes a 
corrective balance to the monologic qualities of secular materialism. In The Satanic 
Verses, we will see Rushdie's most determined creative visualisation of these dialogic 
ground rules. For alongside a genuine critique of religious intolerance, Rushdie uses 
the Islamic faith to demonstrate the ethical transcendent within material history. 
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A common critical opinion of The Satanic Verses is that it is a novcl that 
wrenches the sacred into the secular. A very partial selection from Rushdie's critical 
essays would ostensibly provide some first-hand evidence to support this opinion, 
though Rushdie's statements of his secular location are usually followed by 
assurances that The Satanic Verses 'is by no means always hostile to faith' (Rushdie, 
Homelands, p. 396). All too often, The Satanic Verses is cast as a novel that has 
moved away from the possibility of faith in a secular world. Opinions as to the level 
of commitment to secularism vary. Stephanie Newell sees The Satanic Verses as 'a 
secularised version of Islam' that deconstructs all tropes of omniscience, whatever 
their bias. 25 Timothy Brennan argues that giving a critical priority to the Islamic theme 
in The Satanic Verses is somewhat misplaced, because the novel is actually more 
concerned with the conditions of secular England than with theological ruminations. 26 
At the extremity of opinion about Rushdie's secular credentials is Pierre Franqois 
(whom I will examine later in more detail), who theorises The Satanic Verses as 
Rushdie's almost hateful rejection of religious transcendence and equally vigorous 
espousal of a materialist philosophy. 27 
I would argue that situating Rushdie purely within a secular outlook is a 
mistake of some breadth, not only because of Rushdie's suspicion of secular versions 
of reality, but also because of his empathy with theological transcendence as a way of 
reaffirming individualistic politics. In a recent discussion, Rushdie is very clear about 
his position on secularism when questioned whether he envisaged the possibility of 
secular Islamic states: 
First of all, can I say I don't think secularism is any kind of magic wand. I think there are 
examples right now of the failure of secularism. I think one of the places you could point to is 
Algeria. It's possible to say that the reason why people went rushing towards the FIS was 
because of the bankruptcy and corruption and failure of the old secularist ruling classes. So, I 
don't see it as some kind of automatic good, because there are plenty of secular societies 
which are corrupt and immoral. 28 
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Rushdie is keen to distance himself from an automatic allegiance to the secular by 
illustrating how it shares the same vulnerabilities of any system of social organisation. 
Rather than targeting a specific object for vilification, Rushdie seems to operate a 
critical principle of exposing any system, religious or secular, that operates through 
unjust or oppressive hegemonies. Thus religion is by no means the primary object of 
Rushdie's dissent, as he makes clear in an interview for Channel Four's Bandung File: 
It seems to me completely legitimate that there should be dissent from orthodoxy, not just 
about Islam, but about anything - from Conservative politics, that's a kind of orthodoxy under 
which we all live at the moment, it's important that there should be dissent from that. If radical 
politics were the orthodoxy in this country I think it would be important that there should be 
dissent from that too. (Appignanesi and Maitland, Rushdie File, p. 29) 
Rushdie's advocacy of a critical politics is non-exclusive; all social phenomena come 
under its remit. This simple point is important because it exempts religion from being 
the centre at which Rushdie fires all his critical arrows. More particularly, we can start 
to free Rushdie's treatment of faith from being emblematic only of totalisation. As I 
shall now argue, the representation of Islam in The Satanic Verses is as much about 
celebrating religious/humanistic transcendence (defined according to Rushdie's terms) 
as it is about a Foucauldian stripping away of the media of power. 
Before turning to such positive elements of Rushdie's religiosity, 
acknowledgement must be given to what cautions, concerns and protests Rushdie does 
level against spiritual ideologies and theocratic societies. By historicising the genesis 
and early days of the Islamic faith in The Satanic Verses, Rushdie is able to depict the 
passage that religion can take from an individualistic, experimental spirituality 
interacting with its environment, to a theological monolith that stifles creativity and 
plurality. In a broad reflection upon theocratic nations, The Satanic Verses shows the 
suppressions that can become endemic when church and state form an imperious One. 
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Through the world of Gibreel Farishta's dreams, we are treated to a replaying 
of Muharnmed's receipt of the divine revelation through the Archangel Gibrecl. About 
the status of this dream-history I shall say more later, but Rushdie clearly passes 
thematic comment upon the way that the incipient Islam expands to exercise an all- 
pervasive repressive influence. We are first introduced to the figure of Mahound as 
the leader of a small and alienated religious group in the city of Jahilia, the city's 
name meaning the ignorance of the pre-Islan-& period as defined by Muslim theology. 
Mahound is intent on converting Jahilia from its polytheistic brand of religion to the 
monotheistic worship of Allah, an intention that brings him into friction with Abu 
Simel, the Grandee of Jahilia, who considers the adaptability of polytheism as much 
more conducive to State survival and social contentment. Though the political 
ruthlessness of Abu Simel generates little endearment to his ideology, his fears of 
Mahound's growing significance are sympathetically echoed within the politics of the 
novel. When the State poet, Baal, attempts to reassure Abu Simel of Mahound's 
insignificant following, the Grandee is little comforted: 
No, Abu Simel reflects, the boy Baal was wrong, these men are worth our time. Why do I fear 
Mahound? For that: one, one, one, his terrifying singularity. Whereas I am always divided, 
always two or three or fifteen. [ ... I IVhat kind of idea am PI bend. I sway. I calculate the 
odds, trim my sails, manipulate, survive. 29 
Mat kind of idea am I? This question, either literally or implicitly, is the novel's key 
refrain. For Abu Simel, it is the monologic focus of Mahound's beliefs that he finds so 
disturbing, the way that malleability becomes anathema and that change according to 
fortune is prohibited. Abu Simel's strength is located in his recognition of historical 
temporality and local contrast, and as such he is able to be 'divided' amongst multiple 
personalities and needs. Alternatively, Mahound's strength is in his (initially only 
perceived) permanence and his restrictions upon diversity and change. Mahound's 
religion is in direct contrast to Rushdie's recommended 'theology of doubt' 
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(Appignanesi and Maitland, Rushdie File, p. 29), as it disallows the presence of 
questioning and open difference. We can thus say that Rushdie sees a psychological 
limitation and ideological violence inherent in religious fundamentalism. Such 
potentials are clearly represented in the figure of the Iman, an exiled ruler from the 
Middle East who, while living out his exile in contemporary London, dreams of 
returning and imposing the tight boundaries of Islamic rule. The Iman espouses a 
vitriolic hatred of temporality and history, instead eulogising the static 
commandments of Koranic revelation: 
History is the blood-wine that must no longer be drunk. History the intoxicant, the creation and 
possession of the Devil, of the great Shaitan, the greatest of the lics - progress, science, rights 
- against which the Iman has set his face. History is a deviation from the Path, knowledge is a 
delusion, because the sum of knowledge was complete on the day Allah finished his revelation 
to Mahound. 
(Rushdie, Verses, p. 210) 
The bedevilled history against which the Iman is implacably opposed represents in his 
eyes the denial of the complete and eternal Word of God. Conceptual foundations of 
the West - 'progress, science, rights' - mean nothing to the Iman except corruption 
and ephemerality. 
Under the shadow of fundamentalism, The Satanic Verses reconstructs the 
origins of Koranic revelation, if only through the dream landscapes of Gibreel Farishta 
as he pursues his delusional life in the English capital. Through this reimagining of 
Islamic history, Rushdie unsettles the notions of scriptural permanence implicit in 
some, but not all, Muslim theologies. For Mahound's handling of the early revelations 
from Gibreel is beset by vacillations over the correspondence between his revelatory 
material and his desired social effect, especially in his ambiguous rationalisation of 
the Satanic Verses themselves. These verses, which proclaim the inclusion of three 
female deities from Jahilia in an Islamic pantheon, are accepted then later rejected as 
proceeding from Satan rather than Allah. Mahound's internal debates, leading up to 
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the initial public affirmation of the verses, disrupt the assurance in divine, infallible 
truth when the time, place and society of Jahilia intrude into Mahound's deliberations. 
Lat, Manat, Uzza ... can I call them angelic? Gibreel, have you got sisters? Are these the daughters of God? And he castigates himself, 0 my vanity, I am an arrogant man, is this 
weakness, is it just a dream of power? Must I betray myself for a seat on the council? Is this 
sensible and wise or is it hollow and self-loving? I don't even know if the Grandec is sincere. 
Does he know? Perhaps not even he. I am weak and he's strong, the offer gives him many 
ways of ruining me. But 1, too, have much to gain. The souls of the city, of the world, surely 
they are worth three angels? Is Allah so unbending that he will not embrace three more to save 
the human race? -I don't know anything. - Should God be proud or humble, majestic or 
simple, yielding or un-? What kind of idea is he? What kind ani I? (Rushdie, Verses, p. I 11) 
At this moment when God's identity seems suspended and obscured, when Mahound 
attempts to balance practical social conditions with his religious message, the dangers 
of authoritarian and repressive narratives are somewhat refused by the mixing of 
human doubts with spiritual concerns. The value of this moment is that unlike the 
Iman's desire to purge history from religion, here Mahound's faith is intricately 
intertwined with historical conditions. Owing to such a positioning, Mahound's 
consciousness is circumspect and self-conscious, considering his own location in 
relation to others as an important part of the spiritual equation. The same effect is 
achieved when the scribe Salman later slips his own variations into Mahound's 
dictation of the Koran, variations which go unnoticed for some time. By destabilising 
the Word through words and placing it in an ambiguous status between God and man, 
the novel seeks to relocate religious sentiments and revelations beyond the autocratic 
and atemporal. The consequences of failure to achieve this condition are most visibly 
depicted in Mahound's later return to Jahilia in 'the Name of the Most High, the 
Destroyer of Men' (Rushdie, Verses, p-373). The effect on Jahilia, usually a place of 
vital, interactive commerce, is one of dreadful psychological austerity: 
The city of Jahilia was no longer built of sand. That is to say, the passage of the years, the 
sorcery of the desert wind, the petrifying moon, the forgetfulness of the people and the 
inevitability of a process had hardened the town, so that it had lost its old, shifting, provisional 
quality of a mirage in which men could live, and become a prosaic place, quotidian and (like 
its poets) poor. Mahound's arm had grown long; his power had encircled Jahilia, cutting of its 
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life blood, its pilgrims and caravans. The fairs of Jahilia, these days, were pitiful to behold. 
(Rushdie, Verses, pp. 259-60) 
The monologic theology eventually adopted by Mahound operates through a severe 
limitation of cultural diversity. The carnivalesque and fluid nature of Jahilia's social 
and commercial life grinds to a halt under the imposition of a dogma that disallows 
ideologies not aligned with the fundamentalist crced. Rushdie's emphasis on the 
crushing effects of the 'prosaic' and 'quotidian' explains the authoritarian 
metanarrative as a clamp upon the imaginative faculties and, by implication, social 
creativity and liberty. 
So Rushdie's warning about fundamentalist religion is emphatic: once 
revelation is detached from the uncertainties of its human origins, then it becomes a 
monologic repression that negates plurality and mutability. Yet from this warning we 
must be cautious about establishing general relations between Rushdie's strategies of 
literary disruption and his overall perspective on religion. On such critic who makes 
this mistake on an impressive scale is Pierre Franqois in his essay 'Salman Rushdie's 
Philosophical Materialism in The Satanic Verses'. Associating himself, and Rushdie, 
with a tradition of materialist philosophers such as Feuerbach, Comte and Sponville, 
Frangois argues that The Satanic Verses sets up a dialectical process in which the 
material clashes with the spiritual before finally triumphing in the last chapter when 
Saladin Chamcha is reunited with his father and native India, and when the neurotic 
and fragmented Gibreel Farishta commits suicide. 
My contention is that 'counterpoint' is a structural scaffolding erected by Rushdie to, 
ironically, bolster up an idealist line of thought which he detests, whilst 'dialectic' is his 
material-grounded device for, first undermining idealism (in the first eight chapters) and, 
secondly, expunging it (in chapter 9) from the novel's fabric. (Franqois, 'Materialism', p. 305) 
Frangois' application of the dialectic is almost the exact opposite to my claims for it in 
this chapter. Whereas I argue for the dialectic as Rushdie's means of engendering a 
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humanistic 'transcendent' between the material and the spiritual, Franqois sees the 
dialectic as relentlessly moving towards the eradication of faith and idealism. 
Frangois cites as proof for his argument the episode in the novel where the 
orphan girl Ayesha leads a group of pilgrims towards Mecca, a pilgrimage that 
terminates in the drowning of the faithful after they walk into the Red Sea believing 
that it will part for them. For Franqois, this act is Rushdie's expos6 of religion's 
delusional mind set and of a certain psychology that involves a 'withdrawal from life 
into dreams of liberating death' (Frangois, 'Materialism, p. 313). Yet with some close 
examination of the episode in question, Franqois' argument seems erroneous in the 
extreme. Far from exemplifying a dialectic 'God-bashing' (Frangois, 'Materialism', 
p. 318), the depiction of Ayesha's pilgrimage seems to be more involved in cautioning 
against an over-materialist interpretation of events. A key moment comes after the 
pilgrims have drowned themselves and detectives are sent in to unpack the sequence 
of events and reduce that sequence to a forensic explanation. Yet however materially 
conclusive the physical evidence seems to be, the detectives are still disquieted by the 
testimony of the few surviving pilgrims: 
Sri Srinivas, too, swore by the goddess Lakshmi that he had seen the parting of the Arabian 
sea; and by the time the detectives got to Mrs Quereshi, they were utterly unnerved, because 
they knew that it was impossible for the men to have cooked up the same story together. 
Mishal's mother, the wife of the great banker, told the same story in her own words. 'Believe 
don't believe, ' she finished emphatically, 'but what my eyes have seen my tongue repeats. ' 
Goosepimply CID men attempted the third degree: 'Listen, Sarpanch, don't shit from your 
mouth. So many were there, nobody saw these things. Already the drowned bodies are floating 
to shore, swollen like balloons and stinking like hell. If you go on lying we will take you and 
stick your nose in the truth. ' 
'You can show me whatever you want, ' Sarpanch Muhammed Din told his interrogators. 
'But I still saw what I saw. ' (Rushdie, Verses, pp. 504-5) 
Typical of much of his treatment of the miraculous, Rushdie is at pains to unsettle an 
overtly materialistic interpretation of religious events. 30 From the defence of the 
MCC's supernatural gifts in Midnight's Children, through the clairvoyance of the 
police chief Talvar Ulhaq in Shame, to the physical transformation of Saladin 
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Chamcha in The Satanic Verses, Rushdie provides a balance of realist and 
metaphysical evidence that dilutes materialist interpretations and leaves the spiritual 
world intact as the reality of others. Thus the CID men are confronted with the fact 
that 'it was impossible for the men to have cooked up the same story together', an 
evidential detail that binds them into a 'goosepimply' half-world somewhere between 
the material and the metaphysical. By creating such ambiguity, Rushdie also evokes 
his literary transcendent in a situation that must alternate its reasoning between 
contextual inside and spiritual outside. 
Contrary to Franqois' argument, the Ayesha episode is Rushdie's attempt to 
dialectically move beyond any form of reductionism into an aesthetic transcendent 
which affirms the material, but also 'transcends' it in a religious moment which is, 
because of its strangeness, 'beyond dogma'. 31 The magic realism of Rushdie's writing 
is an arena for the dialectical encounter between radically different worlds, yet the 
ground rules for the performance of the dialectic seem to be a belief that the material 
and transcendent must be in equal balance for the synthesis to be a non-oppressive 
one. 32 Even in the last chapter of The Satanic Verses, which Frangois imagines as 
driving the last nail into the coffin of faith, there are voices that preserve the 
metaphysical/material blend essential to resist repressive hegemonic poles. One such 
voice is that of the poet Bhupen, who in defence against Swatilekha's theory of 'grand 
narratives' protests that religion should not be reduced to a simple ideological tyranny: 
But these narratives are being manipulated by the theocracy and various political elements in 
an entirely retrogressive way. ' Bhupen said: 'We can't deny the ubiquity of faith. If we write in 
such a way as to pre-judge such belief as in some way deluded or false, then are we not guilty 
of elitism, of imposing our world-view on the massesT Swatilekha was scornful. 'Battle lines 
are being drawn up in India today, ' she cried. 'Secular versus religious, the light versus the 
dark. Better you choose which side you are on. ' (Rushdie, Verses, p. 537) 
Swatilekha's either/or positioning is exactly what Rushdie assaults throughout The 
Satanic Verses. Bhupen's argument is that religion is not an unwelcome bolt-on extra 
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to a natural secularism, but is the reality of Indian culture and psychology, a point 
which Rushdie repeatedly makes in Shame. 33 Bhupen's positioning against the 
aggressive dichotornisation proposed by Swatilekha aligns itself with Rushdie's 
aversion to monologism and turns the last chapter away from the anti-idealism 
proposed by Franqois. Even events such as the impending death of Saladin's father, 
which draws Saladin back into the world of his original cultural and national roots, 
directly evoke sentiments that cannot be wholly reduced to socio-economic factors or 
examples of national situation: 
Salahuddin [ ... ] marvelled, also, at how beautifully everyone behaved in the presence of the dying man: the young spoke to him intimately about their lives, as if reassuring him that life 
itself was invincible, offering him the rich consolation of being a member of the great 
procession of the human race, - while the old evoked the past, so that he knew that nothing 
was forgotten, nothing lost; that in spite of the years of self-imposed sequestration he remained 
joined to the world. Death brought out the best in people; it was good to be shown - 
Salahuddin realized - that this, too, was what human beings were like: considerate, loving, 
even noble. We are still capable of exaltation, he thought in a cclebratory mood; in spite of 
everything, we can still transcend. (Rushdie, Verses, p. 527) 
Remembering Rushdie's definition of the transcendent as 'the sense of being more 
than oneself, of being in some way joined to the whole of life', an experience which 
he also speculates as occurring at the moment of death, we can read Saladin's 
ponderings on death as significant within Rushdie's artistic philosophy. Saladdin 
perceives a sense of holism and community, an ability to 'transcend' the ideological 
apparatus in which human identity is frequently imprisoned. Again, I repeat my 
contention that this emphasis on transcendence does not mean a dismissal of the 
significance of the material and the social. What Rushdie seems uniquely able to 
achieve throughout many of his works, is the emphasis on social and spiritual needs as 
part of the same package, and the transcendent lies between these two poles as a 
potential aesthetic, even moral, bedrock for a balanced dialogicity. 
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What conclusions can we draw about Rushdie's peculiar brand of Islam in The 
Satanic Verses? Firstly, I would argue that Rushdie historicises Islam by describing it 
in the fullness of its human, social and political origins. In so doing, the distance 
established between the human and divine is closed and a genuine dialogue can take 
place between apparently incommensurable worlds. Secondly, religion is a useful 
theme for presenting Rushdie's definition of the transcendent. Through emphasising, 
not necessarily advocating, religious presence, Rushdie counteracts an exclusively 
materialist interpretation of his work and indicates that material considerations to a 
certain degree always involve metaphysical judgementS. 34 Thirdly, Rushdie wants to 
demarcate the religious urge in general from fundamentalist forms of faith in which the 
church and the state merge. His novels are by no means antagonistic to all faith, only 
towards faith that imprisons the dialogic process. What unites all three positions is not 
any latent association with negative theology. Instead, Rushdie tends more towards 
affirmative religion, for he sees the ideas of god and metaphysics as vital processes of 
realising social projects in metanarrative ideas. Without the spiritual, Rushdie appears 
to say, materialism would become too inhuman and without the material, the spiritual 
would become too purist. 
The fact that all the Islamic passages in the novel are dreamed by the 
psychologicaUy deteriorating Gibreel Farishta, may attract the charge of over- 
interpretation to my basic arguments. Couldn't it be said, as many have, that the 
dreams of angelic status suffered by Gibreel. - dreams that lead to his suicide - are 
more especially about the fragmentation of the migrant psychology than a re- 
exploration of Islamic history? Certainly the confusion Gibreel experiences as divine 
messenger, plus the way that his cinematic background distorts his encounters with 
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Mahound, all suggest the output of a delusional mind. Yet Gibreel seems to represent 
more than purely his migrant disintegration. 
Just as Gibreel and Saladin's respective roles of angel and devil are shown to be 
far from watertight, thus denying the schismatic separation of good and evil, so 
Gibreel's dreams disallow the detachment of faith from those who practice it. Rushdie 
has said that the intention behind the dream sequences 'is not to vilify or "disprove' 
Islam, but to portray a soul in crisis, to show how the loss of God can destroy a man's 
fife' (see Rushdie, Homelwxfs, p. 399). Rather than make an assault upon faith, 
Rushdie indicates that his goal is an insertion of the human into the religious without 
the human becoming the opponent of the religious. Remembering that Rushdie sees 
migrancy as a common human condition, Gibreel seems to have the role of writing 
migrancy into religion, making faith more universal by reinvestigating its humanity. 35 
Thus Gibreel's dreams are able to attain a relevance apart from the confines of his 
specific visions. It is, in fact, because of Gibreel's dreams that the novel is able to 
revalue religion by demonstrating faith as part of a human spirituality rather than being 
imposed on humans from without. In this technique of contextualising the religious, 
Rushdie saw little that was offensive: 
The odd thing is that I didn't think it was any kind of disrcspecL In fact I thought of it as the 
opposite, as a way of making accessible and human something that vms otherwise 
inaccessible and remote. Formulaic if you like. Putting it in a modem language, I think, was 
just a way of rethinking it, and clearly rethinking it was one of those things that I chose to 
do. (Rushdie, 'Interview', p. 62) 
Rushdie's 'rethinking' of Islam transfers religion from the absolute to the 
comprehensible; thus, by projecting Islamic history through Gibreel's dreams, the 
human and the fallible are accepted as participants in religion both at its source and in 
its subsequent practice. Though Rushdie is certainly on no proselytising mission, his 
rewriting of Wan& history in Ae Satmic Verses strives towards a dialogic style that 
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asserts the importance of materiality and spirituality as a total package in forming a 
humane politics that understands its own limits. I have chosen to focus exclusively on 
Rushdie in my last chapter, because I believe that he, unlike many so-called 
postmodem authors, affirms a brand of spirituality that is firmly linked to the material 
world and the human, unlike the negative brand of theology that emerges from the 
metaphysical pursuit of alterity. His specialist sense of aesthetic transcendence does 
not seek to defer all meaning and render all things unstable under an ineffable 
difference. Instead, Rushdie seeks to ground his work in a dialogic play that affirms 
the necessity of spiritual and material needs as essential to the relevance and politics 
of that play. 
If Rushdie is so keen on resisting the monologic, it might be argued that I am 
accrediting his work with a closure that he purposefully resists. I certainly concede 
that Rushdie is hostile to making meaning an ideological hostage set apart from 
change and fluidity. To strike a balance with Rushdie's fragments and multiplicities, 
however, we must do justice to his equal tendency towards confirming the necessity of 
acts of closure in narrative. In Midnight's Children Saleem's reflection that 
'Everything has shape, if you look for it. There is no escape from form' (Rushdie, 
Midnight, p. 226), comments on the way that Rushdie sees narrative and society locked 
into a continual act of developing forms and closures which give the world the shape 
of reality. This idea is also developed in Shame, most vividly illustrated in the 
influential narratives manufactured by Bariamma, Raza Hyder's grandmother and 
overseer of Bilquis Hyder's infidelity. The social myths that she spins are not mere 
stories to be responded to, but are somehow bound up with the creation of new social 
realities: 
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such stories, were the glue that held the clan together, binding the generations in webs of 
whispered secrets. Her story altered at firstý in the rctellings, but finally it scttled down, and 
after that nobody, neither teller nor listener, would tolerate any deviation from the hallowed, 
sacred text. This was when Bilquis knew that she had become a member of the family; in the 
sanctification of her tale lay initiation, kinship, blood. 'The recounting of histories, ' Raza 
told his wife, 'is for us a rite of blood. ' (Rushdie, Shame, pp. 76-7) 
Bariamma's stories transform themselves from being evolutionary narratives to being 
kinds of social scripture, reference points by which the individual is able to find wider 
location in a social tnilieu. Though there is undoubtedly a hint of begemonic threat 
behind 'the hallowed, sacred text', Rushdie makes clear that social reality, in this case a 
family unit, is closed by specific acts of narration that become indistinguishable from 
actual material and cultural conditions. Moreover, while Rushdie's characters do attest 
to multiplicity and plurality, often they equally insist that closure is a social necessity 
that need not imply the end of social change and cultural possibility. This is realised by 
the mountaineer Allie Cone in 7he Satanic Verses, as she understands that her mystical 
encounter on Everest, an experience beyond all forms of representation, is in 
inadequate basis for living: 
You find the nothingness wrapping you up, like a sound. Non-being. You can't keep it up, of 
course. "Me world rushes in soon enough. What shuts you up is, I think, the sight you've had 
of perfection: why speak if you can't manage perfect thoughts, perfect sentences? It feels like 
a betrayal of what you've been through. But it fades; you accept that certain compromises, 
closures, are required if you're to continue. (Rushdie, Verses, p. 296) 
Significantly, the act of closure here represents movement and temporality rather than 
a narrative imprisomnent. Following her negative epiphany, Allie links 'compromises, 
closures' with the need to progress, the need to engage the world as it 'rushes in'. 
What Allie, Saleem. and Bariamma establish is that social engagement is an 
impossibility without an active centralisation of meaning. To be within a closed 
meaning does not axiomatically petrify reality's fluid shapes, though that is a danger. 
Rather, narrative and meaning have to have a certain centripetal force to provide the 
interface between language and decisive social action. 
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If we move to Rushdie's last novel, The Moor's Last Sigh, we can see the 
more visible links between Rushdie's acceptance of narrative closure and ethical 
responsibility. We saw in the case of Kurt Vonnegut how the mortal finality of death 
presents itself as an ethical confrontation. Similarly, The Aloor's Last Sigh is a novel 
that uses death to demonstrate that meaning and narrative do have a very definite 
terminus in physical mortality, yet this end increases responsibility to the way that we 
use narratives. Like Saleem in Midnight's Children, the narrator of The Moor's Last 
Sigh knots narrative and existence together in very concrete bonds. The pages of the 
Moor's narrative litter the route by which he has escaped from his imprisonment in 
Vasco Miranda's fortress. The implication is that the end of the novel will be the 
moment when his murderous pursuers, who are following his literary trail, discover 
his whereabouts and end his life. Thus the novel is essentially a mortal script: the 
narrative's progression eats into the very life of the narrator. As the narrative extends 
its hold over the Moor's existence, he speculates increasingly on the fragility of the 
self and its relation to meaning. At the beginning of Chapter Four when Moraes 
ponders the strain of his asthmatic attempts to sleep, he equates his Being with the 
breath that onlyjust sustains his life: 
I am what breathes. I am what began long ago with an exhaled cry, what will conclude when a 
glass held to my lips remains clear. It is not thinking makes us so, but air. Suspiro ergo sunt. I 
sigh, therefore I am. The Latin as usual tells us the truth: suspirare = sub, below, + spirare, 
verb, to breathe. 
Suspiro: I under breathe. 
In the beginning and unto the end was and is the lung and beyond the airless, 
silent void. 36 
The Moor's revision of Descartes realigns Being with respiration, with the fragility of 
the lung which is always under-breathing, hovering over its own collapse and the glass 
that will remain clear. The emphasis on mortality, however, is not the signal for a 
subjection to despair. Rushdie's preoccupation, similar to that contained in Derrida's 
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The Gift of Death, is in distinguishing our uniqueness, our individuality, because of 
our irreplaceable relationship with mortality. And like Derrida again, Rushdie extends 
the consciousness of mortality into moral responsibility. Thus the Moor realises that 
the 'presence' of death offers a demand on his, and our, responsibility: 
A sigh isnI just a sigh. We inhale the world and breathe out meaning. While we can. While we 
can. (Rushdie, Moor's, p. 54) 
The Moor's ethical statement moves from the individual lung to the collective breath. 
Death, one of Rushdie's 'transcendent' moments, moves from personal implication to 
collective ethics by establishing responsibility for the meanings that we create and 
'breathe out' into the world. Thus, throughout the novel, the Moor creates mottoes 
which unite the solitary responsibility towards life with the expectations of immincrit 
demise: 'I must live until I die' (Rushdie, Moor's, p. 169), 'So you made it today. Will 
you still be here tomorrow? ' (Rushdie, Moor's, p. 340). Under the conscious mortality 
of the narrator, the text becomes framed in the demise of the source and the existence 
of the text. This awareness is extended to reader responsibility by the recognition that 
our reading is enacted by the meanings that we produce under the recognition of 
death. Under the perspective of death, The Moor's Last Sigh attests to the need for 
closure in a finite existence, the requirement for us to possess meaning while we have 
the breath to execute our responsibility. Significantly, it is in The Moor's Last Sigh 
that we see moments where the pluralistic and open philosophy of postmodemity 
seems to attract direct criticism, or at least the suggestion that it contains its own 
world of crimes. Most prominently, the Moor considers the multi-dimensional and 
protean Uma Sarasvati to be a questioning of his secular pluralism: 
It did not fail to occur to me - indeed, for a time it occupied most of my waking thoughts - 
that what had happened was, in a way, a defeat for the pluralistic philosophy on which we had 
all been raised. For in the matter of Uma Sarasvati it had been the pluralist Uma, with her 
multiple selves, her highly inventive commitment to the infinite malleability of the real, her 
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modernistically provisional sense of truth, who had turned out to be the bad egg[j (Rushdie, 
Moor's, p. 272) 
The manipulative opportunism of Uma raises the possibility that postmodcrn plurality 
is not an intrinsically more benign way of interacting with the world, but still stands or 
falls upon the closures it makes within its local areas of performance. By the time of 
the writing of The Moor's Last Sigh, Rushdie appears to be less optimistic about the 
postmodcm sensibility and more engaged with the issue of necessary closure that has 
always been important in his work. He by no means recommends overbearing 
narratives as political solutions, but the dialogic process in his writing has always 
implied that the clash of narratives is as much, if not more, a case of repackaging 
foundations as accepting the absence of foundations. 
Through the application of the theme of death in his novels, Rushdie not only 
maintains the links with physical existence and metaphysical awareness that we have 
noticed throughout this chapter, but also directs our attentions to the responsibility we 
bear in generating meaning. Saladin Chamcha's devilish transformation in The 
Satanic Verses, resulting from the descriptive power of racist Britons, potently urges 
us to look at the nature of our metaphors and narratives. Meaning in Rushdie's novels 
does celebrate play and hybridity, but equally recognises that the things that we say 
and think frequently determine how society grounds its sense of reality. This is not to 
say that Rushdie's definition of self is of an unlimited creative power; this would be 
the subtext of the postmodern subject that I find most questionable. Rushdie moves 
outside postmodemism by insisting on the presence of different realities in definite 
social, political and spiritual conditions. Our narratives are in incessant dialogue with 
these conditions and we must simultaneously accept the roots of our own dialogic 
voice and the responsibilities of our contribution. 
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It is unfortunate that Rushdie's constant interaction with theological ideas, 
religious history and mythical archetypes has been so often conflated with the 
postmodem project of assaulting metanarratives. By fixating on Rushdie as an 
iconoclast, much of the genuine political power of his spiritual content is overlooked. 
Rushdie's deepening relationship with Islam is etched within the theme and fabric and 
his novels, especially in his attempt to weld the religious and the material into a 
distinct whole. Moreover, it has always seemed important to Rushdie to dismiss the 
simplicities spoken concerning religion in general. He has always pointed out that the 
West, in its obsessive demonisation of Islamic fundamentalism, has overlooked the 
sheer varieties of tolerant, pluralistic and philosophical Islam that exist throughout the 
world. Few critics have seen Rushdie's use of Islamic motifs as a celebration of the 
Muslim community itself in all its shapes and contours. A notable exception is Feroza 
Jussawala, who claims that Rushdie embraces Islam in both his form and philosophy, 
though an Islam of the more fluid and self-questioning post-Mughal traditions. 37 
Jussawala goes on to argue that Islam's plural and radical traditions question whether 
we are right to position Rushdie's characters purely within the status of postcolonial, 
hybridised subject; this is a western appropriation of Indian historical experience. On 
the basis that 'migration and hybridisation are not just conditions of recent 
postcoloniality', Jussawala concludes that Rushdie's evident parallels with the dastan, 
a 'long-winded stream of consciousness tale' from Urdu and Persian traditions, 
combined with a deep sense of problematic faith, makes The Satanic Verses a novel 
fundamentally located within Islam (Jussawala, Tastan', p. 60). Rushdie's abiding 
attachment to the spiritual life of India and the Middle East is in many ways a 
challenge to secular deficiencies and the overlooking of cultural reality. Jussawala 
contends that 'Postmodern indeterminacy can [. I result in dangerous 
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misinterpretation when authority is wrested from both the author and his/her cultural 
location' (Jussawala, 'Dastan', p. 71). Rushdie has been a victim of this sort of 
appropriation. Though he has expressed sympathies for postmodern ideas, he is 
ultimately distinct from the projects of that camp, though the social force of his work 
can be put in parallel with other authors labelled as postmodern. Rushdie's novels are 
more akin to E. L. Doctorow's Ragtime and Ishmael Reed's Mumbo, Jumbo rather than 
the works of Pynchon or Auster, not least because they refuse to transfer social variety 
and change into aporetic encounter. Rushdie's novels retain a strong sense of presence 
and reality, and his use of religious themes elucidates what he understands as human 
spirituality's enactment within a material world. 
In many of the novels considered in this thesis, the overwhelming tendency has 
been to transform alterity, indeterminacy and difference into transcendental principles 
that exercise total control over the interpretative possibilities of the text. Implicit in this 
process has been a tendency to place negativity into models of religious language and 
religious iconography - an inevitable result once alterity becomes the centre of the 
author's fictional theme and aesthetic content. The consequence of all this is a 
dishonesty at the heart of the postmodern project. The problem is that while 
postmodernism claims itself as a pluralised philosophy that disrupts metaphysical ideas, 
it is actually a quite limited philosophy that thrives on some of the most metaphysical 
ideas of all history. By effectively creating a negative theology that is unable to have 
confidence in affirmative ideas, postmodernism creates for itself a sublimity that is at 
best idealistic and at worst socially bankrupt. 
What Salman Rushdie gives us is an alternative to combining religion and 
indeterminacy into transcendentalism. Rushdie merges fragmentation and faith to 
produce not an absolute theology of absence, but a material theology of dialogue. 
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Rushdie shows how the metaphysical is part of the total material condition of being 
human and of being part of a society. As such, Rushdie steers clear of pure conceptions 
of absence to establish instead a complex material world that is fixed in a dialogue 
between the material and the spiritual (or psychological) and not the present and the 
absent. In the latter dialogue, which postmodernism tends to promote, absence is always 
the winning binary, or at least the guiding figure. In the Rushdean dialogue, the aim is 
not philosophical detachment, but a total involvement in the realities of a multi-faith, 
multi-ideological world. Rushdie's religious tendency is ultimately 'affirmative' because 
for him metaphysics are not something to be deconstructed (which leads back to a 
transcendent brand of metaphysics), but something to be accepted as the essential fabric 
of existence both material and spiritual. 
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Conclusion 
Throughout this thesis I have attempted to demonstrate how postmodemism is 
profoundly metaphysical in the nature of its language and the perspective of its 
philosophy. Of course, the fact that postmodern theory has been up and running for 
nearly thirty years means that I have had to leave many theoretical and fictional stones 
untumed. It may be argued that I have focused exclusively on a certain sublime 
postmodernism that is rather unrepresentative of the full scale of postmodem thought, 
particularly its Jamesonian elements that concentrate on postmodernity as a social 
effect rather than a conceptual project. With postmodernity I have few problems. The 
world has seen awesome technological, political and social changes since the last war 
and I regard postmodernity as no more than a label for these concrete effects. 
Postmodemism, however, is a step beyond social description into a pure metanarrative 
of alterity. In this metanarrative, the dominant models are metaphysical and 
theological, though these are masked by an anti-foundational discourse. Again, I 
accept that postmodem theory is aware of the inescapability of the metanarrative. Yet 
implicit in its arguments is the suggestion that the narratives we use to define our 
reality are not the whole picture and that there remains an aporetic deposit that judges 
all that we say and do when it is consciously determined. 
The alternative to postmodern discourse is a subtle shift in perspective, though 
a rather traditional one. By accepting metanarratives as competing presences free from 
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the judgements of a reified alterity, we can keep narrative linked to material reality in 
a way that postmodernism cannot. For postmodernism is at heart a transcendental 
theology. In fact, postmodernism's sceptical relation to the law and the metanarrative 
means that its has not the focus on praxis that most major religions contain. In the end, 
postmodernism has found trouble accepting itself as an historical phase, even though 
it should have no problems determining itself so. As the potency of its thought starts 
to wane, we wait to see how reality will perceive itself in the near future. 
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